Why People Do Not Trust the State: Myths Surrounding the Public Administration Reform in Ukraine

In this article, we will examine the most common myths about the civil service. This is a continuation of a series on myths surrounding key reforms: in the previous article, we analyzed fears and prejudices related to digitalization.

Anatomy of distrust 

Sociological data from the Razumkov Centre for February–March 2025 show a complex picture of trust in institutions within Ukrainian society. Traditionally, the highest levels of trust are enjoyed by security structures and organizations directly related to the defense of the country: 93.5% of respondents trust the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 85.5% trust the State Emergency Service, and 80–85% trust volunteer units and volunteer organizations. At the same time, traditional political institutions and executive authorities mostly have low levels of trust. 77% of Ukrainians do not trust the Verkhovna Rada (the balance of trust–distrust is -58.9%), and 77% do not trust political parties (-67.2%). Particularly alarming is the growing distrust of the state apparatus itself — 79% in 2025 compared to 75% in 2021, despite the war and the declared public administration reforms.

Accordingly, this distrust extends not only to institutions but also to the reform itself. In 2024, we attempted to explore the reasons for such attitudes. Among 13 reforms assessed by respondents, civil service reform ranked relatively low in popularity. Digitalization, the army, healthcare, and anti-corruption measures emerged as leaders. At the same time, one of the elements of digital and anti-corruption reforms is precisely the transformation of state processes. This may indicate both an existing, albeit hidden, demand for public administration reform and an insufficient level of awareness of the functions of the civil service, with real changes remaining “invisible” to citizens. 

Factors of distrust 

Distrust of public administration reform does not arise suddenly — it is rooted in a complex system of deep social, historical, and institutional factors.

• Historical prerequisites. Distrust of the state has deep roots and was formed over centuries: from serfdom to the totalitarian regime of the USSR. This led to the atomization of society: people learned not to trust anyone outside their immediate circle of family and friends, while automatically denying trust to formal institutions. This experience is rooted in collective memory.
• Personal experience of interaction with the state. For many Ukrainians, interaction with state bodies is still associated with queues, rudeness, incomprehensible procedures, and bribes. Although digitalization and the reform of administrative services have significantly reduced these problems, the inertia of perception remains.
• Low awareness of state bodies’ work. The Public Administration Reform Strategy 2022–2025 had two components. The first was internal, aimed at civil servants: the formation of new civil service standards, merit-based recruitment, and decent remuneration. The second was external, focused on people: the development of a service-oriented state through digital tools and simplified access to administrative services. However, in the media and on social networks, the reform often appears distorted. Any reduction of ministries is interpreted as “chaotic optimization,” the adaptation of the civil service to European requirements as “external control,” and digitalization as “a new way of control.”
• Russian disinformation. An additional factor in reinforcing distrust is Russian disinformation, which systematically leverages existing perceptions and fears in society. It does not create them from scratch but reinterprets individual difficulties, mistakes, or delays in reforms as evidence of the state’s “total incapacity.” Complex, long-term reform processes are presented in a simplified, emotionally charged manner, reinforcing a sense of hopelessness.

Myths about the civil service

Distorted perceptions of reform most often concern civil servants, and discussions of their work are often accompanied by myths. These myths cover quite different areas: the work of state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption bodies, and, in general, the distribution of functions and areas of responsibility of state institutions.

Myth: Requirements for the independence of supervisory boards are a sign of external governance 

Manipulations around supervisory boards and their composition have been regularly spread since 2016, since the beginning of corporate governance reform. Ukrainian politicians have also repeatedly commented on this topic. Most often, the claim is made that the presence of foreigners on the supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises is a sign of external governance. Allegedly, through foreign control, state-owned enterprises operate in the interests of international partners or transnational corporations. However, supervisory boards are not involved in enterprises’ operational activities (these are the functions of the management board). Supervisory boards are supposed to formulate the development strategy for state-owned companies, appoint management, evaluate their performance, and select an auditor.

Ukraine is implementing corporate governance reform in accordance with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. However, the main requirement for supervisory boards is their independence, not the presence of foreigners. Ukrainian state-owned enterprises involve foreigners because this makes it easier to guarantee the independence of supervisory board members. Foreign professionals risk their careers, reputations, and the ability to hold senior positions not only in Ukraine but in companies around the world. This significantly reduces the likelihood of corruption schemes.

The OECD notes that many supervisory boards across countries include independent members, but the concept of independence varies significantly under national legislation and corporate governance codes. In general, independent persons are those who have no material interests or ties with the enterprise, the state, management, or other interested parties that could affect their impartiality. Such members should be selected based on their achievements and should possess the appropriate competencies to perform their duties on the supervisory board.

The OECD does not require the involvement of foreigners but recommends limiting the composition of supervisory boards to citizens of the state only when necessary, for example, due to potential national security risks. If there are no such threats, the OECD proposes involving citizens of any country, taking into account their abilities and achievements. In European countries, supervisory boards are predominantly composed of citizens of those states, but legislation does not prohibit the involvement of foreigners. Here are a few examples of the participation of foreigners on the supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises:

•  in the Lithuanian energy company Ignitis Group (75% of shares belong to the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance), there are foreigners on the supervisory board (6 out of 9, including the chair of the supervisory board);
•  in the airline Air Baltic (more than 80% of shares belong to the Latvian state), there are also foreigners (2 out of 5 members);
•  in the Dutch bank FMO (51% of shares belong to the Netherlands), there are foreigners (2 out of 6).

