Proposed Amendments to the Electoral Code: Who Would Control the Mandates?

In July 2025, MPs registered one main and five alternative draft laws to amend the Electoral Code, all concerning the organization of parliamentary and local elections. Which of these proposals would provide citizens with more opportunities to influence the political process—and thus help boost voter turnout?

Voter turnout is a critical issue, as it has been steadily declining in Ukraine, as well as in other European countries. The most recent parliamentary elections in 2019 recorded the lowest turnout on record: according to the Central Election Commission, only 49.25% of citizens cast a ballot. With the exception of the 2012 elections, each subsequent parliamentary cycle has shown a gradual drop in voter participation—from 69.63% in 1998 and 65.21% in 2002 to 52.13% in 2014 and 49.17% in 2019.

A similar trend is evident in local elections: turnout gradually fell from 75.6% in 1994 to 46.6% in 2015. And in 2020, only 36.9% of voters went to the polling stations. The pandemic was not the only reason for this record-low turnout. Experts and sociologists attribute the decline in participation to citizens’ growing disillusionment with politics and doubts about the significance—or impact—of their vote. At the same time, some voters may be deterred by the complexity of the electoral system. So what changes to the system do the registered bills propose, and which of them would positively affect turnout?

Parliamentary elections

Proportional, majoritarian, or mixed?

In 2019, elections to Parliament were held under a mixed proportional–majoritarian system. However, the Vox Ukraine editorial board believes that a proportional electoral system with open party lists would be more conducive to increasing political engagement. First, in such a system, the number of mandates each party receives directly depends on the share of votes cast for that party. Second, voters are able to influence places of individual candidates on the party list.

International studies show that voter turnout is higher in countries with proportional representation systems than in those with majoritarian systems. First, a proportional system “converts” a larger share of voters’ ballots into mandates, whereas in a majoritarian system, the votes cast for losing candidates are effectively “lost.” Second, party competition is greater under proportional representation, since even less popular political forces receive some seats if they clear the electoral threshold. As a result, public trust in the electoral process grows. Indeed, according to a 2021 survey by the NGO Opora, a relative majority (42%) of Ukrainians considered the open-list system the best option—although 73% were unable to name the electoral system that existed in Ukraine at the time.

In the same year, MPs from the “For the Future” group proposed bringing back closed lists and the majoritarian system, which prompted a negative reaction from civil society organizations. Among the new draft laws, a return to that system is proposed in Bill No. 13464-3 authored by Anton Yatsenko, a former member of that faction.

By contrast, the main bill (No. 13464) and its alternative (No. 13464-1) propose a purely proportional system, while Bills No. 13464-2 and No. 13464-5 provide for a quasi-proportional system in which candidates who receive at least one electoral quota worth of votes can obtain a mandate regardless of whether their party passes the threshold.

Party lists and the distribution of mandates

Before an election, party leadership forms two types of lists: a national list and regional lists. The national electoral list is a single list of the party’s candidates across the entire country. Candidates from this list receive seats in Parliament proportionately to the number of votes the party wins nationwide. A regional electoral list includes candidates of the same party within a given region. Accordingly, to enter Parliament, these candidates must secure the support of voters in that region.

The current law stipulates that a party’s regional electoral list must include no fewer than five and no more than eighteen candidates. This rule is retained in Bills No. 13464-1, No. 13464-3, and No. 13464-5. By contrast, in Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-2, the maximum number of candidates on a list depends on the number of voters in the relevant region (Table 2). These bills do not set a minimum number of candidates a party must nominate, which opens the door to forming “minimal” regional lists.

For example, if the maximum number of candidates in a regional list is nine but no minimum is set, a party may nominate only two. In that case, if the party wins five seats in Parliament, two of them will go to the regional candidates who received votes from the electorate, while the remaining three mandates will be allocated among the individuals on the national list chosen by party leadership. Thus, if a party nominates fewer candidates than the maximum allowed, it artificially limits voter choice.

Although the initial order of candidates on the list is determined by the party, the law can provide mechanisms that allow voters to influence that order. Candidates who receive a certain number of votes move up the list and increase their chances of being elected. Under the current rule, they must receive 25% of the electoral quota to do so.

