Fact-Checking Russia’s Claims on Chemical Weapons

Russia employed this rhetoric and leveraged its membership in both the OPCW and the United Nations Security Council to shield Syria from similar accusations. Now, with the fall of Syrian leader Bashar Al Assad from power in December 2024, there is an opportunity to expose Russia’s inconsistent record on these issues. Insurgent forces already requested international assistance to secure and destroy whatever remains of Syria’s clandestine chemical weapons program. As international investigators uncover the regime’s chemical weapons remains, it will expose Russia’s disinformation campaign designed to protect an allied autocratic regime and condone the violation of an international norm. Fortunately, the international community’s tolerance for Russia’s malign statecraft has finally diminished, and it is now holding Russia to account for its actions. 

The following essay recounts Russia’s history of not abiding by the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and how it has used disinformation to deny its past actions, distorted facts, deceived others, deflected attention from its actions, and sowed division in the international community committed to maintaining the ban on chemical weapons. Holding Russia to account for its actions by preventing it from holding a seat on the governing body of the OPCW sends a strong message to the global community that no matter who you are, you cannot use chemical weapons with impunity. 

Russia’s Disinformtion Denies, Deflects, Distorts from Its Record on Chemical Weapons

In the last decade under the leadership of Russian president Vladimir Putin, Russia has been a serial violator of the chemical weapons ban and has denied it whenever challenged. Russia’s use of chemical weapons under Putin can be traced back to 2015, with a case attributed to Russia involving the attempted assignation of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev, for which three Russian nationals were charged. Again, in 2018, Russian military agents poisoned Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer, and his daughter in Salisbury, United Kingdom. This attack involved the use of a chemical agent from a group of nerve agents known as Novichoks, also referred to as fourth generation agents. Novichoks were developed during the Soviet era, and despite Russia’s assurances of discontinuing the program, evidence indicates that their development continued. Russia may have deliberately used Novichok nerve agents in violation of the Article I of the CWC to avoid detection because these agents were not specifically identified in the CWC’s Annex of Chemicals. In response to these actions, Russia faced significant diplomatic and economic consequences. Despite extensive evidence of the Putin government’s involvement, Russia officials dismissed the extensive evidence. The United States and the European Union imposed sanctions and expelled over a hundred Russian diplomats from various countries. Russia has consistently denied any involvement. 

In 2020, Russian military intelligence operatives poisoned Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny with a Novichok nerve agent while on a plane traveling between Russian cities. Navalny survived the attack and in collaboration with Bellingcat managed to call the military operatives involved in his poisoning and fooled them into admitting what they had done. The attack on Navalny led to a new round of sanctions and condemnations. Again, Russian officials denied the evidence and provided a litany of disinformation about the case.

Russia has also played a major role in providing diplomatic cover when the Assad regime used chemical weapons against neighborhoods where opposition forces were located in Syria. Assad regime officials coerced Syrian doctors at hospitals by threatening them and their families if they acknowledged that the patients they treated were victims of chemical weapons attacks. Russia disseminated false narratives claiming the attacks were staged by opposition forces and obstructed the efforts of the global community to conduct thorough investigations. By shielding the Assad regime from accountability, Russia eroded the credibility of international mechanisms designed to deter chemical weapons use, thereby condoning their use. Russia did not uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons; it eroded it. Until Russia acknowledges its past transgressions of the CWC’s intent, its standing at the OPCW does not qualify it for leadership position at the OPCW. 

Russia’s Disinformation About Chemical Weapons in Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has escalated concerns about its use of chemical weapons. Even before the war, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu accused U.S. contractors of planning a “provocation with unknown chemical components.” Reacting to these claims, Putin warned of a “military-technical response,” and used these allegations—among others—as a pretext for the invasion. Putin’s false claim of chemical weapons threats was further propagated by Russia-backed separatists and top Russian officials, who claimed that Ukraine was preparing to use them to justify its planned large-scale operations across the Donbas region. They never provided evidence for their claims and Ukraine never used chemical weapons. Russia forces invaded Ukraine despite the false claims. 

