Open letter to Jeffrey Sachs on his position regarding Russian war on Ukraine

Open letter to Jeffrey Sachs on his position regarding Russian war on Ukraine

Photo: / palinchak
20 March 2023
Dear Dr. Sachs,

We are a group of economists, including many Ukrainians, who were appalled by your statements on the Russian war against Ukraine and were compelled to write this open letter to address some of the historical misrepresentations and logical fallacies in your line of argument. Following your repeated appearances on the talk shows of one of the chief Russian propagandists, Vladimir Solovyov (apart from calling to wipe Ukrainian cities off the face of the earth, he called for nuclear strikes against NATO countries), we have reviewed the op-eds on your personal website and noticed several recurring patterns. In what follows, we wish to point out these misrepresentations to you, alongside our brief response.

Pattern #1: Denying the agency of Ukraine

In your article “The New World Economy” from January 10, 2023, you write: “It was, after all, the US attempt to expand NATO to Georgia and Ukraine that triggered the wars in Georgia (in 2010) and in Ukraine (2014 until today).” Similarly, in your article “What Ukraine Needs to Learn from Afghanistan” from February 13, 2023, you write: “The proxy war in Ukraine began nine years ago when the US government backed the overthrow of Ukraine’s president Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych’s sin from the US viewpoint was his attempt to maintain Ukraine’s neutrality despite the US desire to expand NATO to include Ukraine (and Georgia).”

Let us set the record straight on the historical events from 2013-2014, at which you hint in the aforementioned misinformative statements: The Euromaidan had nothing to do with NATO, nor the US. Initial protest was sparked by Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement, despite said agreement passing the Ukrainian Parliament with an overwhelming majority and enjoying broad support among the Ukrainian population. Yanukovich’s regime’s choice to respond by brutally beating peaceful protesters (mostly students) on the night of November 30, 2013, only further alienated the population and intensified the protests. After the adoption of a set of laws forbidding the freedom of press and assembly (commonly termed the “dictatorship laws”) by Yanukovych in January 2014, the Euromaidan turned into a broader movement against government abuse of power and corruption, police brutality, and human rights violation – which we now refer to as the Revolution of Dignity. Ukraine’s accession to NATO was never a goal of this movement. Hence, your attempts to trace the beginning of the war to “NATO” are historically inaccurate. Furthermore, treating Ukraine as a pawn on the US geo-political chessboard is a slap in the face to millions of Ukrainians who risked their lives during the Revolution of Dignity.

Pattern #2: NATO provoked Russia

You repeatedly emphasize that the expansion of NATO provoked Russia (e.g., “NATO should not enlarge, because that threatens the security of Russia,” from your interview to Isaac Chotiner at the New Yorker from February 27, 2023).

We want to alert you to a few facts. In 1939, it was the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that invaded Poland. In 1940, it was the Soviet Union that invaded the Baltic countries. In 1940, it was the Soviet Union that annexed parts of Romania. In 1956, it was the Soviet Union that invaded Hungary. In 1968, it was the Soviet Union that invaded Czechoslovakia. Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Hungary or Czechoslovakia did not invade Russia or the Soviet Union. No threat emanated from these countries. But these countries were attacked by the USSR/Russia. This is why these countries wanted to join NATO. Since joining NATO, none of these countries have been attacked by Russia again.

Just like these countries, Ukraine (whose military budget was a mere $2.9 bn in 2013, prior to Russia’s military aggression against it) wants to have security and peace. It does not want to be attacked again by Russia (whose military budget in 2013 stood at $68 bn). Given that Ukraine’s agreement to give up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for security “assurances” from the US, UK and Russia (!) did nothing to prevent Russian aggression, currently the only credible guarantee is NATO membership.

We also want to draw your attention to the fact that Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership in response to Russian aggression, and yet Russia did not complain about these two countries joining NATO. You do not seem to be particularly concerned about these two countries joining NATO either. This differential treatment of Ukraine vs. Finland/Sweden legitimizes “spheres of influence,” a notion that seems appropriate for the age of empires and not for the modern era.