Under the current Electoral Code, after an election, the Central Election Commission tallies all the votes cast for parties that have passed the 5% threshold—that is, received votes from at least 5% of voters who took part in the election. This total number of votes is then divided by the number of seats in Parliament. The resulting figure is the electoral quota—the “price of one seat” in votes.

For example, if the parties that enter the legislature together receive 9 million votes, the electoral quota will be 9 million ÷ 450 seats = 20,000 votes. The threshold of one quarter of a quota—the level a candidate must surpass to move up the party list in this example—is therefore 20,000 ÷ 4 = 5,000 votes. A higher position on the party list means a higher chance of being elected to Parliament.

In the last election, the threshold of 25% of the electoral quota was out of reach for most candidates, so their ranking was effectively determined by the party. Among the new draft laws, only Bill No. 13464-5 retains this rule, while Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-1 provide for the abolition of the threshold. This would allow candidates to move up the list based on a simple plurality of votes. Bill No. 13464-3 does not provide any mechanism for voters to influence the order of the list (i.e. the lists are closed).

Bill No. 13464-2 also abolishes the 25% threshold. At the same time, it proposes automatically granting a mandate to any candidate who receives a full electoral quota (Bill No. 13464-5 proposes a similar mechanism but with a threshold of one and a half quotas). As a result, only very popular candidates would be able to obtain a mandate automatically; for all others, the order of the list would be determined by the party. In this way, the electoral system takes on majoritarian features: the right to participate in the allocation of mandates belongs not only to parties that pass the 5% threshold, but also to individual candidates from parties who receive votes equal to or exceeding the electoral quota. At the same time, all candidates must belong to a party—self-nominated candidates would not be able to participate in the elections.

A guaranteed mandate is a mandate assigned to a party that is not affected by how voters cast their ballots: the candidate is guaranteed to receive it if the party clears the electoral threshold. The current law, as well as Bills No. 13464-3 and No. 13464-5, provide for nine guaranteed mandates in a party’s national list. Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-1 include only one such “reserved” position. Bill No. 13464-2 abolishes guaranteed mandates altogether. Draft laws with fewer or no guaranteed mandates give voters greater influence over the composition of Parliament than those that retain their current number.

However, Bill No. 13464 stipulates that each regional electoral list would include one candidate who is guaranteed to enter Parliament if the party passes the electoral threshold. As a result, the “untouchable nine” regional candidates under current law would effectively become “the untouchable 26”: one centrally designated candidate in the national list and another 25 in the regions—meaning that even if a candidate receives more votes than the top-ranked person in either the national or a regional list, that candidate would still get only the second place.

In a proportional representation system, voters either cast their ballots only for a party (closed lists) or for a party and its candidates. In the former case, party leadership holds more power, since it determines who will enter Parliament. Among the draft laws analyzed, the most open lists are proposed in Bill No. 13464-1, which would abolish the 25% threshold and reduce the number of guaranteed mandates. Bill No. 13464 would introduce semi-open lists, since it includes a group of candidates whose positions cannot be shifted. Bill No. 13464-2, by contrast, would allow voters to influence the order of the list but would introduce an automatic mandate for any candidate who receives a full electoral quota. The lists in No. 13464-5 would remain semi-open because of the higher threshold of 1.5 quotas and the nine guaranteed mandates—meaning that no candidate can “overtake” the first nine individuals on the party list. Fully closed lists are proposed in Bill No. 13464-3, as it provides no mechanism for voters to alter the order of candidates. 

Organization and voting procedures

A well-designed ballot is critically important for ensuring that voters can express their preferences correctly and that their votes are counted properly. The main draft law proposes simplifying the ballot format and unifying it for both parliamentary and local elections, which would make both voting and vote counting easier.

Current legislation requires voters to write the ordinal number of the candidate they support (taken from the party’s regional list) on the ballot. Bills No. 13464-2 and No. 13464-3 suggest simplifying this procedure: voters would only need to check a box next to the candidate’s name. According to a study by the Civil Network OPORA, “How Voters Perceive Different Types of Ballot Papers to Improve the Election Process,” respondents evaluated the proposed change positively, considering this type of ballot easier to understand.

Regarding the stencil-based system—that is, tracing the outline of a number—to enter candidate numbers on ballots, respondents voiced numerous complaints. They noted that this method is confusing and not used in modern life. The authors of Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-1, who propose this system, would be well advised to take these comments into account.

