From “Support of Democracy” to Democratic Resilience: What the EU and Its Eastern Neighborhood Partners Need to Change

REDEMOS analysis promotes precisely this reframing: a move away from a collection of fragmented grants towards a portfolio strategy in which complementary models of democracy — electoral, liberal, participatory, egalitarian, feminist, and peacebuilding — operate together across three pillars of resilience: institutions, participation, and values. This approach shifts the discussion from isolated “case studies” to a managed portfolio, making complementarities, duplication, and structural “bottlenecks” visible — most notably in the electoral model and in local participation.

Today, the donor project portfolio suffers from three principal shortcomings: (1) short time horizons and fragmentation, meaning that individual projects are not aligned with each other; (2) insufficient data, reflected in the absence of standardized fields for “duration,” “phasing,” and “co-financing”; and (3) chronic underfunding of the electoral domain despite rising risks, including those associated with artificial intelligence.

Postwar planning and Ukraine’s status as an EU candidate open a rare window of opportunity: assistance can be relaunched through budgetary and programmatic instruments rather than grants alone. Long-term “anchor” programs such as U-LEAD ensure continuity. They provide a structural backbone to which smaller, innovative initiatives can be attached — initiatives that do not vanish without a trace but instead work towards a common result.

In this article, we present the outputs of the REDEMOS project — an EU-funded research initiative focused on democratic reforms in the countries of the Eastern Neighborhood. The project brings together 10 institutions from 9 countries — including the Kyiv School of Economics — to analyze the impact of political regimes on democratization and to identify pathways for strengthening democracy in the region. The article draws on the following studies: (1) Working Paper D3.4, Funding practices, variegated conceptions of funding categories, and implications for democracy support research, Anastasiia Vlasenko, Maryna Rabinovych, Vira Usyk, Andrii Darkovich, Kyiv School of Economics; and (2) REDEMOS Policy Paper D3.3, February 2025, Trends, patterns, and coordination in the EU, Member States’, and international institutions’ assistance to the Eastern Neighborhood countries, Maryna Rabinovych and Stiven Kimmel.

We use the REDEMOS database for 2005–2022, compiled from official OECD/CRS reporting. The database contains 1,474 records of democracy support projects for six Eastern Neighborhood countries — Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus — disaggregated by donor: EU institutions — 222; EU member states — 646; the United States — 416; and international organizations — 155. To identify what and where different donors fund, we classify each record as belonging to one of six “models of democracy”: electoral (projects related to elections or the rules of the game), liberal (human rights and courts), participatory (citizen participation and media), egalitarian (access to services and equality), feminist (gender equality), and peacebuilding (conflict prevention and security). This classification makes it possible to trace how donor priorities evolved in 2005–2013, after 2014, and after 2022.

In our research, we describe where funding was directed and for what purposes, but we deliberately refrain from drawing causal conclusions such as “this funding strengthened democracy” — because public reporting lacks data on project duration, phasing, and co-financing, and because of asymmetries in the classification of missions (for example, the EUMM in Georgia is often classified as “democracy support,” whereas EUAM/EUBAM in Ukraine is not). To avoid distortions, we applied a harmonized rule — we include in the portfolio all missions with mandates related to the rule of law, human rights, and civil security, and, in parallel, present a “narrow” version without CSDP missions as a sensitivity check. Our result is a portfolio map of priorities and gaps suitable for managerial decision-making. We do not assess project effectiveness, as this would require different data and methods. Nevertheless, we can see the “big picture” — what money was spent on, what it was not spent on, and we can also identify data problems, such as how inconsistent coding leads to distorted results.

Short cycles and fragmentation reduce the ability of programs and projects to generate lasting impact — effects become short-lived, solutions are difficult to scale, and cumulative impact dissipates. At the same time, the absence of standard data fields and inconsistent coding of joint initiatives distort analytical conclusions about portfolio priorities and effectiveness, making the portfolio more difficult to manage.

What the 2005–2022 data show

The EU has significantly increased democracy support in the region — from USD 159,000 in 2005 to more than USD 13 million in 2022. However, this trend has been uneven, shaped by domestic and geopolitical factors. Georgia has been the largest recipient of EU assistance, accounting for approximately 47.6% of total support, while Ukraine received 32%; the remaining countries together accounted for 20%. One reason for this distribution lies in differing practices for classifying missions, which expose reporting gaps (Figure 1).