Pattern #3: Denying Ukraine’s sovereign integrity

In your interview to Democracy Now! on December 6, 2022, you said: “So, my view is that […] Crimea has been historically, and will be in the future, effectively, at least de facto Russian.”

We wish to remind you that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has violated the Budapest memorandum (in which it promised to respect and protect Ukrainian borders, including Crimea), the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (which Russia signed with Ukraine in 1997 with the same promises), and, according to the order of the UN International Court of Justice, it violated international law. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia was supposed to protect peace, but instead Russia violated the foundational principle of the UN (Article 2 of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). Indeed, the entire world security architecture after WWII is based on the assumption that country borders (regardless of historical background) cannot be changed by force in order to preserve peace, as Kenya UN ambassador highlighted in his famous speech. If a nuclear power is allowed to annex territories of another country as it wishes, then no country in the world can feel safe.

By insisting that Russia can keep Crimea, you are making an implicit assumption that if Russia is allowed to do that, it will leave the rest of Ukraine in peace. However, this is demonstrably not true, as Russia’s “de facto” ownership of Crimea over 2014–2022 did nothing to preclude its current aggression. The aim of Putin is to “ultimately solve the Ukrainian question,” i.e. to completely destroy Ukraine and annex its entire territory. Thus, by annexing Crimea he did not “restore the historical justice” — he just prepared a springboard for further military attacks on Ukraine. Therefore, restoring Ukraine’s control over its entire territory is crucial not only for the security of Ukraine but also for the security of all other nations (by reinforcing the lesson that aggressors should not get away with land grabs!).

Also, you state that “Russia certainly will never accept NATO in Ukraine.” For your information, the UN Charter emphasizes the self-determination of peoples as a key principle. It’s not for Russia to decide what alliances or unions Ukraine will or will not join. Ukraine has its own democratically-elected government (not a dictatorship, like in Russia), and this government, after consultation with Ukrainian people, will decide whether Ukraine will or will not join NATO. Likewise, NATO countries have every right to decide for themselves whom they would like to welcome in their alliance.

Pattern #4: Pushing forward Kremlin’s peace plans

In the aforementioned article “What Ukraine Needs to Learn from Afghanistan,” you write: “The basis for peace is clear. Ukraine would be a neutral non-NATO country. Crimea would remain home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, as it has been since 1783. A practical solution would be found for the Donbas, such as a territorial division, autonomy, or an armistice line.”

While your suggestion is perfectly aligned with that of Russian propagandists, it leaves unanswered the key question from the Ukrainian perspective: Based on what evidence do you trust a serial warmonger, who has stated on multiple occasions that Ukraine does not exist, to be satisfied with Crimea and Donbas and not try to occupy the entire country? Until you find a convincing answer to this question, we would kindly ask you to refer to the 10-point peace plan proposed by President Zelensky and fully backed up by the Ukrainian people. Regurgitating Kremlin’s “peace plans” would only prolong the suffering of Ukrainian people.

Writing that if Ukraine offered Putin Crimea and Donbas in December 2021 or March 2022 then “the fighting would stop, Russian troops would leave Ukraine, and Ukraine’s sovereignty would be guaranteed by the UN Security Council and other nations” is just wishful thinking. Peace negotiations in early 2022 broke down not because of nonexistent US intervention but because Russia demanded unconditional capitulation of Ukraine (and it still does!). Remember that Russia’s goals in Ukraine were “demilitarization and denazification”. What “denazification” means was explained by one of Putin’s political advisors, Timofey Sergeitsev, in his piece “What Russia should do with Ukraine?” There, he argued for the brutal destruction of the Ukrainian nation involving killing millions of people and “re-educating” others. Russians already started implementing these plans in the occupied territories of Ukraine.

