Important Draft Laws. Issue 50: Rebooting the SBI, Ministerial Interpellation, NABU’s Jurisdiction, and New Privatization Rules

Rebooting the SBI: changes to status, appointment procedures, and accountability

The State Bureau of Investigation is a state law enforcement agency subordinated to the President. The President determines the Bureau’s organizational structure, appoints the director on the recommendation of a selection commission, and may dismiss the director at his discretion. Under Bill No. 13602, the SBI would be transformed into a central executive authority, removing it from the President’s direct control. The Cabinet of Ministers would appoint the director on the recommendation of the selection commission. In contrast, the director would establish the Bureau’s organizational structure and appoint deputies based on recommendations from internal personnel commissions. The Cabinet of Ministers would be able to dismiss the SBI director only based on a clear list of grounds: reaching the age of 65, acquiring the citizenship of another country, a court decision, failure to pay alimony, or a negative conclusion from an external evaluation (see below).

MPs are also proposing to change the rules for the selection commission for the SBI director. It currently consists of nine members: three appointed by the President, Parliament, and the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet’s appointees are selected from candidates proposed by international organizations in the anti-corruption field. The commission chooses one winner by majority vote, and the President must appoint that candidate. However, the law does not specify what happens if the President refuses to appoint the candidate chosen in the competition.

The bill proposes reducing the size of the selection commission from nine to six members: three designated by the Cabinet of Ministers and three appointed by the government from among candidates proposed by international organizations working in the anti-corruption field (the list of such organizations being determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). A decision would require at least four votes, including at least two from the representatives of international organizations.

The commission would select one winner of the competition and submit the candidate to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval, which would have to take place within ten days. However, the bill does not specify what would happen if the government fails to appoint a director within the prescribed period.

The bill would also reduce MPs’ influence over the SBI. Currently, 150 votes in Parliament are sufficient to summon the SBI director to deliver a report. If, after hearing the report, Parliament finds the director’s performance unsatisfactory, the President may dismiss him on that basis. Under the bill, the SBI director would instead be obliged to present an annual report to both Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers, but this would not be grounds for further decisions.

The bill would also change the approach to selecting SBI staff. Currently, the director determines the procedure for holding competitions for positions and forming selection commissions. The bill would rename these commissions as personnel commissions and establish that they consist of five members: at least two nominated by assemblies of civil society organizations, and at least one by the SBI’s Public Oversight Council. A personnel commission decision would be considered adopted if three members voted in favor, including at least one nominated by the assemblies of civil society organizations.

The assemblies of civil society organizations would be convened by the SBI director, who would determine the time and place. Organizations eligible to participate must have worked for at least five years in anti-corruption, law enforcement reform, human rights, or business protection. Organizations that have received funding from entities of the aggressor state, or international technical assistance whose donor is the aggressor state, would not be allowed to participate (the bill contains an ambiguity here, since the wording “technical assistance whose donor is the aggressor state” could formally be understood to cover even organizations such as the World Bank or the UN, which at some point received contributions from Russia). The document package for participation would include a recommendation letter from an international organization, copies of financial audit reports for at least two projects involving international technical assistance, a biographical note on the CSO’s representative, and the candidates the CSO nominates to the personnel commission. Within ten days, the SBI director would admit organizations to the assemblies or publish reasoned refusals. The SBI website would then publish the list of admitted CSOs together with the candidates they nominated. The assemblies would be considered valid if at least five CSOs participate.

MPs also propose that one year and three years after the appointment of the SBI director, the Bureau’s work be evaluated by a Commission for External Independent Assessment. This commission would consist of three experts appointed by the government on the recommendation of international organizations that have provided Ukraine with technical assistance in anti-corruption. The commission would independently develop its methodology, collect data, assess the effectiveness of the SBI and its director, and provide recommendations. For a thorough evaluation, it would have access to completed proceedings and interviews and could submit requests to any government body or private individual. A negative review of the SBI’s work would be one of the grounds for the Cabinet of Ministers to dismiss its director.

An alternative bill, No. 13602-2, provides that the SBI retain the status of a law enforcement agency. The government would appoint the director based on a competition and determine the organization’s structure.

