Ukraine: Results of the Revolution of Dignity. How have the country and the people changed

Introduction

As of 2014 about 6.5 million of people (or 14% of the Ukrainian population[2]) lived in the territories of Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts which are currently occupied. Two years after the military conflict started, 1 788 527 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are officially registered in Ukraine[3]. Generally 22%[4] of Ukrainians residing in the government-controlled areas around the country indicate that tragic events in the East of Ukraine and/or Crimea affected them directly.

Economic crisis followed the military conflict: the inflation index constituted 124.9 in 2014 and 143.3 in 2015[5]. Budget cuts and increase in tariffs for  energy and communal services towards full cost recovery levels affected the living standards of the most vulnerable groups which depend on social transfer payments (particularly, pensioners). As a result 19% of Ukrainians had to save on food as of January-March of 2016 (vs.10% as average for 12 months of 2013), and 32% had enough money for food but had to save on buying clothes and other basic needs (vs. 25% in 2013)[6]. The unemployment rate of economically active population increased from 7.3% in 2013 to 10.3% in the first quarter of 2016[7].

Therefore, the central question of this paper is whether the continuous war and the economic recession of 2014-2016 had led to the deterioration of people’s patriotic enthusiasm that had flourished after the succession of the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014. The broader question is – what changes in the Ukrainian society can be traced two years after the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of the war?

The comparative analysis of the survey data show that a range of social changes had occurred since March 2014. The main transformations in people’s views and attitudes towards institutions, activities, and vectors of country development are outlined below[8].

A rise in national integrity and responsibility

Ukrainian sociologist Iryna Bekeshkina compared 2013-2015 data of annual monitoring surveys from the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences[9] and emphasized the following positive changes in the portrait of Ukrainians: 47% of the adults felt proud to be Ukrainians in 2013 comparing to 67% in 2015; 16% felt themselves responsible for the situation in Ukraine in 2013 comparing to 30% in 2015; 26% felt themselves responsible for the situation in their settlement in 2013, comparing to 41% in 2015.

Only 14% of Ukrainians were optimistic and 32% felt hope about  the future of Ukraine in 2013, while in 2015 these figures increased to 23% and 44% respectively[10]

In March 2016 58% of Ukrainians believed that membership in the EU would be good for Ukraine and 28% disagreed with that comparing to 48% and 43% in December 2013 respectively[4]. These figures remained stable throughout 2014-2016. Therefore, European integration is not a situational changeable choice, but constant value for Ukrainians.

Increasing of civic engagement

In October 2015, 41% of Ukrainians reported rising personal readiness for donation within the last 2 years (vs. 12% who reported decreasing readiness), 33% of Ukrainians reported on increasing readiness to protect their rights, freedom and dignity (vs. 8% of those whose readiness decreased), 22% reported on increasing readiness to volunteer (vs. 12%), 20% reported on increasing readiness to participate in the affairs of local community (vs.12%), 18% reported on increasing readiness to join civil society organizations (vs. 12%)[11].

23% of Ukrainians made donations to charity in 2012, comparing to 41% who did that in 2014, and to 47% in 2015. Such increase is especially significant considering impoverishment of the population as described above in the introduction. At the same time the increase in the share of volunteers during the last 5 years was not such drastic: 10% of Ukrainians volunteered within a year prior to the survey in 2012 and 13% did that in 2015[12].

However, if instead of asking about “volunteering” (which is rather new term for Ukraine and is associated mainly with support to the army) we asked “whether you spend spare time helping others or performing socially useful works”, then 54% of urban citizens confirmed doing so in 2011 comparing to 69% in 2014[13]. According to both abovementioned surveys, the share of volunteers/those who spend spare time helping others or performing socially useful works is the highest among the youth aged below 30 years old.

Unfortunately, civic engagement of Ukrainians is limited mostly to donating money for helping the army and vulnerable groups. Specifically, 65% of those who donated and/or volunteered did that for the Ukrainian army, while others were engaged mainly in helping vulnerable groups of people[12]. The participation in civic activities as tools of citizen interaction with authorities decreased in 2016: 20% of urban citizens participated in at least one of the activities (listed in Graph 1) in 2013 comparing to 14% of such people in 2016[14]. However, there is a huge potential for increasing of citizens’ engagement. The interest towards all activities from the list increased significantly from only 26% of those interested in participation in at least one of activities in 2013 to 48% in 2015. Moreover, the share of those who would like to know more about at least one of the tools of interaction with the authorities increased from 26% in 2013 to 31% in 2016.