To test how data shortcomings affect conclusions, we constructed three versions of the portfolio:

1. A “broad” version — includes all missions and operations with mandates related to the rule of law, civil security, or conflict prevention, regardless of the institutional framework. This version covers both CSDP missions, such as EUMM in Georgia and EUAM in Ukraine, and adjacent non-CSDP operations, such as EUBAM on the Moldova–Ukraine border;
2. A “narrow” version — excludes such missions and operations altogether;
3. A “harmonized” version — applies a single mandate-based rule: all missions and operations (both CSDP and non-CSDP) are included if their official mandate explicitly refers to the rule of law, human rights, civilian security, or conflict prevention. This approach removes asymmetries between EUMM, EUAM, and EUBAM and yields comparable results.

Harmonization narrows the gap between the shares of Georgia and Ukraine — in 2014–2022, funding for Ukraine in some scenarios reaches or exceeds that for Georgia. At the same time, over the full 2005–2022 period, Georgia’s lead persists due to the long-term effect of the EUMM. This example illustrates the extent to which classification choices shape final outcomes.

Spending patterns vary by donor. EU institutions more frequently operate within the “peacebuilding” model (focused on security and conflict prevention) while EU member states tend to emphasize the liberal model (rule of law and human rights) and the participatory model (civil society). The United States, in turn, primarily focuses on the participatory model, particularly at the local government and media levels. This diversity makes democracy assistance multi-directional and, as a result, difficult to coordinate.

In numerical terms, the EU institutions’ portfolio breaks down as follows: the largest share of funding — 45.4% (USD 83.68 million) — is allocated to the peacebuilding model, primarily via the EUMM project in Georgia. The liberal model ranks second at 19.9% (USD 36.70 million), followed by the egalitarian model (social services and employment) at 17.2% (USD 31.84 million) and the participatory model at 13.2%. By contrast, the feminist and electoral models each receive just over 2%. Overall, the EU clearly prioritizes security- and institution-centered approaches, provides moderate support for civic participation, and leaves the electoral model as the weakest link in its funding portfolio. EU member states, by contrast, place a strong emphasis on the liberal (approximately 34.6%) and participatory (approximately 27%) models and, compared to other donors, provide the greatest level of support for the feminist model.

Georgia receives the largest share of funding from EU institutions — approximately 47.6% of the total — while Ukraine receives 32%. However, Ukraine is the largest recipient of assistance from individual EU member states (approximately USD 71.9 million) and from the United States (USD 139.1 million). The United States invests most heavily in the participatory model (48.9% of its portfolio), followed by the liberal model (24.1%), and also provides substantial support to the media and information ecosystem.

Figure 2 shows that total democracy assistance provided to the Eastern Neighborhood countries over 2005–2022 encompassed all models of democracy, although different models were more prominent at different points in time.

Why is “resilience” the key word?

“Democratic resilience” is not a buzzword but a process — the ability of institutions and society to endure, adapt, and renew themselves under pressure. It is useful to think of democratic resilience across three dimensions:

• Institutional capacity — free and fair elections, separation of powers, the rule of law, anti-corruption
• Civic participation — strong NGOs, inclusiveness and representation, party development
• Societal values — social cohesion, the rights of minorities and women, and a culture of democratic norms

Each of the six models of democracy strengthens specific components of resilience (Table 1). Some components are affected directly, while others are influenced indirectly, as a secondary effect.

What to do: seven steps for the EU, member states, and partner countries

These steps are elements of a single portfolio logic that operates comprehensively.

The first recommendation concerns data and standards. In REDEMOS research, we emphasize that portfolio manageability requires unified standards for reporting project titles, descriptions, and classifications to OECD databases (CRS/IATI), including data on project duration and phasing. At present, discrepancies in project descriptions and the absence of time parameters distort both the coding of democracy models and the comparability of trends.

Second, despite the centrality of free and fair elections and the growing risks of external interference, the electoral domain has systematically received the least funding. REDEMOS research therefore recommends that the EU and member states strengthen support for the electoral model. In addition, we emphasize the need for portfolio assessments in order to see complementarities among initiatives, eliminate duplication, and balance stability with adaptability.