During the war, Russia has falsely claimed that it possesses “irrefutable evidence” implicating Ukraine in the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield. Despite its frequent claims, it has not provided evidence that the OPCW or any other independent third party deems credible. Russian authorities make claims about others that actually reflect what they contemplate or are actually doing. This tactic known as “fake mirroring.” Claiming that others violated the CWC creates an ambiguous impression that Russian authorities can claim justification for their use of chemical weapons and riot control agents, which the CWC also bans as a method of warfare. While not all uses of riot control agents by armed forces amount to use as a method of warfare, use by military forces against combatants on the battlefield in an armed conflict is specifically called out as a violation of Article I, paragraph 5 of the CWC. 

In February 2024, Russian spokeswoman Maria Zakharova falsely asserted that Russian security thwarted a Ukrainian plan to use “an analogue of NATO’s BZ chemical warfare agent.” Additionally, Russia has accused Ukraine of deploying chemical weapons on Russian territory, such as in the Kursk oblast. Again, Russia provides no evidence for the claim. This is just another example of its attempt to deflect attention from the reality of its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. 

In contrast to its false claims about unproven plots, there is considerable evidence that Russia has been using riot control agents and chemical weapons to flush Ukrainian troops out of trenches for easy killing. This is reminiscent of World War I use of toxic chemicals, which led to the initial international effort to ban chemical weapons in warfare. To obscure these actions, Russia often claims victimhood, denying use by its forces and deflecting attention by alleging chemical attacks by others against it. The international community should fact-check Russia’s false claims for what they are—disinformation.

Ukraine has consistently reported chemical attacks by Russian forces. These incidents include the use of riot control agents and the chemical agent chloropicrin against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukraine’s statements were substantiated by reports from Russian soldiers, photographic evidence, and testimonies from affected Ukrainian military personnel. 

In 2024, the frequency of these chemical attacks increased significantly. In early March 2024, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the Netherlands indicated in a statement for OPCW that “346 individual toxic chemical incidents” were recorded that year alone, which translates to approximately “6 Russian breaches of the CWC per day.” Later that year, Ukraine reported over four thousand chemical attacks by Russian forces, marking a dramatic escalation from about 700 incidents reported since the start of the war until December 2023.

When confronted with allegations of chemical weapons use, Russian officials consistently deny these claims, often employing disinformation to counter the accusations. Russia completed destruction of its declared chemical weapons stockpiles in 2017. Based on its use of chemical weapons since then, however, Russia did not declare the full extent of its chemical weapons stockpile and maintains a chemical weapons program. In its annual report to Congress on compliance with the CWC, the United States State Department noted that it “does not believe Russia has declared all of its [chemical weapons] stockpile, [chemical weapons production facilities], and all [chemical weapons] development facilities.” Similarly, EUvsDisinfo, a project of the European External Action Service, has collected evidence suggesting that Russia still possesses an undeclared chemical weapons stockpile.

Until June 2024, Russia’s focus was primarily on claims regarding the use of chemical weapons rather than their production within Ukraine. Now, alongside the discredited accusations of “biolabs,” Russian discourse now includes references to “chemical labs.” This layering of fabricated claims is a deliberate tactic intended to construct a parallel narrative that undermines objective truth.

Moscow groundlessly alleged that Ukraine has employed toxic substances on 400 occasions since February 2022, but it does not provide evidence for a single attack. It also falsely claims that Ukraine is equipping drones with hazardous chemical dispensers and using grenades containing the riot control agent CS and Ukrainian hand grenades labeled “Teren-6,” said to contain toxic chemicals. Russia has not presented any tangible evidence to back its allegations. The Russian Foreign Ministry explained that Russia intentionally chose not to seek technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat to verify the alleged use of toxic chemicals and riot control agents by Ukraine. This decision, they argued, was made to protect the lives and health of international experts, as Ukraine supposedly does not distinguish between military and civilian targets in its attacks. Disingenuously, it is Russia that does not make the distinction. Russia’s massive strike against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure on Christmas day 2024 is ample proof.

