“Not the Right Time”: Fact-Checking Politicians’ Statements on Derussificat

Renaming or dismantling Russian monuments is also being discussed at the local level. Not all Ukrainian politicians support shedding Russian and Soviet legacies. Fakes and manipulations are being used: some distort historical facts or sociological data, while others argue that it is “not the right time” for decolonization and it should be postponed until after the war. VoxCheck analysts examined the derussification efforts at the local level and the falsehoods being spread about it.

Derussification: from decommunization to decolonization

The process of decommunization in Ukraine began after gaining independence but significantly intensified in 2014 following the Revolution of Dignity and the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In 2015, four decommunization laws were passed to regulate different aspects of this process: honoring the memory of Ukraine’s independence fighters in the 20th century, rethinking events of World War II, accessing Soviet special service archives for historical research, and banning the propaganda of communist and Nazi regimes.

By April 2019, 987 settlements and 25 districts had been renamed, almost 52,000 toponyms changed, and about 2,500 monuments and memorials promoting the totalitarian regime were dismantled. Discussions about transitioning from decommunization to decolonization began, aimed at eliminating the influence of Russia’s imperial past.

The full-scale invasion became the catalyst for action. In 2022 alone, Ukraine renamed nearly 10,000 toponyms and dismantled 145 monuments associated with Russian imperial propaganda. Since July 27, 2023, a law has been in effect condemning and banning the propaganda of Russian imperial policies in Ukraine and decolonizing toponymy.

Local authorities were given nine months from the date of adoption to rename toponyms (six months initially, with an additional three months if the process couldn’t be completed within the first period). If local authorities failed to complete the renaming process, the responsibility shifted to regional state administrations. The process was supposed to conclude by July 2024, but it is still ongoing.

One key issue is the lack of proper dialogue between authorities and communities about the consequences of renaming and the decision-making process itself. According to a Transparency International report, municipalities faced criticism from residents both over the process and the new names, leading to prolonged debates. Conversely, the public criticized the limited time allocated for discussions or the removal of previously approved names from voting lists. Both sides also noted the use of impersonal, neutral names instead of historical figures.

As explained by Vakhtang Kipiani, editor-in-chief of Historical Truth, renaming should be accompanied by restoring Ukrainian identity. Opting for “neutral” cultural figures, such as Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka, or Ivan Kotliarevskyi, instead of historical figures tied to specific regions, denies local historical context. For example, in 2016, Lenin Avenue in Mykolaiv was renamed Central Avenue instead of Arkasivskyi Avenue, in honor of Mykola Arkas, a Ukrainian writer and composer who lived in Mykolaiv. Similarly, renaming Yuzhnoukrainsk to Pivdennoukrainsk disregarded the option of Hard, a name with local roots.

Manipulating history

Historical manipulations are among the most common during discussions on the policy of derussification. In the quotes we checked, politicians most often mentioned the “nationwide recognition of Russian figures” (for example, “Pushkin and Gagarin are respected in Ukraine and around the world”), ignored the crimes of certain Russians, or denied the historical connection of new names with Ukraine.

In recent months, the monument to Pushkin in Odesa has become a subject of manipulation. Its removal has been approved by the city council’s executive committee. However, Hennadii Trukhanov, the mayor of Odesa, has repeatedly defended its preservation.

The number of admirers of Alexander Pushkin worldwide has no relevance to the issue of dismantling his monument in Ukraine, as long as Pushkin remains a symbol of Russian imperialism. Pushkin is a perfect example of someone who falls under the Ukrainian law “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and the Decolonization of Toponymy”. This law prohibits honoring individuals in monuments who supported, glorified, or justified Russian imperial policy. This is exactly what Alexander Pushkin did, as anyone who has studied his works beyond memorizing “There stands a green oak by the bay” and Eugene Onegin from the Soviet school curriculum would know. For instance, in his poem Poltava, Pushkin glorified Russian Tsar Peter I:

By the order of this “genius Peter” in November 1708, the Russians destroyed the Cossack capital of Baturyn, brutally killing over 11,000 residents, including children, women, and the elderly. A contemporary French newspaper described the tragedy: “All the inhabitants of Baturyn, regardless of age or gender, were slaughtered, as dictated by the inhuman customs of the Muscovites… All of Ukraine is bathed in blood.” In May 1709, the same tsar destroyed the Zaporizhian Cossack capital, Chortomlyk Sich. According to the testimony of Cossack leader Stepanenko, during the suppression of the Cossacks, imperial troops even dug up the graves of the deceased and severed their heads.