The main bill and the alternative bill No. 13464-1 retain the current rules—that is, indicating only the candidate’s last name, initials, and ordinal number on the ballot. Bill No. 13464-2 would go further by requiring ballots to include the last name, first name, and patronymic of the party leader, as well as the last name, first name, and patronymic of all candidates for Parliament. Bill No. 13464-3 proposes an even more informative ballot that would include each candidate’s year of birth, education, position (occupation), place of work, place of residence, party affiliation, and nominating entity. This approach increases the informational content of the ballot but may make it harder for voters to process it because of the excessive amount of information.

Local elections

During the 2020 local elections, Ukraine used a two-tier proportional electoral system (the first tier—voting for party lists; the second tier—direct voting for candidates in single-mandate districts) and partially open lists in communities with 10,000 or more voters. In multi-mandate districts within communities with fewer than 10,000 voters, a majoritarian system applies.

A key restriction on voter influence in the current proportional system (for communities with 10,000 or more voters) is the high intra-party threshold of 25% of the electoral quota that a candidate must receive to move up the list. In practice, this largely nullifies the “openness” of the lists. In the 2020 elections, nearly half of all seats in regional councils (47.1%) were allocated using “closed” lists whose order voters could not influence. Abolishing the threshold, as proposed in the main bill, would increase transparency, competition, and trust in the electoral process—factors that should help boost voter turnout.

Type of electoral system

Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-2 propose abolishing the majoritarian component and introducing a fully proportional system with open lists for all local councils, including the smallest communities. This would allow council members to be replaced through party lists if their mandates terminate early, which in turn strengthens the functioning of local councils—especially important given their expanded powers today. However, this approach eliminates the possibility of independent candidacy, reducing voter influence by preventing citizens from electing a preferred representative who is not affiliated with a party. It also contradicts the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Bills No. 13464-1 and No. 13464-5 propose maintaining a mixed system but raising the population threshold for applying the proportional tier: to 50,000 voters (No. 13464-1) or 30,000 voters (No. 13464-5). Increasing the threshold would extend the use of the majoritarian system to most communities, thereby strengthening the direct link between voters and their representatives. However, such an approach may lead to the weakening of party structures at the local level.

Bill No. 13464-4 proposes a purely majoritarian, first-past-the-post system in multi-mandate districts for all councils, where candidates are not required to be party members. This significantly increases voter influence over the selection of individual representatives and enhances deputies’ accountability. At the same time, such a system carries the familiar risks associated with majoritarian elections—corruption, vote-buying, and administrative pressure. It also jeopardizes the stable functioning of local councils, as replacing council members during wartime becomes considerably more difficult.

Type of electoral list

The current system uses two-tier proportional flexible lists—essentially semi-open lists in which the 25% threshold effectively limits voter influence.

The main bill, No. 13464, and the alternative bills, No. 13464-1 and No. 13464-2, propose abolishing the 25% quota threshold required for candidates to advance up the list. If adopted, this change would substantially strengthen voters’ ability to shape the composition of local councils—under the current system, only 35% of candidates succeeded in moving up the lists in 2020.

Under the current system, when candidates in lower positions receive more votes than the top-ranked candidate in the district but fail to reach 25% of the electoral quota, the mandate is awarded to the first number on the territorial list regardless of how many votes that person received. A candidate can win only if they are placed high on the national or territorial list, and reaching 25% of the quota is realistically possible only for representatives of a relatively popular party.

As a result, voter influence over the formation of council membership is significantly reduced. According to the Central Election Commission, in the 2020 local elections, 68 councilors were elected without receiving a single vote, while 80% of voters marked a specific candidate rather than voting solely for a party.

Ultimately, such an electoral system discourages voters who recognize the unfairness of the rules—and this can negatively affect turnout.

Mandatory party affiliation

The current Code requires candidates in communities with more than 10,000 voters to be nominated by political parties. In smaller communities, self-nomination is allowed.

Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-2 propose abolishing self-nomination for all councils. This limits voters’ ability to elect independent candidates, as self-nomination is fairly common. For example, in the 2020 local elections, 32% of all candidates in communities with fewer than 10,000 voters were self-nominated.

Bill No. 13464-4, which proposes a fully majoritarian system, and Bills No. 13464-1 and No. 13464-5, which propose mixed systems, preserve or restore the option of self-nomination for majoritarian candidates.