On December 17, 2024, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, Chief of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops and the most vocal spokesperson for Russia’s propaganda on chemical weapons, was assassinated in Moscow. In response, Russian state media used this incident to emphasize Kirillov’s perceived achievements in “exposing” the alleged use of chemical weapons by Ukraine and the United States, as well as highlighting their purported “crimes.” Little more than a week later, a replacement for Kirillov took to the airwaves to continue Russia’s disinformation regarding the United States, Ukraine, and chemical and biological weapons. Russia authorities have this false narrative ready to go regardless of the propagandists delivering the message. 

Russia’s Abuse of Its Position on the OPCW Governing Body

In addition to repeated disinformation campaigns, Russia actively seeks to obstruct efforts to investigate chemical weapons incidents. This pattern of obstruction is not new. Russia has a history of impeding the operations of international organizations, a practice that became particularly evident during the international community’s attempts to hold Syria accountable for the Assad regime’s chemical attacks on civilians. Russia has repeatedly claimed that chemical weapons incidents in Syria were staged by the “foreign agents.” To support this narrative, the Kremlin has orchestrated multifaceted disinformation campaigns that leveraged a wide array of channels, including statements by high-ranking officials such as Foreign Minister Lavrov, state-controlled media, social media platforms, false accounts journalists, trolls, and bots to amplify the message. 

Russia has sought to shield Syria from accusations of chemical weapons use. Following the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission’s conclusion that chlorine was used as a weapon in Syria in 2014, Russia began to obstruct further investigative efforts. This obstruction reached a critical point in October 2017, when Russia exercised its veto power at the United Nations Security Council, leading to the failure to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) of the United Nations and the OPCW. The JIM had been established to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria and, thus, provide the basis for the international community to hold accountable those who use chemical weapons. 

In 2018, just before the OPCW planned to release its report on the poisoning of the Skripals, four Russian military intelligence agents (GRU) attempted to hack into the organization’s computer system, presumably to disrupt the release of the report. Dutch authorities caught the Russian agents in the process with a car full of computer gear parked in a hotel parking lot next to the OPCW building. This incident is further evidence of Russia’s abuse of the OPCW as the international body with the mission to implement the international ban on chemical weapons.

In response to the suspension of the JIM, the United Kingdom spearheaded a successful initiative to convene a special session of the OPCW’s Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which is comprised of all states party to the CWC. The OPCW website notes that “CSP oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, promotes the Convention’s objectives, and reviews compliance with the treaty. The Conference is composed of representatives of all Member States of the OPCW, each of which has one vote. The CSP meets annually in The Hague.” 

This special session, which convened in June 2018, resulted in a mandate to the OPCW Technical Secretariat to attribute responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The Technical Secretariat established an Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) for this purpose. In April 2020, the IIT concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for three chemical weapons attacks that occurred in March 2017. As a result, Syria’s voting rights at the OPCW were suspended. Russia, however, continued to use OPCW as a platform to further promote its false narratives and deny the evidence of Syrian armed forces’ uses of chemical weapons against opposition forces. At a November 2024 meeting of the OPCW, Russia’s Minister for Industry and Trade repeated the false Russian claim that “Syrian authorities have demonstrated the highest degree of transparency” concerning its chemical weapons program. 

Russia actively sought to obstruct decisions to hold the Assad regime accountable for chemical weapons use. Prior to the special session of the CSP in 2018, Russia, in collaboration with China, introduced a draft decision intended to postpone further investigations, but it was outvoted. Following this setback, Russia, joined by Iran, attempted to vote down the 2019 OPCW budget, which included funding for the investigative mechanisms. Typically, the OPCW budget is approved by consensus at Executive Council meetings. However, due to Russia’s opposition, the budget had to be brought before the CSP, where Russia’s amendments were once again rejected. In addition to diplomatic maneuvers, Russian military police were accused of blocking IIT’s access to sites in Syria that were critical for conducting thorough investigations. 