The third step is donor coordination and long-term orientation. Despite the overall increase in assistance volumes, we observe many small initiatives (under USD 1 million) in areas such as civil society or women’s rights that often lack follow-on support, which reduces cumulative impact. Therefore, we need multi-stakeholder support for long-term priority reforms (for example, the support received by decentralization reform in Ukraine), where an “anchor” program becomes a platform for synchronizing smaller projects and allocating roles based on donor specialization.

Fourth, regular portfolio reviews with public dashboards are needed. An annual review of projects in each country using a unified template (donor, democracy model, instrument, amounts, duration) would make it possible to identify duplication and gaps — primarily in the electoral model — in a timely manner and to reallocate funding on the basis of evidence rather than inertia.

Fifth, the participation of local organizations should become infrastructure rather than a supplement. This requires dedicated and stable support lines for NGOs, local media, and university-based platforms, as well as support for instruments such as service learning, participatory budgeting, student and youth hubs, and similar initiatives, with multi-year funding and simplified reporting. In this way, it is possible to strengthen the accountability of local authorities and increase trust between electoral cycles.

Sixth, flexible funding instruments should be expanded. A larger share of programmatic and sectoral budget support with clear governance benchmarks (rule of law, transparency, gender equality), combined with small reserves for rapid response to shocks (cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns), would reduce the dispersion of short-term grants and add scalability. In other words, small grants should be embedded within the frameworks of larger programs.

Seventh, anti-corruption safeguards, as well as monitoring and evaluation (M&E), should be embedded at every stage of the project cycle. Open data on procurement and contracts, independent audits, integrity assessments of partners, and impact indicators across the three pillars of resilience — institutions, participation, and values — would ensure value for money and the political resilience of the portfolio.

The conceptual conclusion of the study is straightforward: the EU should not choose between values and impact. On the contrary, long-term programs in justice, elections, and anti-corruption, with substantial involvement of local actors, make partner countries more resilient while simultaneously strengthening the EU’s geopolitical weight in the region. Upholding values within the European Union and providing sustained support for them in neighboring countries are integral to the EU’s own democratic resilience and to the strengthening of its geopolitical role. At a practical level, this implies a shift away from providing “external incentives” toward building durable partnerships and sectoral support capable of reinforcing the institutional backbone of partner countries.

A critical contextual factor highlighted in this study is the reduction or termination of most USAID programs in the region — a development that represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU. By observing which organizations withstand the “stress test” created by the exit of a major donor, the EU can reallocate resources toward the most promising implementers, thereby reshaping the democracy support landscape in key subsectors.

Because the study recommends strengthening the electoral component, the information dimension — including countering disinformation and reducing digital risks — and moving from situational to systemic support for civil society, the key sectors should be bottom-up participation, local media, and civic education. These sectors are among the most critical components of resilience. Bottom-up participation — through local NGOs and communities — creates mechanisms of accountability between elections, addresses reform “weak spots” at the community level, and reduces the risk of rollback by building local coalitions to support changes. Local media, in turn, are essential for trust and for countering disinformation precisely where people receive their daily news; without them, national transparency standards are unlikely to be upheld in practice. Civic education builds skills in critical thinking, participation, and integrity in schools and universities, thereby laying the foundation for the long-term legitimacy of reforms and electoral integrity.

What does this mean for Ukraine?

For Ukraine — an EU candidate and a country at war — the shift toward a resilience logic implies three practical priorities:

• Elections and trust — technical strengthening of electoral processes and institutional “safeguards,” including courts, media standards, and transparency in political financing.
• Local participation as resilience infrastructure — from community centers and participatory budgeting to student and university platforms. These mechanisms keep society in a state of “engagement” even during wartime.
• Anti-corruption architecture as a security shield — not merely an EU requirement, but a democratic mechanism that protects defense and reconstruction resources from capture and reduces the country’s vulnerability to external influence.

The EU’s principal resource in the region is not only money, but trust and the rules of the game. Europe’s “geopolitical awakening” after 2022 implies a more active foreign policy and security role, rather than a retreat from values. On the contrary, when the rule of law, inclusiveness, and participation are genuinely embedded in the legal norms, procedures, budgets, and governance practices of partner countries — and, in EU instruments, in program design and funding conditionality — this strengthens their democratic resilience and makes them more reliable allies for the EU in the long game against coercion, corruption, and disinformation.