We suggest that you read the entire text by Sergeitsev’s, but a few passages clearly show what he means: “a country that is being denazified cannot possess sovereignty,” “Denazification will inevitably include de-ukrainization — the rejection of the large-scale artificial inflation of the ethnic component in the self-identification of the population of the historical Malorossiya and Novorossiya territories, which was started by the Soviet authorities”, “denazification of Ukraine means its inevitable de-europeanization”, [denazification implies…] “the seizure of educational materials and the prohibition of educational programs at all levels that contain Nazi ideological guidelines” (in his article, Sergeitsev repeatedly calls Ukrainians “Nazis”).

You seem to be unaware that, consistent with this rhetoric, Russia commits horrendous war crimes as documented by the UN and many others. We fail to discern any indication of a genuine interest in peace from the ongoing Russian atrocities.

We urge you to reevaluate your stance on thinking that Russia is interested in goodfaith peace talks.

Pattern #5. Presenting Ukraine as a divided country

In “What Ukraine Needs to Learn from Afghanistan,” you also state that “The US overlooked two harsh political realities in Ukraine. The first is that Ukraine is deeply divided ethnically and politically between Russia-hating nationalists in western Ukraine and ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.”

This statement echoes a Russian political technology first applied during 2004 presidential elections and still used by Russians to justify the “denazification” of Ukraine today. We encourage you to take a look at the actual empirical facts and history.

In 1991, all regions of Ukraine voted for independence. Including Crimea.

According to the 2001 Census (the latest data on self-identified ethnicity available for Ukraine), Ukrainian population is the majority in all the regions of Ukraine, except for Crimea. And when we speak about Crimea, we should ask why it has the ethnic composition which it has. It has a Russian majority because of a series of genocides and deportations starting from its first occupation by Russia in 1783 and as recently as 1944 when Crimean Tatars were deported to remote parts of the Soviet Union. Crimea’s indigenous population was deported, killed, and replaced by Russians. A similar tactic was used by Russia during its several genocides of Ukrainians — for example, during the Great Famine of 1932–33, Russians arrived to live in the houses of Ukrainians who died of famine. Russia is using the same tactics of population replacement today, in the current war: it deports the Ukrainian population, forcefully adopts Ukrainian children or “re-educates” (brainwashes) them after forcefully parting them with their families.

Besides cleansing Ukrainian and other indigenous populations, Russia used “softer” tactics, such as Russification, i.e. discouraging the learning and usage of the Ukrainian language in all spheres. Russification has been ongoing for centuries. Its instruments have been quite diverse — from “mixing” people by sending Ukrainians to work to Russia and sending Russians to study or work in Ukraine, to making it close to impossible for Ukrainian speakers to enter universities, to representing Ukrainian language and culture as backward and inferior to the “great Russian culture,” to stealing Ukrainian cultural heritage (e.g. only now world museums started to correctly identify Ukrainian artists presented by Russia as Russian, and hundreds of thousands of artifacts have looted from Ukrainian museums from 2014 and especially during the last year). Thus, the acute language discussions are a natural response to Russia’s historical attempts to suppress any restoration of rights of the Ukrainian language. Despite this history of oppression, Ukrainians have been gradually switching to Ukrainian, and the Russian full-scale invasion intensified this process.

Recent polls show that irrespective of language or location, Ukrainians overwhelmingly (80%) reject territorial concessions to Russia. Polls also show that 85 percent of Ukrainians identify themselves above all as citizens of Ukraine, as opposed to residents of their region, representatives of an ethnic minority, or some other identifier. This is hardly possible in a divided country.

In summary, we welcome your interest in Ukraine. However, if your objective is to be helpful and to generate constructive proposals on how to end the war, we believe that this objective is not achieved. Your interventions present a distorted picture of the origins and intentions of the Russian invasion, mix facts and subjective interpretations, and propagate the Kremlin’s narratives. Ukraine is not a geopolitical pawn or a divided nation, Ukraine has the right to determine its own future, Ukraine has not attacked any country since gaining its independence in 1991. There is no justification for the Russian war of aggression. A clear moral compass, respect of international law, and a firm understanding of Ukraine’s history should be the defining principles for any discussions towards a just peace.