Following the Russian use of Novichok nerve agents against the Skripals in Salibury, England, parties to the CWC sought to add these agents to the CWC’s Annex of Chemical because as U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Ward noted “they had not known purpose other than those prohibited by the Convention.” The CWC’s Annex of Chemicals lists toxic chemicals that are or can be used to make chemical weapons. Russia opposed the addition of the chemical agents to the Annex to deflect attention away from its poisoning of the Skripal. Russia claimed that the chemical structures were not sufficiently defined. The OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board reported to States Parties that Central Nervous System-acting chemicals such as Novichoks are not riot control agents because they cause “permanent harm and death due to an irreversible action on life processes.” In 2019, despite Russia objections to the addition of Novichok- related chemicals to the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals, the overwhelming number of states party to the convention voted to do so. 

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have prompted reactions from state parties to the CWC. Shortly after the onset of the war in February 2022, Russia circulated a Note Verbale to the OPCW, accusing Ukraine of planning “chemical provocations.” This move was met with multiple responses from the international community, reiterating that Russia itself was staging provocations with the intent to attack Ukrainian cities with chemical weapons. 

Russia’s false claims of Ukrainian provocations have persisted throughout 2022-2024. One notable instance occurred when Germany, representing a coalition of states, formally requested that Russia provide explanations for admissions made by Russian soldiers on government-controlled media and military Telegram channels, revealing the use of riot control agents against Ukrainian forces because use of riot control agents were viewed as effective for terrorizing Ukrainian forces and forcing them out of defensive trenches to be mowed down by machine gun fire, drones, or artillery barrages, a tactic used in World War I. Russia dismissed the accusations as “absolutely groundless.”

Russia’s allegations against Ukraine and the U.S. of staging false flag attacks or using chemical weapons tend to cluster around OPCW events such as Executive Council meetings and the annual CSP. 

For instance, a day before the opening of the 105th Session of the OPCW Executive Council in March 2024, Russian Deputy Industry and Trade Minister Kirill Lysogorsky stated that the West was developing and supplying chemical weapons to Ukraine. In mid-July of this year, Russia’s disinformation about Ukraine’s alleged use of chemical weapons peaked during the 106th Session of the OPCW Executive Council. A day before the session, late Lieutenant General Kirillov accused Ukraine of violating the CWC. He stated that the OPCW was helping Ukraine bypass CWC rules, claiming it was under U.S. control, and accused the U.S. and Germany of using the OPCW to fabricate evidence framing Russia for deploying toxic chemicals. 

Kirillov further asserted that a chemical lab had been discovered in the temporarily occupied town of Avdiivka. As per his claims, the lab contained chemical reactors for toxic substances, shelves with lab equipment and reagents, and cyanide — a Schedule 3 substance under the CWC, banned by Article 1 of the Convention. The Russian Ministry of Defense simultaneously circulated a video purportedly showing the chemical lab in question. However, the footage lacked verifiable evidence of the lab’s location or its connection to chemical weapons production. Avdiivka, home to Europe’s largest coke plant, might plausibly have chemical facilities due to its industrial nature. Yet, the equipment shown in the video appeared outdated, from the Soviet era, and unsuitable for weapons production. Portraying standard lab equipment, easily obtainable in Russia, as part of a chemical weapons lab represents a clear attempt at manipulation and fabrication.