Meanwhile, Pushkin portrayed the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa in an extremely negative light, portraying him as having “dark intentions”:

The writer, who, according to Trukhanov, supposedly “does not belong to Russia”, wrote “An Essay on the History of Ukraine”, in which he denied its existence. In this essay, he referred to Ukraine as “Malorussia (Little Russia)” and criticized its aspirations for independence:

Overall, Pushkin supported the empire’s occupation of new territories and disdained anyone who dared to resist the tsar’s rule. Take, for example, the line “Accept, Caucasus, that Yermolov is coming!” In Russia, Yermolov is glorified as a great commander who “conquered” the Caucasus. However, in the Caucasus, he was known as the “bloody general”, remembered as a brutal executioner responsible for the genocide of local mountain peoples. Pushkin’s works are steeped in the propaganda of Russian culture and people as superior to others, in the justification of imperial conquest, and in the legitimization of genocides. This is why he remains a powerful symbol for Russia, and it absolutely claims him as its own. His monuments, like his works, are part of the colonial heritage imposed on Ukrainians. Rejecting the cult of Pushkin is a necessary step for a nation that has fought hard to free itself from the oppression of an empire that changed its name but not its essence.

Trukhanov claims that the Pushkin monument was not installed by the government or by Empress Catherine, but by Odesa residents themselves, allegedly through community fundraising. However, this is a myth that was debunked long ago by Mykhailo Komarov (1844–1913) — an Odesa native, lexicographer, and leader of the city’s Ukrainian community during the time the monument was erected. In 1889, Komarov published an article in the Galician nationalist magazine Pravda, detailing how funds were raised for the Pushkin monument. 

Komarov reported that the fundraising was organized by the “Slavic Charitable Society”, which repeatedly appealed to the townspeople, actively collected contributions, frequently lobbied the city administration, and even sought assistance from the governor-general until they managed to scrape together the needed 20,000 rubles. He lamented that this society was engaged in promoting Russian imperialism and culture:

Komarov reported that the collection was organized by a “Slavic charitable society”. “It appealed to the townspeople more than once, and sincerely collected the money itself, and the city administration was often disturbed and even turned to the governor general for help while it was somehow getting by on those poor 20 thousand rubles.” The Ukrainian complains that this community was engaged in propaganda of Russian imperialism and culture: “‘Slavic societies’ in Russia do not adhere to the official lines of their charters at all and are most concerned with all kinds of agitation and swaying among the Slavs in the direction of bringing them under the arm of the dominion of the ‘big brother’. This is the purpose for which the greatness of the memory of Pushkin seemed to serve them. Why not really humble themselves before the Slavs? Look, it’s not stupid that we call ourselves elder brothers, because we have such great poets that monuments to them are erected everywhere.” Komarov recalls that ordinary Odesans did not show enthusiasm for the opening of the monument.

The next argument for preserving this symbol of the Russian Empire in a regional center of Ukraine is its supposed “global significance” as part of UNESCO heritage.

In 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy excluded the Pushkin monument from the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Cultural Heritage, so Ukrainian legislation allows it to be dismantled. In order to finally dismantle the monument, it is still necessary to obtain the consent of UNESCO — the monument is indeed located in a protected zone, so such actions must be coordinated with the organization.

However, there is no reason to believe that UNESCO will not grant this permission. Artem Kartashov, a lawyer and member of the working group on the implementation of the decolonization law under the Odesa Regional Military Administration, argues that the UNESCO nomination dossier includes provisions for the protection of only one monument — the Duke de Richelieu. This monument, unlike Pushkin’s, was part of the historical and architectural landscape that the organization placed under protection. “The Pushkin monument appeared much later than when the Russian Empire began developing Odesa in the form depicted in the historical center,” the expert notes. Thus, the next statement by the mayor of Odesa is also manipulative — dismantling the Pushkin monument will not “reset” the city.