Kind regards,

Bohdan Kukharskyy, City University of New York
Anastassia Fedyk, University of California, Berkeley
Yuriy Gorodnichenko, University of California, Berkeley
Ilona Sologoub, VoxUkraine NGO
Tatyana Deryugina, University of Illinois
Tania Babina, Columbia University
James Hodson, AI for Good Foundation
Tetyana Balyuk, Emory University
Robert Eberhart, Stanford University
Oskar Kowalewski, IESEG School of Management, France
Jerzy Konieczny, Wilfrid Laurier University and International Centre for Economic Analysis
Mishel Ghassibe, CREi, UPF and BSE
Garry Sotnik, Stanford University
Yangbo Du, INNOVO Group of Companies
Stan Veuger, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Pavel Kuchar, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London
Moshe Hazan, Tel Aviv University
Fabio Ghironi, University of Washington
Harry Pei, Department of Economics, Northwestern University
Matilde Bombardini, UC Berkeley
Oleg Gredil, Tulane University
Andriy Shkilko, Wilfrid Laurier University
Oleksandra Betliy, Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting
Santiago Sanchez-Pages, King’s College London
Vadim Elenev, Johns Hopkins University
Dariia Mykhailyshyna, University of Bologna
Valeria Fedyk, London Business School
Grigory Franguridi, University of Southern California
Andrii Bilovusiak, London School of Economics
Ioannis Kospentaris, Virginia Commonwealth University
Benjamin Moll, London School of Economics
Lubo Litov, Price College of Business, OU
Pavel Bacherikov, UC Berkeley Haas
Robert Scott Richards, Managing Director, CrossBoundary
Samuel C. Ramer, History Department, Tulane University
Olena Ogrokhina, Lafayette College
Michael Landesmann, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
Matthew Holian, San Jose State University
Petra Sinagl, University of Iowa
Jeanine Miklos-Thal, University of Rochester
Wojciech Kopczuk, Columbia University
Jonathan Meer, Texas A&M University
Tetiana Bogdan, Academy of Financial Management by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine
Mats Marcusson, Retired EC official
Alminas Zaldokas, HKUST
Christian R. Proaño, University of Bamberg, Germany
Michael Weber, University of Chicago
Daniel Spiro, Uppsala University
Hlib Vyshlinsky, Centre for Economic Strategy
Martin Labaj, University of Economics in Bratislava
Jacques Crémer, Toulouse School of Economics
Marc Fleurbaey, Paris School of Economics
Dmitriy Sergeyev, Bocconi University
Oleksandra Moskalenko, London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Olga Pindyuk, Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
Swapnil Singh, Bank of Lithuania
Yevhenii Usenko, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oleksandr Vostriakov, Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman
Julian Reif, University of Illinois
Ernst Maug, University of Mannheim
Olga Shurchkov, Wellesley College
Vladimir Dubrovskiy, CASE Ukraine
Niko Jaakkola, University of Bologna
Anders Olofsgård, SITE/Stockholm School of Economics
Leonid Krasnozhon, Loyola University New Orleans
Jesper Roine, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, SSE
Krassen Stanchev, Sofia University and Institute for Market Economics
Brendan O’Flaherty, Columbia University
Samuel Rosen, Temple University
Francois Joinneau, “Entrepreneurs for Ukraine”/Tuvalu 51
Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Maria Perrotta Berlin, SITE, Stockholm School of Economics
Oleksiy Kryvtsov
Inna Semenets-Orlova, Interregional Academy of Personnel Management
Denis de Crombrugghe, Nazarbayev University
Olena Mykolenko, VN Kharkiv National University
Solomiya Shpak, Kyiv School of Economics
Oleksandr Talavera, University of Birmingham
Kevin Berry, University of Alaska Anchorage
Denys Bondar, Tulane University
Kálmán Mizsei
Artur Doshchyn, University of Oxford