At the same time, the Ukrainian experience with supervisory boards is still in the process of formation. Among the main challenges are not only the issue of board members’ independence but also the transparency of procedures and their practical impact on the decisions of state-owned enterprises. Foreign experts can bring professional standards, knowledge of international practice, and experience, but success in implementing corporate governance mechanisms depends on clear rules, transparent procedures, and a system of accountability and control by the state and society. It is precisely the comprehensive development of institutions and procedures, rather than only the personal composition of supervisory boards, that determines the quality of corporate governance. 

Moreover, no supervisory board of a Ukrainian state-owned enterprise consists exclusively of foreigners; the balance is ensured by Ukrainian members. In addition, members of supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises (in which more than 50% is owned by the state) are appointed and dismissed by the government, the Verkhovna Rada, or the president. Members of the supervisory boards of state-owned banks are additionally approved by the National Bank.

Myth: Specialized anti-corruption bodies were created only in Ukraine; there is no such practice in the world 

No, this is far from a uniquely Ukrainian idea. On the contrary, it is enshrined in international obligations and is widely used in many countries around the world. In particular, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provides that a State Party shall ensure the existence of independent bodies to prevent corruption (Article 6). Ukraine is a party to UNCAC, so the establishment of anti-corruption institutions, such as National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) or National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), is the building of a corruption prevention system in line with global standards.

In 2024, the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) was held in Vilnius, where Ukraine was represented by a delegation from the NACP among participants from more than 135 countries. National anti-corruption bodies from different countries cooperate to combat corruption and share best practices in anti-corruption legislation. Thus, the participation of Ukrainian anti-corruption bodies in international events only confirms that such bodies are not unique to Ukraine.

According to the French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence Française Anticorruption), as of 2020, national anti-corruption bodies with varying degrees of independence and different functions operated in more than 100 countries worldwide. Let us consider examples from several countries:

• In France, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) monitors asset declarations and conflicts of interest of senior officials and ensures transparency in the activities of public authorities, while the French Anti-Corruption Agency oversees and evaluates anti-corruption programs in public bodies and monitors compliance with anti-corruption legislation.
• In South Korea, there is the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (which focuses specifically on senior officials) and the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), which reviews citizens’ complaints, protects whistleblowers, and oversees compliance with integrity standards in public authorities.
• In the United States, anti-corruption powers are shared among various divisions of the Department of Justice, such as the Public Integrity Section or the Office of the Inspector General. They conduct internal audits and investigate abuses in government agencies, as well as crimes related to corruption and electoral offenses.
• In the United Kingdom, the fight against corruption and economic crime is carried out by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which also oversees compliance with anti-corruption legislation. There is also the International Corruption Unit, which investigates international corruption, including bribery and money laundering, and is part of the National Crime Agency (NCA).

These examples confirm that anti-corruption bodies are not a Ukrainian invention but an international practice in most countries of the world. 

Myth: “Civil servants do nothing” 

This myth is based mainly on emotional assessments and is a classic example of the logical fallacy of hasty generalization. A person who has had one or several negative experiences interacting with bureaucracy, such as a queue at an administrative service center, a delayed decision, or an indifferent official, extrapolates this experience to the entire state apparatus. This cognitive bias is reinforced by the fact that civil servants’ work is mostly invisible: we notice it only when something goes wrong.

Each function of the state apparatus corresponds to a specific societal need. We studied the evolution of Ukraine’s ministries over 30 years of independence and compared it with global experience: the structure of the executive branch is not formed randomly. Ministries are created in response to specific challenges. For example, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs emerged after 2014 in response to a new social reality. In the 1990s, there was the Ministry for the Protection of the Population from the Consequences of the Chornobyl Disaster, a direct response to the Chornobyl catastrophe.

Criticizing specific shortcomings in the work of state bodies is normal and necessary. But the generalization “civil servants do nothing” is an emotional reaction that ignores the systemic work of thousands of people. However, if this were true, not a single fundamental system in the country would function — from state registries to social payments and digital services.

The real effectiveness of the state apparatus is also evidenced by international assessments. The 2024 SIGMA report emphasizes that, despite the full-scale war, Ukraine’s public administration system has remained resilient, ensured the continuity of services, and even demonstrated improvements in certain performance indicators, particularly in digitalization and the provision of electronic services.

How to overcome myths about public administration reform

Myths surrounding public administration reform arise not due to a lack of change, but because of their complexity, their “invisibility” to society, and the absence of clear explanations. Distrust of institutions, historical experience, war, and Russian disinformation create conditions in which managerial decisions are easily reduced to simplified, emotional narratives about “external governance,” “excessive bureaucracy,” or “ineffective officials.” In reality, public administration reform is the foundation for other reforms and ensures the state’s resilience.

Overcoming these myths is possible precisely through consistent and clear communication. This involves explaining the logic of changes — not only what exactly is being reformed, but why it is necessary for citizens and how it affects the quality of decisions, services, and transparency. It is important to make the “invisible” work of the state apparatus visible: to show how decisions are made, how anti-corruption safeguards function, how management differs from oversight, and why a professional, independent civil service is a guarantee of less corruption and greater stability.

Public administration reform is a long-term process of building a capable state able to act in the interests of citizens even under extraordinary conditions. That is why the quality of explaining this reform determines not only the level of trust in institutions, but also society’s readiness to support complex but necessary transformations.