On the Historical Unity of Lies and Vladimir Putin

We have divided the text into four blocks: Economy, Governance, Crimea & Donbas, History. In each block, we collected factual statements from the column and fact-checked them. In short: none are true. 

Economy

Just a quick reminder that due to Russia’s aggression, i.e., the war in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine lost about $100 billion. It is partly a consequence of the “cheap gas” since the price of Russian gas for Ukraine has always been politically motivated. Russia raised the price or even cut off gas supplies to force Ukrainian politicians to act in Russia’s interests. For instance, in 2010, when for a discount on gas prices, the stay of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea was extended until 2047. As a result, Russia was able to increase its troop numbers and the presence of military equipment on the peninsula until the occupation. 

Putin also distorts the essence of the Stockholm arbitration. In 2014, Naftogaz appealed to the Stockholm Court to review the terms of the 2009 contracts.

The take-or-pay principle, which differs from the standard provisions for this type in Gazprom’s European contracts, caused Ukraine losses of $32.1 billion. The Stockholm Arbitration Court ordered Gazprom to compensate Naftogaz for losses in the amount of $4.6 billion.

It is objectively impossible to calculate how much Ukraine saved due to low gas prices. After all, gas transit fees were also lower during the period of the lower gas prices. The rents for the stay of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea were hardly market-level. In addition, not only does the price play a role but also gas consumption levels. As shown in Figure 1, Ukraine consumed much more gas in the 1990s than it does now, spending significant amounts of money despite the low prices. In 2015-2018, Ukraine spent an average of $3 billion on imported gas annually compared to $3.4 billion in 1992-2000. In 2006-2015 (for which data is available), Ukraine paid Russia $61 billion for gas, with peak amounts spent in 2011 and 2012 ($12.5 and $14 billion respectively).

Putin misses the reasons for the decline of Ukrainian industry. The reasons for its decline after the collapse of the USSR is the inefficient Soviet economy and the inability of Soviet enterprises to adapt to market conditions. Talking about the last ten years, the overall decline in industry in 2011-2020 was 33%, not 42% (see the table below). It was mainly caused by the 2013-2015 economic crisis stemming, in particular, from the Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea. In addition to the physical destruction of enterprises, a ban on the purchase of Ukrainian products by Russian enterprises dealt a blow to Ukrainian industry.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 *	2017	2018	2019	2020
Mechanical engineering products index	115.4	96.7	86.4	79.4	85.2	101.8	111.7	112.4	97.8	82.4

Electricity production decreased by 18% from 2006 to 2020 (data for 1991-2006 are not publicly available). The reasons for the decline in electricity production were industrial decline, a decrease in population (with the population now consuming less energy), and increased energy efficiency (the USSR economy was very energy-intensive). Therefore, a reduction in electricity consumption may well indicate not an economic downturn but the introduction of new technologies. For example, during the 2005 economic boom, Ukraine consumed 3.2 kWh per capita compared to nearly 4 kWh during the 1993 crisis.

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Electrical energy production	102.2	97.9	88.6	110.2	105.6	102.8	100.2	93.7	86.2	104	91.4	104.0	99.8	96.4

GDP in current dollars was indeed lower in 2019 in Ukraine than in the countries mentioned above  (see Figure 2). However, it is correct to compare GDP per capita in dollars adjusted by PPP to take into account price differences between the countries. Based on this indicator, in 2019 and 2020 (preliminary estimates), Ukraine did better than Moldova and Kosovo but worse than Albania and other developing European countries.

We must also remember that Russia and Putin started the war against Ukraine and that we lost about 20% of GDP.

Indeed, Russia is still one of Ukraine’s top 3 trade partners after China and the EU in terms of trade in goods and services.

Country	Turnover, $ billion (2020)
China	15.731
EU	14.102
Russian Federation	10.062

However, compared to 2012 (excluding the Russian-occupied Crimea and Donbas), trade fell fivefold. 

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Volumes, $ billion	50.824	44.375	26,922	16.014	12.320	14.986	15.533	16.732	10.062
Change, $ billion	–	-6.449	-17.453	-10.908	-3.694	2.666	0.547	1.199	-6.67

It is primarily the fault of Russia that attacked Ukraine in 2014 and occupied part of our territory. It is what made it our enemy, not “instructions from the West.” However, until 2014, Russia had occasionally waged trade wars against Ukraine. For example, in 2012, it limited exports of our cheese. Therefore, it cannot be called a reliable trading partner.

Since the Russian aggression began, the European Union has indeed become Ukraine’s key foreign trade partner. Its share is now 40.7% compared to 25% in 2013. Ukraine and the EU are currently working to create a free trade area, which will allow us to become even closer to European markets. It will bring huge advantages to Ukraine, including duty-free access to one of the world’s most powerful and largest markets, raising the quality standards for Ukrainian products and obtaining additional foreign investment.