Robert Östling, Stockholm School of Economics
Oleksandr Petryk
Vera Kichanova, King’s College London
Mariia Panga, George Mason University
Oleg Itskhoki, UCLA
Lina Zadorozhnia, Kyiv School of Economics
Dominic Lusinchi, UC Berkeley Extension, instructor (retired)
John S. Earle, George Mason University
Scott Gehlbach, University of Chicago
Konstantin Sonin, University of Chicago
Olena Havrylchyk, University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne
Floyd Zhang, Instacart (previously Stanford)
David Zaikin, Founder of Ukraine Momentum, CEO of Key Elements Group.
Piroska Nagy-Mohacsi, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Szymon Sacher, Columbia University
Iikka Korhonen, Bank of Finland
Sebastian Buhai, SOFI at Stockholm University
Sergei Guriev, Sciences Po, Paris
Gerard Roland, UC Berkeley
Daniel Ershov, University College London School of Management
Denis Ivanov, Corvinus University of Budapest
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Peterson Institute For International Economics
Alexander Rodnyansky, University of Cambridge
Aleksandr Kljucnikov, European Centre for Business Research, Pan-European University, Czechia
Rohan Dutta, McGill University
Nataliia Frantova
Rok Spruk, University of Ljubljana
Bohdan Slavko, JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Oleksandr Shepotylo, Aston University
Andrew Kosenko, Marist College
Bart Lipman, Boston University
Yang Xie, University of California, Riverside
James S. Henry, Global Justice Fellow and Lecturer, Yale University
Jan Fidrmuc, Université de Lille
Michal Zator, University of Notre Dame
Nina Baranchuk, University of Texas at Dallas
Jonathan Schulz, George Mason University
Jakub Steiner, Cerge-Ei and Zurich U
Sergey V. Popov, Cardiff University
Heski Bar-Isaac, University of Toronto
Evan Sadler, Columbia University
Christoph Kronenberg, University Duisburg-Essen
Bart Edes, Professor of Practice, McGill University
Lucan Way, University of Toronto
Jerg Gutmann, University of Hamburg
Andy Semotiuk, President – Centre for Eastern European Democaracy
Hanna Vakhitova, Kyiv School of Economics / Syddansk Universitet
Pedro Romero-Aleman, Universidad San Francisco de Quito
Michał Białek, University of Wrocław
James S. Henry, Global Justice Fellow and Lecturer, Yale University
Nik Gabrovšek,
Rudi Bachmann, University of Notre Dame
Alexander Karaivanov, Simon Fraser University
Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Queen Mary University of London
Hanna Onyshchenko, PhD candidate, University of Michigan
Olivier Coibion, University of Texas at Austin
Tomasz Mickiewicz, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
Andriy Tsapin, National bank of Ukraine
Daniel Heyen, RPTU Kaiserslautern-Landau
Andrey Fradkin, Boston University
Charles Wyplosz, The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Antonio Mele, London School of Economics
Tymofiy Mylovanov, Kyiv School of Economics
Andrii Parkhomenko, University of Southern California
George Loginov, Augustana University
Chris Doucouliagos, Deakin University
Vlad Mykhnenko, Sustainable Urban Development Programme, University of Oxford, UK
Kjeld Schmidt, Copenhagen Business School
Eric Chaney, Institut Montaigne
Ilya Shpitser, Johns Hopkins University
Taras Wolczuk, London School of Economics
Harry de Gorter, Cornell University
Clemens Buchen, WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany
Piotr Arak, Polish Economic Institute
Greg Wright, UC Merced
Mitja Steinbacher, Faculty of law and business studies, Catholic Institute
Karl T. Muth, Booth School of Business, The University of Chicago
Pedro Bento, Texas A&M University
Danilo Guaitoli, New York University
Rick Della
Alex Eble, Columbia University
Michael Tedesco, Ohio University
Victoria Malko, History Department, California State University, Fresno