The Odesa mayor also expressed outrage over the recent renaming of toponyms and tried to take steps to reverse this decision. His argument: street names are intangible cultural heritage that reflects Odesa’s multiculturalism. But this is refuted by the logic of the renaming itself: returning the historical name “Italian” to Pushkinska Street actually emphasizes Odesa’s multiculturalism. And UNESCO will protect the architecture of Odesa’s center, but not its street names.

Yes, UNESCO is indeed involved in the protection of cultural heritage during armed conflicts, but this mostly concerns physical sites, not names. UNESCO’s main focus in Ukraine is on preserving architectural landmarks, historical ensembles, and natural sites. The UNESCO Constitution does not contain direct references to the protection of street names.

The mayor is also against the renaming of streets named after famous residents of Odesa who “created” the city. However, streets are being renamed in honor of figures who also contributed to its development, with the distinction that the new names commemorate Ukrainians. For example, Zhukovskyi Street is now named after Sviatoslav Karavanskyi — an Odesa native, writer, renowned linguist, and dissident. The neighboring Bunin Street was renamed in honor of Nina Strokata — an Odesa native, microbiologist, activist, and human rights defender.

During World War II, Viktor Lyagin organized a reconnaissance and sabotage group to fight against the German occupiers. They gathered information about the location of Hitler’s military units in Mykolaiv, intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, the plans of the occupation authorities, and ship repairs at shipbuilding plants. However, Lyagin’s biography also includes controversial moments regarding his career path. Before World War II, Viktor Lyagin was a member of the NKVD. This period of his life became the reason for the advisability of renaming Lyagin Street to Rizdviana Street. According to the Law of Ukraine “On Geographical Names”, it is prohibited to assign geographical objects the names or pseudonyms of individuals who worked in Soviet state security agencies.

The renaming of Hryhorii Potemkin Street is driven by his anti-Ukrainian actions. Notably, the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich under Potemkin’s leadership was a decisive step in subordinating the Cossacks to the Russian Empire. For a long time, the Sich functioned as an autonomous military and political force defending Ukraine’s southern borders from the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. However, after the Russian Empire’s victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, the need for Cossack detachments diminished.

Additionally, Catherine II feared separatist sentiments among the Cossacks and aimed to centralize power and integrate Ukrainian territories into the empire. The elimination of the Zaporizhian Sich was a key step in this direction — one she entrusted to Hryhorii Potemkin. Potemkin sought to neutralize Petro Kalnyshevskyi, who was a central figure in the governance structure of the Sich. Removing Kalnyshevskyi would dismantle the Sich’s administration and allow for its annexation to the Novorossiysk Governorate, governed by Potemkin. This would enable Potemkin to expand his territorial control and political influence. However, Kalnyshevskyi resisted such plans. So, on June 15, 1775, by order of Catherine II, Russian troops destroyed the Zaporizhian Sich.

As for the renaming of Mykhailo Faleev Street, he was a figure within Potemkin’s circle. He worked as a merchant and was involved in urban development and shipbuilding. However, no publicly available historical records or documented actions indicate that Faleev engaged in efforts to suppress Ukrainian identity. Nor are there any recorded opinions or statements that could serve as grounds for renaming the street.

We found no evidence to support Dmytruk’s claim that museums abroad — even in former “socialist bloc” countries — dedicate entire floors to Yuri Gagarin. Dmytruk himself provides no proof, nor does he name specific museums.

Moreover, Ukraine is not erasing or forgetting Gagarin’s legacy. Ukrainian history textbooks — including those used by students in Odesa and Odesa region — do mention Yuri Gagarin as the first human in space.

Open sources indicate that Gagarin visited Odesa only once — the same visit shown in the photo shared by Dmytruk. Lesia Ukrainka, on the other hand, visited the city multiple times while undergoing medical treatment. Overall, Gagarin had no deep ties to Ukraine or significant impact on its history, nor did he make any controversial statements about the country. Nonetheless, he remains a symbol of the Soviet era — one that Russia continues to use in its propaganda.

