Formation of Human Identity under the Impact of the Occupation Regime in Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine

The Russian occupation regime employs a wide range of propaganda and oppression methods, which inevitably affect the perception and self-identification of the locals, significantly complicating the process of future reintegration. Based upon a series of interviews with those who have lived or still live in the temporarily occupied territories, I have classified the tools used by the dictatorship according to Robert Lifton’s “Eight Criteria for Thought Reform” proposed in his book “Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism.” Applying this analysis to factors and dynamics of identity formation among residents of the temporarily occupied regions , we will be better equipped to understand the motives and beliefs of these people, which will make future policies regarding local population much more effective.

One of the decisive tools for changing identity used by the occupation regime is milieu control. On the one hand, technical isolation makes it possible to establish total control over the information space by restricting access to Ukrainian and global sources. On the other hand, the use of Russian information providers is encouraged and streamlined. In a situation when seeking alternative sources of information is either impossible or requires significant effort, people tend to learn about the news via the interpretation of Russian media. “Every fact is discussed on all TV channels around the clock. It just settles in your mind,” one of the female residents shares. The repetition of information by different sources creates an illusion of objectivity, which particularly destructively affects individuals unfamiliar with media literacy.

The effect of technical isolation is intensified by physical one. Even before the conflict escalated, crossing the temporary demarcation line could take up to several days. The system of checkpoints and official procedures became not only a physical, but also a psychological challenge for locals. Recalling her experience of living in occupied Donetsk, one of the respondents shares: “The most difficult thing for me was not even hearing constant shelling but crossing the border of the so-called republics.”

The procedure of passing border control includes hours of waiting in line, document checks, interrogations, and often inspections of personal belongings. “I saw how a girl who was ahead of me in line was forced to partially undress in search of suspicious tattoos or marks from weapon carrying,” one of the respondents shares her memories. “Once I witnessed a situation when an elderly man passed out after long hours of waiting in line. His family approached a military officer asking for help, and he responded that he could only shoot him to spare his suffering,” another respondent shares. Observing the suffering of others, individuals crossing the border experience intense emotional stress driven by feelings of guilt, fear for their own lives, and secondary traumatization.

One of the respondents was a female volunteer who worked on both sides of the demarcation line. “I had to come up with a story about working at a market and visiting Ukraine to buy goods because they were asking why I crossed the border so frequently,” she tells. “They have a lot of information about your profession, lifestyle, and movements, and that’s the most stressful part – because you don’t know what exactly they know.” The border control system creates conditions where people are forced to lie or conceal facts, feeding subconscious feelings of guilt and self-betrayal. The physical and psychological hardships compel individuals in temporarily occupied territories to think twice before crossing the border, and even if they do, this process becomes deeply ingrained in their subconscious as something extremely negative.

In the conditions of total information control, propaganda also employs mystical manipulations to convince people of the omnipotence and righteousness of the ruling regime. When talking to those who have been influenced by this, one can notice that they are given precise dates and forecasts regarding hypothetical events. “They told us that Ukraine would attempt to seize Donbas on March 8th; they even showed us their plan, and Russia saved us by attacking first,” a typical propaganda narrative emerged during one of the interviews. According to local residents, such statements are spread both through official media and word of mouth: “At some point, you find yourself surrounded by rumors of something ‘approaching.'” Typically, these “forecasts” do not come true but rather are used to create psychological tension. The predicted events are often provoked or orchestrated by the authorities themselves. In any case, the occupation authority gains from this by claiming either “we predicted this” or “we prevented this,” thus ensuring an image of a prophet or a savior for themselves.

Among other typical instruments, local propaganda actively exploits loading of language. In conversations with people influenced by it, one can often hear specific words or entire phrases that function solely within the framework of the propaganda lexicon. “Ukrainian Nazis,” “Bandera followers,” and “they bombed Donbas for eight years” are the most common among them. This jargon consists of template clichés that serve to alter people’s thinking according to the thought pattern of the group. When the question “What did you feel when the war escalated in 2022?” is posed, one of the respondents corrects it: “When the ‘special military operation‘ started…”. Such words serve as euphemisms to soften potential popular dissatisfaction, and people are inclined to adopt them to avoid a subconscious sense of guilt and confusion.