The selection commission for appointing the director would also consist of nine members, but with two differences: the Cabinet of Ministers would continue to appoint three members; instead of Parliament as a whole, three members would be designated by the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement; and instead of three members appointed by the President, the government would select three from among representatives of civil society organizations chosen through an open competition with online voting, the rules for which would be set by the government. The regulations for decision-making would also differ: not by majority of the full commission, but by majority of those present, provided that at least six members participate.

Another alternative bill, No. 13602-1, proposes abolishing the State Bureau of Investigation and transferring its functions to the Security Service of Ukraine and the Military Police.

Introducing interpellation as a form of parliamentary oversight of ministers

Parliament exercises oversight of ministers through MPs’ inquiries, committee hearings, government reports, and participation in “question hour,” during which a specific minister may be heard. These mechanisms are informational only and do not require assessing a minister’s performance or deciding on dismissal. Current legislation contains no special procedure with such legal consequences.

Bill No. 13596 seeks to introduce interpellation, a procedure of parliamentary oversight of ministers. It would require the Verkhovna Rada to consider a minister’s actions, inactions, or decisions and allow Parliament to declare the minister’s performance unsatisfactory.

Grounds for interpellation would include violations or obstruction of the rights or interests of the state, citizens, or legal entities, as well as breaches of international obligations. An interpellation could be initiated by at least 45 MPs or a committee whose field of competence corresponds to the ministry concerned. For example, the Committee on Economic Development could begin a review of the Minister of Economy, and the Committee on Education and Science could initiate a review of the Minister of Education. The request must be submitted in writing, include a justification, and be accompanied by either a list of MPs’ signatures or an extract from the committee’s minutes.

The Speaker of Parliament would be required to consider the request within 15 days. The Speaker could refuse a request only in cases of formal noncompliance, repeat interpellation of the same minister within three months, or if one-third of the government had already been dismissed in the same year or session as a result of previous interpellations. The minister concerned would be required to attend the parliamentary session, provide explanations, and answer questions.

If a resolution is adopted declaring a minister’s performance unsatisfactory, the Prime Minister would be required to submit a motion for that minister’s dismissal to Parliament within 15 days. If not, Parliament itself would consider the matter. In the case of the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Parliament would recommend that the President submit a motion for dismissal. However, the President could decline to act, and the bill does not specify any further procedure for Parliament in that case.

Expanding the list of officials whose criminal cases fall under NABU’s jurisdiction

The Criminal Procedure Code defines the officials whose corruption-related cases are investigated by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). These include former Presidents of Ukraine, Members of Parliament, Cabinet members, judges, heads of central executive authorities, senior local government officials, directors of large state-owned enterprises—those with more than 250 employees and annual revenues of at least €50 million—namely the largest state or municipal companies such as Naftogaz, Ukrzaliznytsia, Ukrenergo, Energoatom, and the major regional energy companies, as well as senior officers of the security sector (major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, general of the Army of Ukraine, rear admiral, vice admiral, admiral).

Bill No. 13617 proposes adding to this list the Head of the President’s Office, his deputies, the Director of the State Bureau of Investigation, and his deputies. This would place corruption cases against these officials within NABU’s jurisdiction.

Recently, the High Anti-Corruption Court required the Prosecutor General to return a case involving the Deputy Head of the President’s Office from the Security Service of Ukraine to NABU, emphasizing that such proceedings fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of anti-corruption bodies. The bill would enshrine this jurisdiction in law to prevent similar conflicts in the future.

Introducing state ranks for prosecutors

Bill No. 13603 proposes introducing a new system of state ranks for prosecutors, based on length of service and position, and conferred for life. The Prosecutor General would have the authority to confer most of these ranks (the Regulations on Prosecutors’ State Ranks would be approved by the Prosecutor General). The President of Ukraine would confer the highest ranks—State Counselor of Justice, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class.

A prosecutor could be stripped of a state rank in several cases: the Prosecutor General, if dismissed on the recommendation of a disciplinary body or the High Council of Justice; an ordinary prosecutor, if rejected for violation of incompatibility rules, confiscation of unjustified assets, a criminal conviction, loss of Ukrainian citizenship, or pursuant to a disciplinary body’s decision finding further service impossible. In addition, as a disciplinary sanction, a prosecutor’s state rank could be reduced by one level. In all cases of rank removal, the prosecutor would lose entitlement to a length-of-service pension.