What’s more, the history of Ukrainian space exploration also includes notable figures. These include Leonid Kadeniuk — the first and so far only astronaut of independent Ukraine; Judith Resnik — the first ethnic Ukrainian in orbit; and Heidemarie Stefanyshyn-Piper — a Ukrainian of American origin who performed spacewalks, among others.

The issue of renaming streets related to the Second World War and the Afghan War is indeed debatable and each case requires individual historical analysis.

Ukraine has recognized the USSR’s war in Afghanistan as an act of aggression, but Ukrainians who participated in it are equated to combatants. Since the beginning of the decommunization process in 2015, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory did not recommend renaming streets or dismantling monuments related to individuals or events of the Afghan War of 1979–1989. However, names containing the mention of “internationalist soldiers” were subject to renaming, as this term is associated with the activities of the so-called Bolshevik “Red Army international brigades”, which included Chinese, Hungarians, Czechs, Germans, Latvians, and other foreigners. The official pretext for the invasion of Soviet troops into Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) was precisely the “provision of international assistance” and the fulfillment of an “international duty”.

The topic of the Second World War, or more precisely the “Great Patriotic War”, began to be cultivated years after the victory itself, and often not for the purpose of preserving the memory of heroic military deeds. It was about creating a “cult of victory” and forming a Soviet identity on this basis.

However, legislation does not require the renaming of all toponyms related to these historical periods. Thus, toponyms must not glorify Russian imperial policy or be dedicated to individuals who:

• held leadership positions in state structures, the military, and parties, including those created by the empire in subordinated territories; participated in the implementation of Russian imperial policy;
• were employees of Soviet state security bodies at all levels;
• publicly supported Russian imperial policy.

Commemorative signs related to the resistance and expulsion of the Nazis from Ukraine are not subject to prohibition. Nor are those signs that were established during the USSR or the Russian Empire, as long as they do not glorify Russian imperial policy.

“People’s” sociology

Sociological surveys are an important indicator of whether the population truly supports renaming in their hometowns. However, politicians often refer to polls that do not reflect the opinion of the entire population (surveys on social networks or street interviews with a few passersby). Or they do not refer to anything at all, limiting themselves to the comment “most locals are against it”.

Trukhanov argued that the decision on the dismantling of Pushkin and the renaming of streets should be made by the community. He organized a public discussion by creating a poll on Telegram, which allegedly showed that residents were against it. The option “Against renaming and dismantling” received 95,278 votes, and “For renaming and dismantling” — 93,641.

Let’s start with why the results of a poll on the mayor’s Telegram channel do not represent the public opinion of Odesa residents. Only sociological studies with a sample that takes into account all population categories (by gender, age, income level, etc.) and with developed data collection and processing methodology have such strength. On Telegram, however, not only residents of a particular city can vote — anyone can, as Trukhanov himself notes by thanking residents of other cities for participating in the vote. And the difference in votes is so minimal that it’s hard to say for sure that Odesa residents firmly support preserving the monument and street names.

First, street surveys are non-representative and reflect the opinion of only specific respondents, not the entire population or a part of it. Second, Dmytruk manipulates by claiming that the first respondent allegedly knows nothing about the history of Odesa and believes everything must be banned, destroyed, and renamed. We found the original survey video. In it, the girl interviewed supported the renaming of Odesa streets in honor of fallen Ukrainian heroes. She said nothing about banning or destroying anything. And she was not asked about the city’s history at all, nor did she comment on it.

There are no sociological surveys that would answer the question of whether Odesa residents support particular street renamings. However, if we look at national-level studies, Ukrainians generally view the renaming of toponyms related to Russia positively. According to a joint survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center as of late 2022, 59% of Ukrainians gave a positive assessment, 13% — negative. The remaining respondents expressed indifference (almost 19%) or refused to answer (9%). Among residents of the East, the share of positive responses was 53%, in the South — about 23%. At the same time, the number of negative responses ranged between 20–30%.

In 2024, the Rating Sociological Group studied Ukrainians’ attitudes toward renaming in honor of remembrance. Nearly 90% of respondents viewed positively the renaming of cities, streets, or squares in honor of fallen soldiers, military personnel, and veterans; about 80% — in honor of volunteers; and 67% — in honor of civilians. Although this does not indicate citizens’ attitudes toward renaming toponyms related to Russia, it demonstrates society’s general readiness for name changes.