After November 18, 2024, when the OPCW confirmed Russia’s use of the riot control agent CS against Ukrainian positions, Russian global media asserted that the OPCW report was the very provocation Russian officials had previously warned about. They also claimed that the report was crafted to unjustly strip Russia of its voting rights within the organization. Kirill Lysogorsky, head of the Russian delegation at the OPCW CSP, described the conclusions of the Technical Secretariat as a “theater of the absurd.” Vladimir Tarabrin, Russia’s representative at the OPCW, argued that it was no surprise the document was distributed among OPCW members just before the CSP. He described it as a well-known tactic used by Damascus’ opponents for years to set the tone for discussions on the Syrian chemical dossier. These statements further highlight Russia’s tactic of “fake mirroring,” as the actions described are exactly what Russia itself does before and during the CSP.

By preemptively providing false accusations warning about Ukrainian provocation, Russia framed a narrative more favorable to itself, shifting the focus from its own crimes to alleged OPCW bias. During the 29th Session of the C SP, Russia also attempted to divert attention from the Technical Secretariat’s report by stating that it had provided the organization with at least 30 diplomatic notes “proving” Ukraine’s use of banned chemicals. Russia stated it would continue collecting information regarding Ukraine’s alleged chemical crimes, while conveniently omitting any mention of its own actions. Moreover, Russia used the conference to spread a new false claim about a new provocation by the West and Ukraine. The head of the Russian delegation asserted that ISIS, in collaboration with Western and Ukrainian intelligence, is preparing yet another chemical provocation using toxic chemicals. Ultimately, Russia provided no evidence for any of these claims. 

Setting the Record Straight on Russia Use of Chemical Weapons in Ukraine

From the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western nations have consistently expressed strong support for Ukraine and cast doubt on Russia’s allegations regarding Ukraine’s use of chemical weapons. Many countries have taken formal steps by issuing Notes Verbale or other diplomatic documents at the OPCW, urging Russia to adhere to the CWC and refrain from any violations. In July 2024, the OPCW conducted a Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) to Ukraine. The CSP in November 2024 discussed Russia’s use of chemical weapons. Prior to the meeting, Nicole Shampaine, the U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, reiterated the commitment of the United States, along with “many other countries in ensuring this issue is at the top of the agenda at the OPCW in order to hold Russia accountable for its actions.”

In response to Russia’s activities and to deter future uses of chemical weapons, Western countries have implemented a series of measures aimed at holding Russia responsible. In May 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian entities in response to Russia’s use of riot control agents and chloropicrin, a chemical weapon with origins dating back to World War I. Similarly, the United Kingdom, in October 2024, sanctioned Russia’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense forces and Lt. General Igor Kirillov, the chief propagandist spreading disinformation on the deployment of chemical weapons in Ukraine and the CWC.

Russia’s Repeated Efforts to Regain an OPCW Executive Council Seat

Contrary to Russia’s false rhetorical narrative, the overwhelming majority of the Eastern Europe Group in the OPCW do not want Russia as its regional representative because it has used chemical weapons, sought to undermine the OPCW, and invaded one of the regional group members. An overwhelming number of Eastern Europe states have argued that until Russia complies with the CWC and stops trying to subvert it, it is not qualified to represent Eastern Europe states at the OPCW.

In November 2023, Russia lost its seat at the Executive Council of the OPCW for the term that started in May 2024. The CSP elected Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania to represent Eastern Europe. The region has five seats on the Executive Council, and two of these seats were scheduled for reelection at the CSP, slated for November 25-29, 2024. In a bid to regain its influence within the OPCW, Russia put forward its candidacy, competing against the Czech Republic and North Macedonia. It publicly declared its intention to vigorously fight for reelection, falsely claiming the West “may resort to…provocations, fraud, pressure, blackmail, [and] threats.” 

In July 2024, Russia announced its candidacy for a seat on the OPCW Executive Council. When questioned about its prospects, the Russian Representative to OPCW emphasized that Russia would not have put forward its candidacy if it did not believe it had a viable chance of success. He further reasserted that Russia was prepared for months of laborious work to make it happen. In its campaign, Russia continued to push narratives claiming that Western countries are attempting to “politicize” the OPCW and are preparing a “Syrian scenario” to undermine Russia, and the West would spare no effort to prevent Russia’s election. Russian Ambassador to the Netherlands and Permanent Representative to the OPCW, Vladimir Tarabrin, stated that he could not rule out the possibility of Western countries resorting to provocations, manipulation, coercion, blackmail, or threats in an effort to keep Russia away from the OPCW’s decision-making structures. These allegations have been echoed by major Russian propaganda outlets and propagandists, who argue that the U.S. provided funding to Ukraine to conduct a chemical attack and frame Russia, which would trigger similar OPCW procedures akin to those employed in response to Syria’s chemical weapons use.