Bills No. 13464 and No. 13464-2, which propose a fully proportional system, limit voters’ influence over local governance by eliminating the option of self-nomination. This runs counter to public expectations and international standards.

Gender quotas

The current Electoral Code introduced the zipper quota, which requires at least two candidates of each gender in every group of five on the list for councils in communities with more than 10,000 voters.

Most of the bills retain the rule that a party must include at least 30% of candidates of one gender in the total number of candidates on the relevant regional list. The main bill No. 13464 proposes mechanisms to strengthen the effectiveness of the quota. For example, if a candidate withdraws, the next candidate in line must be of the same gender. These changes are intended to counter the practice of “technical female candidates,” which was observed in 2020.

Bill No. 13464 proposes defining the term “sexism” and prohibiting the distribution of campaign materials that contain sexist elements. These provisions would help create a more inclusive environment for female candidates. Bill No. 13464-4, which introduces a fully majoritarian system, simultaneously raises the gender quota to 40% for each list.

Overall, the more voters feel that their vote has an impact—for example, by supporting an independent candidate or helping a preferred candidate move up the list—the higher turnout is likely to be. By contrast, initiatives that strengthen party control or complicate the system may deepen distrust in political institutions, which in turn could reduce voter turnout.

How do the proposed bills align with leading European practices—particularly the Finnish model?

Finnish model

Finland has one of the most open and voter-centered electoral systems in the EU. At the parliamentary level, the country uses a proportional system with fully open lists, where a candidate’s personal vote is decisive. Parties nominate candidates, but they do not determine the order in which those candidates are elected—the outcome for each person depends solely on the number of votes they receive. The Finnish model has no internal thresholds or barriers like Ukraine’s 25% of the electoral quota.

Unlike Ukrainian legislative initiatives that aim to preserve or modify a system of guaranteed mandates, the Finnish model is built on the complete absence of any “protected” seats. Party leadership has no formal mechanisms to reserve a mandate for a particular candidate. Seats are allocated through a single transparent algorithm: first, the number of mandates a party receives in a district is determined, and then those mandates are assigned to the candidates with the highest personal vote totals. As a result, party leaders and “central” candidates compete on equal terms with regional contenders. This logic significantly enhances political accountability, since a candidate’s place in Parliament depends on voter support rather than internal party arrangements.

Local elections in Finland follow the same logic as parliamentary ones: a proportional system with open lists is used. Seats on municipal councils are allocated solely according to voters’ personal choices, and the order of candidates on the ballot is determined by lottery, ensuring equal conditions for all. Independent candidates may also run. Finland’s framework for gender-balanced representation is enshrined in law: under the Act on Equality between Women and Men, national and local authorities must include at least 40% of each gender. This contributes to a high level of women’s participation—for example, women hold roughly 45% of the seats in the Parliament of Finland.

Conclusion

After the war, Ukrainian voters will likely want to play a more active role in shaping the political agenda and determining their country’s direction. Moreover, EU accession requires updates to electoral legislation. This makes it essential to build an electoral environment that is equal and transparent—one in which every vote truly counts—and thus motivates people to follow the rules.

However, most of the draft laws discussed—particularly No. 13464-2, No. 13464-3, and No. 13464-5—give parties a disproportionate degree of influence over the allocation of mandates. Ukraine would therefore benefit from following Finland’s example, where open lists, unrestricted upward movement of candidates, and the absence of guaranteed mandates create an electoral environment in which the voter is paramount. This system fosters higher political trust and boosts turnout (in Finland, voter turnout in the 2023 parliamentary elections was about 72.8%).

For Ukraine, introducing similar provisions would mean that electoral reform is guided not by preserving party control over mandates, but by strengthening the voter’s real influence on the composition of elected entities by:

• Introducing a proportional system with open lists
• Abolishing internal party thresholds for advancing candidates within regional lists
• Eliminating guaranteed mandates that parties receive regardless of voting results
• Removing electoral thresholds (including in local elections) and allowing candidates to run independently
• Ensuring a transparent allocation of mandates, clear rules, and broad voter participation

The reformed system should be designed around the voter rather than the parties. This approach would bring Ukraine’s electoral system closer to European democratic standards while also meeting the public demand for fair, transparent, and accountable representation.