Rising of trust

The trust to compatriots increased from 45% in 2013 to 52% in 2015. As for the social institutions, the highest trust is observed towards volunteers (59% in 2015), followed by church (50%), Army (22% in 2013 vs 41% in 2015) and civil society organizations (18% in 2013 and 34% in 2015)[10]. “Volunteers” were added in the list of social institutions only in 2015 because of large-scale involvement of people in helping army through volunteers. As of September 2014, 30% of the population of Ukraine supported army through volunteers.[15]

The trust to mass media decreased from 37% in 2013 to 19% in 2015[10], but this can be viewed as a positive trend reflecting increase of understanding that owners of the main TV channels are politically connected and therefore may produce some biased information – TV remains the main source of news and information on current events for the majority of Ukrainians[16].

The trust to authorities is still low in 2016, although it is higher than in 2013, before the start of the Revolution of Dignity. The data is presented in Graph 2: 23% of Ukrainians trusted local authorities in June 2016 (vs. 16% in September 2013), 16% trusted the President (vs. 14% in 2013, however, trust to former President Viktor  Yanukovych constituted 2% in March 2014), 10% trusted each of three branches of power, specifically Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers and the judicial branch (vs. 5%, 8% and 7% in 2013, respectively[17], the latter will hopefully increase due to the adoption of the new law on judicial reform on June 2, 2016 because in March 2016 the level of trust was still 6%).

Although current President Petro Poroshenko elected in May 2014 is the only President in the history of Ukraine elected in one round by the majority of voters (55%), there is a significant decrease of trust to him within two years. It is a standard trend of perception for all five presidents elected during 25 years of Ukraine’s independence. Regardless of economic conditions during the presidency, Ukrainians lost trust to the presidents quite fast: Leonid  Kravchuk, the first President of independent Ukraine, had 16% of trust in 1994 before leaving the office, the second President Leonid Kuchma left with 15% in 2004[10], and Viktor Yushchenko elected after the “Orange Revolution”[18] left with 19% of support[19] in 2010. As mentioned above, only 2% trusted Viktor Yanukovych after the Revolution of Dignity.

A fall in electoral activity

Patriotism and civil activity did not transform into political activity – voter turnout was somewhat lower during all elections held in 2014-2015 (presidential, parliamentary and local) than in 2010-2012. According to the Central Electoral Commission the turnout was 66.7% in the first round of the presidential elections in 2010 compared to 60.2% in 2014; it was 57.9% in the parliamentary elections in 2012 compared to 52.4% in 2014, and it was 48.7% in the local elections in 2010 compared to 46.5% in 2015. The most significant decrease in the voter turnout at parliamentary elections was observed among those aged 18-29 years old (19% of those who voted in 2012 compared to 17% in 2014) and those aged 60+ (27% and 25%, respectively)[20]. A fall in turnover of those aged 60+ can be explained by the elimination of political parties/candidates preferred by this age group before, specifically the Party of Regions led by former President Viktor Yanukovych, and the Communist party. A decrease of voter turnout among youth is the long-lasting trend observed since 2006 when 57% of this age group voted in parliamentary elections, which declined to 47% in 2012, and 35% in 2014[21]. At the same time, youth is the most educated age category: 54% of youth have higher or incomplete higher education compared to 40% of total population, and  tend to use TV as a source of news to a lesser extent than total population (77% vs. 87%, respectively), prefers Internet as a source of news more often than the total population (57% use Internet sites and 34% use social media compared to 35% and 20% among total population, respectively)[22].

Conclusion

Despite the continuous war and economic recession Ukrainians demonstrate higher patriotism, optimism, civic responsibility, and civic activity in 2014-2016 compared to pre-war situation. However, civic activity did not transform into political activity – low voter turnout (especially among people aged 18-29 which constitute the most active and educated category) and voting in line with populist TV ads or receiving “gifts” for proper voting[23] are important factors of slow replacement of political elite and slow pace of progressive reforms. Transforming increased civic responsibility into political responsibility can be achieved through facilitating citizen’s interaction with the authorities. There is immense potential for increasing citizens’ engagement in this sphere: 48% of the population of big cities was interested in different tools of influence on authorities in April 2016 (vs. 26% in 2013) whereas only 14% participated in such activities (see Graph 1).

Ukrainians might learn different tools of influence on the authorities and improving living conditions in local communities after decentralization and housing reforms which are currently implemented through taking the responsibility for managing the local life, particularly in apartment blocks. The application of tools of public control over the local authorities, homeowner associations, housing management companies can drive the voters’ control over the central authorities, particularly through participation in elections. Moreover, increase of Internet penetration might foster the rise of independent media and result in the voting on the basis of the analysis of the information about candidates’ achievements and programs outlined in the independent media.

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