A prosecutor’s salary and pension would depend on rank. Under the bill, prosecutors dismissed with loss of state rank, or who lose it by court verdict, would forfeit entitlement to a length-of-service pension.

For those who previously held class ranks (abolished in 2019), the Prosecutor General would determine their correspondence to the new state ranks, while the Cabinet of Ministers would establish equivalence with civil service, military, and diplomatic ranks.

New procedure for defining priorities in scientific activity

Bill No. 13629 seeks to establish a unified system for setting long-term (10-year) and medium-term (5-year) priority areas in science, technology, and innovation. Prioritization would be based on forecasts and analytical studies organized by the Ministry of Education and Science. The Ministry would prepare the terms of reference and announce a competition (in accordance with government procedures) among research institutions and higher education establishments. Experts from government bodies, research organizations, business, and other sectors could also be involved in selecting the winner. The bill does not specify the details or criteria for selecting research organizations—these would be set out in the published terms of reference for each competition. The main goal of these studies would be to identify current challenges, assess scientific potential, and develop well-grounded proposals for priorities.

The government would submit proposals for long-term priority areas to Parliament with an analytical justification prepared by the executor of the forecast and analytical studies. This justification would include an assessment of the country’s potential, economic needs, a detailed sectoral analysis, the prospective impact on the economy, security, and environment, resource needs and availability, opportunities for international cooperation, and a list of corresponding medium-term priority areas. The Cabinet of Ministers would define the medium-term areas separately, within three months after the long-term ones are approved. At the drafting stage, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, sectoral academies, the Scientific Committee of the National Council on Science and Technology, and other stakeholders would also participate.

The defined priority areas would receive state support, with specific instruments to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers. In addition, the government would organize annual monitoring of its development and impact on the economy, science, security, and integration into the global scientific and innovation space. The list of priority areas would be updated based on the monitoring reports.

The new law would repeal two separate laws—on priority areas in science and technology development and on priority areas of innovation activity. These laws provided only general lists of priorities (for example, national security and defense, energy and energy efficiency, rational use of natural resources, technological renewal and development of the agro-industrial complex, and the introduction of new technologies and equipment for quality medical care, treatment, and pharmaceuticals) without clear procedures for defining, monitoring, or revising these areas. Under current legislation, the government establishes the list of places independently, but is not required to conduct studies or provide analytical justification.

Changes in privatization and the management of state and municipal property

Currently, the law on privatization of state and municipal property allows the formation of privatization “pools” from several enterprises or business entities if they operate in the same or related sectors. Bill No. 13620 proposes allowing such pools to include creditor claims against these legal entities. A claim is the legal right of a creditor to demand that a debtor fulfill an obligation—repayment of money, performance of work, or provision of services—as regulated by the Civil Code. In other words, whereas a pool could previously consist of Enterprise A and Enterprise B, it could now include Enterprise A (at book value) and claims (for example, bonds or a loan agreement) against Enterprise B (at nominal value).

In addition, the value threshold for classifying assets as subject to large-scale privatization would rise from UAH 250 million to UAH 1 billion. Accordingly, enterprises previously categorized as “large” (worth between UAH 250 million and UAH 1 billion) would be reclassified as subject to “small” privatization. The proposed procedure for small-scale privatization is considerably more straightforward: sales are conducted exclusively through electronic auctions, timelines are shorter, and decisions are taken by the State Property Fund or local governments without separate Cabinet approval. By contrast, large-scale privatization requires an individual decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, creation of an auction commission, preparation of the asset with audit and valuation, approval of a privatization plan, and more extended sale procedures.

Repeat auctions for property sales are currently held with the starting price reduced by 50%, and Dutch auctions lessen the cost in 50 steps. The bill would change this model by increasing the number of steps to 99, making the process more flexible and enabling participants to fine-tune their bids. In addition, not only technical contractors but also electronic platform operators could be involved in preparing lots, and the costs of this preparation could be reimbursed by buyers, who would cover them as part of the purchase price. Another change concerns the guarantee deposit: if the winning bidder refuses to complete the purchase, the deposit is forfeited to the state budget. The bill clarifies that part of these funds would remain in the system for its development, while the rest would go to the budget.