In the lead-up to the November 2024 CSP, Russia actively lobbied and disseminated disinformation to garner support for its candidacy. Reports indicated that Russia attempted to secure its election through strategic vote trading with other member states. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated a memo reiterating key talking points to its embassies in several countries, including Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, and the Philippines. 

When the majority of CSP attending states supported the Czech Republic and North Macedonia to represent the Eastern Europe Group, Russia criticized the OPCW for what it termed “selective execution” and argued that Russia’s absence from the OPCW Executive Council weakened the CWC. Despite losing its candidacy to regain a seat on the OPCW’s Exeucutive Council, Russia vowed to remain active in the OPCW, asserted its intent to counter perceived abuses by the United States, which Russia accused of using the OPCW to cover U.S. wrongdoings. Russia’s statements and allegations had been featured in foreign media, for example, Chinese and Ghanaian outlets, which quoted Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov at length. Russia’s claims have been circulated within the German-language information space, notably by outlets such as Anti-Spiegel, which regularly repeats Russian narratives on current events.

Speaking to conference participants before the vote, Tarabrin also criticized efforts to block certain countries from joining the Executive Council, which he argued revealed an intent by some nations to exert excessive control over the OPCW’s operations. He emphasized Russia’s pivotal role in the region regarding chemical weapons monitoring and expertise. “Russia holds almost 37% of all declared objects in Eastern Europe that are subject to OPCW inspections,” he stated, calling Russia “the undisputed leader in the region” based on these figures. Tarabrin contrasted this with the campaigns of the Czech Republic and North Macedonia for the Executive Council, claiming that rather than highlighting their own achievements, these countries attempted to discredit Russia. Yet, Russia warrants being fact-checked on any number of issues.

To impede Russia’s reelection to the OPCW Executive Council, most of the states in the Eastern Europe Group (EEG) actively lobbied other states party to the CWC. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, has characterized Russian candidacy as “cynical.” In late October 2024, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Yuriy Gusev, urged Azerbaijan to support North Macedonia and the Czech Republic in the upcoming election. He emphasized the importance of sending a signal that the international community stands united against aggression. Similarly, an official from the Ukrainian Embassy in Malaysia stressed that allowing Russia to secure a seat on the Executive Council would undermine the OPCW’s credibility and send “a dangerous message to the world.”

On November 26, 2024, the states party to the CWC blocked Russia from a leadership seat and instead voted for the Czech Republic and North Macedonia to represent countries in the Eastern Europe regional group. This decision occurred just days after the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat issued a report confirming the use of toxic chemicals as weapons against Ukrainian forces. Despite Russia’s lobbying efforts and disinformation campaigns the OPCW’s finding factored prominently in the voting decisions of CWC member states. From one year to the next, support for Russia retaining a seat on the Executive Council of the OPCW has declined. In November 2023 Russia failed to secure a seat by 1 vote and in 2024 it failed by 12 votes. Similarly, in 2023 32 members states joined in a statement opposing Russia’s candidacy and in 2024 59 member states opposed its candidacy. Russia continues seemly undeterred with false claims regarding chemical weapons, but these vote trends, suggests that international community’s tolerance for Russia’s spurious claims is declining.

Ahead of the November 2024 elections to the Executive Council, Vladimir Tarabrin, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the OPCW, voiced concerns over what he described as the West’s deliberate efforts to paralyze the Eastern European Group’s activities within the organization. Speaking at the 29th Conference of States Parties to the OPCW, he pointed out that “18 out of the group’s 23 members are either full participants or align themselves with the European Union and NATO,” stressing Russia’s view that Western influence unjustly compromises the group’s autonomy. 