Finally, the propaganda doctrine is presented as the ultimate truth. In the case of temporarily occupied territories, it largely exploits the collective trauma of the population. Since 2014, local residents have been living under uncertainty and constant fear for their lives. Experiencing moral or physical trauma, almost everyone has faced a sharp sense of injustice without clear rational direction, and propaganda exploited this vulnerability. It provides the population with clear pseudological explanations of ongoing events and creates an image of the “main enemy.”

The respondents’ answers to the request to determine who is to blame for the war vary. Still, the majority assert that “America (or the West) orchestrated everything, and the Ukrainian authorities sold the country to them,” or “we just wanted to be independent republics, and Ukraine attacked us,” and so on. People are emotionally attached to this doctrine because they lack other explanations for the events, and their entire worldview hinges on this single interpretation that is viable in a totalitarian society. Any attempt to question their beliefs is met with hostility. The propagandist dogma, rooted in personal traumatic experiences, is very personal to those who adhere to it; it has become a part of their identity, and they defend it against anything that might undermine it.

Even personal experiences and general events are subservient to the doctrine, and anything that doesn’t fit into this system is marked as “fake” or just another confirmation of the enemy’s deceitfulness and errors. “Russia doesn’t attack civilian infrastructure,” or if it does, it must be that “Ukrainian soldiers hide ammunition there.” “In one of the TV shows, we saw how they hide weapons in a supermarket.” “Bucha is a fake created by Ukrainians to show that Russians are bad.” Even with photos, videos, and confirmations from independent experts, the response often becomes, “How do you know those weren’t Ukrainian soldiers dressed in Russian military uniforms?” – such pseudo-logical chains are commonly heard in conversations with respondents.

The regime’s manipulations contribute to this binary way of thinking, emphasizing the contrast between “us” and “them.” On the one hand, Ukraine is portrayed as a “poor country falling apart and bombing its own territories,” while Russia is presented as the “elder brother” who aims to help the “republics.” To support this narrative, the local authorities employ classic populist tactics: they satisfy the basic needs of the population, such as social protection through pensions and other payments, low utility prices, humanitarian aid etc. All of this is extensively covered in the media as Russia’s generosity and benevolence toward its protectorate. State holidays are used as an effective political tool for this purpose too. In May, a series of public celebrations traditionally takes place, glorifying the independence day of the “republics,” Victory Day in the “Great Patriotic War,” and other related holidays. As a result of this campaign, the local population often sympathizes with Russia not so much due to a negative view of Ukraine but because they perceive Russia as a “savior” and “protector.”

In addition to shaping a new identity, propaganda in the temporarily occupied territories works to sever connections with the old one. Locals are forced to understand that their Ukrainian identity has no place neither in the so-called “republics” nor in the territories controlled by Ukraine. Many inhabitants are convinced that they are considered traitors in Ukraine and fear punishment if they were to go there. Putin’s recent order [1] for the forced passportization of the population in the occupied territories became the culmination of this cynical policy. When attempting to define their national identity, respondents mostly find themselves in doubt: “I was born in Ukraine, but now I have a Russian passport, so I’m probably Russian now, and for Ukraine, I’m a traitor,” says one of them. Many residents feel moral guilt for their actions under the pressure of occupants and adopt the new national identity of the “republicans” or Russians simply because they have been convinced that there is no way back.

Over the course of nine years, during which cynical Russian policies had free rein in the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine, the identity of local residents has dramatically changed. Even after liberation of these territories, appealing to these people’s consciousness and establishing constructive dialogue with them will be exceedingly difficult.

As a result of the trauma experienced by local residents due to the actions of the enemy regime in the temporarily occupied territories, a unique type of society has emerged for which most existing political solutions may not work. Post-occupation policy measures proposed by government representatives and Ukrainian citizens at this stage often lack sensitivity to the trauma of the local population and the changes their worldview has undergone during the long-term occupation.

However, in order to establish a functioning and cohesive democratic society, it is extremely important to lay the ground for productive collaboration with people residing in the temporarily occupied territories. To achieve this goal, it is crucial to pay special attention to comprehensive research on identity formation under occupation, which will serve as the foundation for developing effective reintegration policies in the future.