In addition, the bill proposes requiring property management bodies to submit for privatization those assets whose maintenance costs exceed 50% of their book value. Currently, no such rule exists: management bodies decide on their own which assets to propose for privatization.

Support for small and medium-sized businesses: the bill would establish the possibility of providing financial assistance to entrepreneurs purchasing assets through small-scale privatization. This assistance could take the form of partial reimbursement of loan interest, state guarantees, or grants, with the procedure to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers. No such support exists under current law.

Clarifying warranty rules for buildings

The Civil Code requires contractors to guarantee that a construction project complies with design documentation and remains suitable for use for at least ten years. The contractor must correct defects at its own expense unless it can prove they were caused by wear and tear, improper use, or faulty repairs by the client.

Bill No. 13607 proposes clarifying these rules. A contractor would explicitly guarantee the quality of the work performed and the installed components and structures, not only the completed building. All projects accepted for use would carry a warranty of at least ten years, except for private houses and small structures, if the owner built them independently without a contractor. A property owner who identifies defects would notify the client. The client would then be required to arrange an inspection, propose options for remedying the defects, and agree on them with the owner. If the client does nothing or refuses to correct the deficiencies, the owner could repair them independently at the client’s expense or go to court. In other words, compensation could be obtained through a court ruling and mutual agreement between the owner and the client.

Strengthening penalties for violations of drone regulations after the war

At present, drone use is permitted only for the military. Bill No. 13600 proposes rules for drone use after the end of martial law. All drones weighing 250 g to 20 kg—even those used for recreation, training, science, or sports—would be subject to mandatory registration with the National Police. Registration would include recording and maintaining data on drones and their owners, and flights without such registration would be prohibited.

The bill sets a UAH 85,000–136,000 fine with confiscation of the drone for operating without registration. Operating a drone under the influence of alcohol or drugs would be punishable by a fine of UAH 17,000, community service, or administrative detention. Operating a drone without authorization would entail a fine of UAH 25,000 or administrative detention for 10–15 days, while consuming alcohol after an incident would be punishable by a fine of UAH 20,400. If such actions cause bodily injury or significant material damage, the bill provides for a fine, corrective labor, restriction of liberty, or imprisonment for up to three years. If a person dies due to such violations, the punishment would be five to ten years’ imprisonment.

All drones must be registered within one year of the law’s entry into force (if adopted).

Regulating biocidal products

Bill No. 13604 sets clear rules on the production, sale, use, and safety of substances that destroy or control harmful organisms (biocidal products). These include disinfectants, antiseptics, antifungal agents, rodenticides, insecticides, and preservatives for wood, textiles, water, and other materials.

The bill defines the procedure for approving active substances used in biocides. No new substance may be used without prior expert review by a state-owned enterprise or institution designated by the Ministry of Health. This body would assess the substance’s effectiveness and safety, and only then could the Ministry grant approval. Hazardous substances—such as those that may cause cancer or disrupt the endocrine system—could not be approved, except in exceptional cases where no safer alternatives exist and where failing to use the biocide would lead to worse consequences.

All biocidal products would be subject to state registration. In other words, no disinfectant, antiseptic, or insecticide could be sold until tested in an accredited laboratory and entered into the State Register of Biocidal Products. The register will begin operating on January 1, 2030, and will incorporate the existing register of disinfectants. The current register covers only surfaces, equipment, water, or skin disinfectants. It is based on simple effectiveness and general safety tests, without evaluating long-term effects on human health, the environment, or animals. It also excludes other biocides, such as insecticides, repellents, rodenticides, and preservatives for wood and textiles.

The bill also extends to goods treated with biocides, such as furniture with antimicrobial coatings, wood treated with antiseptics, or textiles with antibacterial finishes. Such products could be sold only if treated with approved substances. Labels would be required to indicate that the product contains a biocide, specify the substances used, and describe the property provided (for example, “mold protection” or “antibacterial coating”). If a buyer requests more detailed information, the manufacturer or seller would be obliged to provide it free of charge.

All services related to substance approval and product registration would be provided for a fee. For example, approval of an active substance or state registration of a biocidal product would cost UAH 21,801; review of an approval or simplified registration, UAH 13,020; and amendments to a registration—administrative, minor, or major—UAH 2,120 (Fees would be linked to the subsistence minimum for working-age persons, set at UAH 3,028 in 2025).