“Not the right time”

“Not the right time” — this phrase is heard every time a politician wants to justify canceling or delaying renamings. The claim is that there’s no sense in focusing on renamings when there are more important areas of work for politicians. The reasons may vary — some deputies suggest “not dividing society and postponing this issue until the end of the war”, others emphasize that renamings will consume too many resources, which would be better directed toward urban improvement or defense.

Defense spending, including naval support, is a top priority in the state budget. In 2024, nearly UAH 1.2 trillion was allocated for defense, while about UAH 11 billion was allocated for culture, including public broadcasting.

After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine lost over 80% of its naval assets and capabilities. At that point, funding for the construction of several large military ships ceased, with focus shifting to smaller capacities. With the full-scale invasion, naval development has intensified: the Navy has added many new units and structures, including the creation of a river flotilla and a marine corps.

As for renaming streets and cities, this process is funded by local budgets. Usually, this involves planned spending on producing new street signs as part of city beautification. Residents don’t need to register new documents or pay for this.

We were unable to find data on what average percentage of the state budget is spent on renaming urban toponyms. However, in September 2023, analysts from Transparency International Ukraine published a study on how local authorities procure signs and how much has already been replaced. They analyzed 19 regional centers and the city of Kramatorsk, where toponyms were renamed during 2022–2023. The study found that in several cities, sign replacements have not yet begun and are not planned — including to redirect funds to address issues related to Russian aggression.

The analysts also stated that municipalities often lacked data on how many signs and markers needed to be changed and did not allocate funds in the budget for new signs. This suggests that local authorities independently set financial priorities, and there is no requirement to urgently replace all signs immediately after official renamings.

The MP uses covert manipulation and attempts to sow feelings of “betrayal” among readers. Firstly, street renaming is not directly carried out by MPs, President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, or the Head of the Presidential Office Andrii Yermak, as Dubinskyi tries to portray. The Verkhovna Rada (i.e., MPs) makes decisions regarding the renaming of geographic names of settlements, cities, districts, towns, and villages.

Meanwhile, decisions about renaming streets are made at the local level. As mentioned above, any citizen can submit a request to the village, town, or city head. The head must consider it and submit it for public discussion. This process runs in parallel with arms procurement for the front and addressing issues in the military-industrial complex.

Secondly, while streets are being renamed at the local level, the government is simultaneously purchasing weapons for the Defense Forces and addressing urgent problems. Weapons production in Ukraine is only increasing. According to Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, in the first 8 months of 2024, Ukraine doubled its arms production compared to the previous year. Moreover, the largest portion of Ukraine’s state budget since the start of the full-scale invasion has been allocated to defense.

Additionally, street renaming does not require large state budget expenditures. According to the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, on average, 3–5% of streets are subject to renaming, and in the East — about 10%. The renaming process itself is free, with costs limited to the production of signs. Even those are funded by local budgets under beautification expenditures. For instance, according to Transparency International, in 2022–2023, five cities in Ukraine spent about UAH 14 million from local budgets to produce 9,900 signs for renamed streets. Current cost data for street renamings in 2024 is not available.

So it is incorrect to compare the government’s work on solving military-industrial complex issues and arms procurement with street renamings, which are handled by entirely different agencies.

Conclusions

Despite the deadlines set, the decolonization process continues. The NGO “Decolonization. Ukraine” collects data on toponyms and objects falling under the laws on decolonization and decommunization. As of October 6, 2024, the organization’s map marked more than 3,000 objects requiring dismantling or renaming. And this count only includes monuments and objects, not streets.

Renaming is not about changing signs, but about restoring Ukrainian identity and forming national consciousness. This process requires a thoughtful approach, considering local historical context, assessments by historians and experts, and public opinion. And explanation — why a particular street should be renamed and what the person whose name it bears actually represents in Ukrainian history. So here’s how to “catch” a politician lying about derussification:

• manipulating historical facts;
• manipulating sociology;
• justifying the absence or delay of renamings with the narrative “not the right time.”
  

In reality, what’s not the right time is to play into Russian propaganda and help preserve Soviet and imperial narratives in the names of Ukrainian streets and settlements.