Carlos Gomez-Lopez, HSBC
James S. Henry, Managing Director, Sag Harbor Group
Chris Doucouliagos, Deakin University
Reuben Kline, Stony Brook University
Daron Acemoglu, MIT
Martin Kahanec, Central European University, CELSI and EUBA
Vadim Marmer, University of British Columbia
James S. Henry, Managing Director, Sag Harbor Group
Germà Bel, Universitat de Barcelona
Marcel Smolka, University of Flensburg
Anton Sukach
Christopher A. Hartwell, Zurich University of Applied Science
Adrien Couturier, LSE
Vladimir Novak, National Bank of Slovakia
Yuki Takahashi, European University Institute
Philippe Gabriel, Avignon Université et Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en didactique éducation et formation
Pauric Brophy, GDSI Limited, Galway, Ireland
Mark V. Pauly, University of Pennsylvania
Garance Genicot, Georgetown university
Vitaly Radsky, UNC Chapel Hill
Rune Jansen Hagen, University of Bergen
Olena Ivus, Queen’s University
Lars Handrich, DIW Econ, Berlin/Germany
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Paris School of Economics
Laszlo Halpern, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Nicolas Gavoille, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
Lyubov Zhyznomirska, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Saint Mary’s University (Canada)
Alex Krumer, Molde University College
Adrian Ivakhiv, University of Vermont
Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway University of London
Cathy Schneider, American University School of International Service
Matthew Pauly, Michigan State University
Florin Bilbiie, University of Cambridge
Irwin Collier, Freie Universität Berlin (ret.)
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford
Timur Kuran, Duke University
Athena Small, University of Virginia
Lena Edlund, Columbia University
Serhii Abramenko, EIEF
Mauricio Drelichman, University of British Columbia
Raymond Riezman, Aarhus University
Igor Masten, University of Ljubljana, School of Economics and Business
Joseph Steinberg, University of Toronto
Hans-Joachim Voth, University of Zurich
Edgar Morgenroth, Dublin City University
Vitaliy Ryabinin, Imperial College London
Anna Nagurney, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Serhiy Stepanchuk, University of Southampton
Piotr Zoch, University of Warsaw and FAME | GRAPE
Colin Rowat, University of Birmingham
Jim Leitzel, University of Chicago
Yevgenii Tymovskyi, Student
William Szuch, UkeTube – Ukrainian Video
Ole Agersnap, Princeton University
Clara E. Dismuke-Greer, Health Economics Resource Center, VA Palo Alto Health Care System
Rick Harbaugh, Indiana University
Margarete Biallas
David Jaeger, University of St Andrews
Germán Gieczewski, Princeton University
Jana Kunicova
Lee Ohanian, UCLA
Andy Zapechelnyuk, University of Edinburgh
Mark E. Schaffer, Heriot-Watt University
Jacopo Mazza, Utrecht University School of Economics
Silvester van Koten, University of Jan Evangelista in Ústí nad Labem (UJEP)
Tetiana Albrecht, Student of MA in Security and Diplomacy, Tel Aviv University
Artem Korzhenevych, TU Dresden, Germany
Paul Klein, Stockholm University
Philip Ushchev, Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Julia Korosteleva, Professor in Business Economics, UCL, UK
Giovanni Caggiano, University of Padua
Sergey Alexeev, The University of Sydney
Pawel Bukowski, University College London
Fabian Lange, McGill University
Paul De Grauwe, London School of Economics
Lorenz Kueng, University of Lugano
Andrei Belyi, University of Eastern Finland
Louis Furmanski, University of Central Okalhoma
Maxim Mironov, IE Business school
Benjamin Hilgenstock, KSE Institute
Elina Ribakova
Elodie Douarin, UCL SSEES
Gabriel Lee, University of Regensburg, Germany
Iryna Stewen, University of Mainz and University of Zurich
David Lambert
Ewa Karwowski, King’s College London