Russia spreads narratives about Western control over the OPCW to a broad international audience through its embassies’ social media accounts and by translating these statements for its global state media outlets, primarily RT and Sputnik. And Russia has already garnered some international support. For instance, former Major General of the Indian Army, Shashi Asthana, expressed views in an interview with state-sponsored Russian outlet RT that align with Russia’s narrative. He asserted that the United States has been attempting to discredit Russia by framing it as using chemical weapons. Asthana further suggested that the OPCW and other monitoring bodies are influenced by their Western sponsors, thereby undermining their authority.

Russia’s reaction to its failure in the OPCW elections was notably subdued. Only a few Russian domestic media reported on this development, and they did so rather reticently, as if such an outcome had been expected from the very beginning. Prominent Russian propagandists and military experts did not comment on the issue. The country’s international media outlets have also remained silent. Only Russia’s leading state news agency issued a statement in English, acknowledging that it had been unable to secure a seat within the OPCW’s Executive Council. This silence appears to be aimed at both downplaying the reputational setback and undermining the importance of the OPCW by implying that the outcome carries no serious consequences for Russia.

What is shocking about Russia’s quest to have a leadership role at the OPCW is that it has been a serial violator of this international accord banning the development, production, storage, and use of chemical weapons and relentless in its denials and deflections about its past activities and those of its allies such as the Assad regime in Syria. State parties that did not support Russia’s candidacy to gain a seat on the OPCW Executive Council showed that no amount of Russian disinformation or lobbying can change the historical record. The vote reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to ensure that no country that violates the core objectives of an internationally agreed-upon treaty is allowed to serve on its governing body.

African countries party to the CWC suggested changes to the CWC voting procedures for how representatives of regional groups are selected for the OPCW Executive Council. Changing the longstanding rules agreed to by all states party to the CWC and overlooking Russia’s history of not abiding by the core tenets of the accord, is a dangerous development. This is tantamount to re-negotiating the treaty to overlook a violator of its essential purpose. 

Russia’s track record of not abiding by the terms of the CWC and obstructing OPCW activities are examples of how it seeks to undermine the current international order. If Russia regained a leadership position within the OPCW, it could exploit this international platform to amplify its malign narratives and disrupt ongoing efforts to uphold the norm against chemical weapons. The result of the recent vote selecting countries other than Russia for leadership seats at the OPCW serves as an important signal that disinformation campaigns fail when confronted with facts from trusted third parties. 

Conclusions

Russian authorities will likely continue to deny accusations, deflect inquiries, distort facts, and fabricate stories to obscure their actions in Ukraine and around the globe. States party to the CWC should hold Russia to account for its chemical weapons use until it discloses its secret chemical weapons activities, and lays out a plan for coming into compliance with the CWC, an accord it helped negotiate. That is what a responsible nation should do. In the meantime, states party to the treaty should prevent Russia from holding any leadership positions at the OPCW. Suspending Russia’s rights and privileges is the next step for the international community to take, as it did after Syria used chemical weapons and obstructed the OPCW’s attempts to verify Syria’s claims of compliance. 

Russia has long been recognized for employing a range of strategies to influence the international agenda, leveraging opportunities to advance its interests through participation in international organizations. The OPCW was established to prevent the use of chemical weapons, which have devastating effects on civilians, and to uphold the norms of the CWC. Allowing Russia to exploit its position within the organization and potentially gain a leadership seat in the future, along with any attempts to change the OPCW rules and procedures to benefit Russia even without a formal leadership role, poses significant concerns, given the evidence of its prior obstructions of the organization’s functioning and alleged use of chemical weapons. Such a scenario could send a perilous message to other potential malign actors, risking undermining the system of deterrence that the OPCW and similar organizations are designed to uphold.