Roman Sheremeta, American University Kyiv
Paul Terdal, Portland-Lviv Sister City Association
Dmytro Hryshko, University of Alberta
Anders Aslund, Stockholm Free World Forum
Tomislav Ladika, Associate Professor of Finance
Iryna Franko
Volodymyr Bilotkach, Purdue University
Daniel Philpott, University of Notre Dame
Ian Gaunt, International Arbitrator
Olha Krupa, Seattle University
Olga Slivko, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
Xavier Jaravel, London School of Economics
Franco Bruni, Bocconi University and ISPI
Paul Knight
Roberton Williams, University of Maryland
Gerhard Riener, University of Southampton
Victoria Hui, University of Notre Dame
Olha Markova
Vita Faychuk, Gustavus Adolphus College
Tetyana Shlikhar, University of Notre Dame
Richard Green, University of Southern California
Mykola Riabchuk, Research Fellow, NIAS
Michael Koziupa, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc., – New Jersey Co-ordinating Council
Douglas Almond, SIPA and Economics
Michal Myck, Centre for Economic Analysis, CenEA
Kevin Costa, Massachusetts Democratic State Committee
Myroslav Marynovych, Ukrainian Catholic University
Györgyike Margit Trautmanné Zsigri
Laada Bilaniuk, University of Washington
Bohdan Kordan, University of Saskatchewan
Victor Rodwin, New York University
Mikhail Galashin, UCLA
David Marples, University of Alberta
Michael Alexeev, Indiana University – Bloomington, IN
Zenon Radewych
John Weiss, Cornell University
Ezekiel Emanuel, Iniversity of Pennsylvania
Ben Fitzhugh, University of Wasington
Peter Zalmayev, Eurasia Democracy Initiative, director
Attila Ratfai, Central European University
Myron Spolsky, Plast Conference
Miklós Vörös
Lukasz Rachel, UCL
Lada Roslycky, Black Trident Consulting Group
Peter Terem, Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica
Lars Svensson, Stockholm School of Economics
Pavel Baev, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
walter gregory kuplowsky, partner – Mitchell Bardyn & Zalucky
Mai’a K Davis Cross, Northeastern University
Mitja Steinbacher, Faculty of Law and Business Studies, Ljubljana
Olivier Simard-Casanova, Economist and data scientist, Aléryon Science
Igor Shevchenko
Ambassador (retired) Allan Mustard, Retired Soviet/Russia specialist, agricultural economist
Laurence Kotlikoff
Christian Moser, Columbia University
Glenn Gibson, University of Ulster
Nataliya Zadorozhna
Talia Zajac, University of Manchester
Danylo Sudyn, Ukrainian Catholic University
Tanya Richardson, Wilfrid Laurier University
Andreas Önnerfors, Linnaeus University, Sweden
Michael J. Orlando, University of Colorado Denver
Dóra Győrffy, Corvinus University of Budapest
Vidvuds Zigismunds Beldavs, Riga Photonics Centre
Claudio Morana, University of Milano-Bicocca
Wlodzimierz Dymarski, PhD, Poznan University of Economics (retired)
Andrey Shulik
Jukka Mäkinen, Estonian Business School
Iryna Dudnyk, British Columbia Institute of Technology
Dasha Safonova
Teng Biao, University of Chicago
Soumya Datta, South Asian University
David Schindler, Tilburg University
Stephenson Strobel, Cornell University
Heiko Pääbo, University of Tartu
Francis Fukuyama, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford
Timothy Frye, Columbia University
Gerald Friedman, Economics Department at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Craig Kennedy
Michael Grinfeld, University of Strathclyde
Austin Starkweather, University of South Carolina
Andriy Danylenko, Pace University
Sergey Ivanov
Andrei Kozyrev
Clément Mangin, Université du Québec à Montréal
Joel Mokyr, Northwestern University
Larry Epstein, McGill University
Susanne Wengle, University of Notre Dame
Michele Boldrin, Joseph G. Hoyt Distinguished University Professor of Economics, Washington University in Saint Louis


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