Russia did not offer Ukraine cooperation but tried to get it to join the Customs Union, forcing it to abandon the Association Agreement with the EU. For example, these words said by Dmitry Medvedev sound more like blackmail than a proposal for cooperation. The difference between a customs union and a free trade area is that the former restricts trade with other countries, while the latter only facilitates trade between the members of a free trade area. 

According to the State Statistics Service surveys, there were 342 thousand (26%) labor migrants working in Russia in 2015-2017 (these are those who went abroad to earn money at least once during this period). It is less than in 2010-2012 when they were 511 thousand (43% of all migrant workers). Poland replaced Russia as the primary labor migration destination for Ukrainians with the beginning of armed aggression.

This “horror story” has been told to us many times by both Russian and Ukrainian politicians. But we want to remind Putin that the land market in Russia has been in operation since 2003. Like in Ukraine, it is closed to foreigners (although this impairs the economic effect). Foreigners will be able to buy land in Ukraine only if such an opportunity is voted for in an all-Ukrainian referendum in 2024.    

Opening the land market does not mean agricultural land sales. The market will give those owning land the right and opportunity to dispose of their property as they see fit. It can be sold if so desired, or it can be further cultivated or leased. The main thing is that it can be sold legally and not “in the shadows” as now.

Despite the moratorium on sales of agricultural land, the market existed in the shadows. And it is the lack of a free market and a right to acquire land legally that gave rise to numerous corruption schemes. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention identified the most commonly used corruption schemes, under which both large agricultural holdings and individuals illegally obtained land plots. Among them are the unauthorized occupation of state and communal land “with consent” from officials, concluding agreements on joint use of state and communal land, etc.

Land reform aims to streamline land market operations and prevent corruption by developing transparent land management. 

The law On the Circulation of Agricultural Land prohibits selling land to legal entities whose participants are citizens of the aggressor state or to individuals under sanctions, even if Ukrainians allow sales of land to foreigners in a referendum. Also, regardless of the referendum’s decision, foreigners are prohibited from buying land located closer than 50 kilometers from the state border of Ukraine. 

Because foreigners cannot be participants in the land market, Ukraine is blocking the inflow of foreign investment. With the full implementation of land reform, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) plans on investing about $3 billion in Ukraine’s economy by 2024. 

Also, foreign ownership of land can have several advantages, e.g., the ability to use capital, technological know-how and access to supply chains, and creating added value. Ukraine will also be able to receive investments from the EU, and they will be more transparent due to the strict rules of the countries from which investment will be coming.

Land reform states that land plots will be used more productively since farmers will invest in their own land (buying machinery, investing in land improvement, and using new technologies). The land market will also promote longer-term production, such as horticulture or growing berries.

Governance

It is not the first time Putin lied about the law on “indigenous peoples”. He said that the law would divide people into “sorts”, called it a Nazi law contradicting international law. All of it is an outright delusion that we have already fact-checked.

VoxCheck has repeatedly debunked the notion of “external management”. 

Foreign advisers are not leaders or “curators”. They do not make government decisions but only give advice. For example, foreign advisers are members of the Advisory Expert Group of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine and provide support for defense reform. 

As for NATO’s infrastructure and troops in Ukraine, every country in the world has sovereignty, including the right to allow or prohibit foreign troops from staying on its territory. Russia, too, conducts joint military exercises in Belarus and Kazakhstan, but for some reason, it does not believe that these countries are under “external control.” 

The President of Ukraine initiated Bill #5506 on the indigenous peoples on May 18, 2021. The Verkhovna Rada passed it on July 1, and on July 8, the law was presented for the President’s signature. And the Ukraine-U.S. Sea Breeze 2021 exercises began in Ukraine on June 28. They have been held regularly since 1997. Therefore, the connection between the “criminal” indigenous law and the joint exercises is entirely far-fetched. 

The statement refers to the UN resolution on combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Ukraine has indeed voted against this resolution in recent years (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). The United States also votes against the resolution together with Ukraine. European countries abstain from voting.  

The problem is that Russia is the main initiator of this resolution submitting it each year to the UN General Assembly. The document features Russian interpretation of the events of the Second World War, specifically:

• keeps silent about the crimes of the Soviet regime, which also resulted from intolerance and xenophobia;       
• expresses “serious concern” about the ban on symbols associated with the victory over Nazism (i.e., Soviet symbols banned in Ukraine);       
• condemns the demolition of monuments erected in honor of the fighters against Nazism (while in the eyes of many Eastern European countries, these characters were also opponents of the countries’ independence, and so they cannot be considered national heroes).       

In Ukraine, both Nazi and Soviet totalitarian regimes are condemned, and their symbols are banned at the legislative level.

Crimea and Donbas

In 1783, Crimea became part of Russia 

This myth is an integral part of the concept of the “originally Russian” Crimea. In this way, Russian propaganda justifies the conquest of foreign territories –  it is allegedly the “return” of their own lands. However, it is indeed difficult to refer to the annexation of Crimea in 1783 as a voluntary or peaceful accession. 

In his book “250 Years of Untruth: Russian Myths in the History of Crimea,” Crimean historian Serhiy Hromenko explains that in the early Soviet era, the word “takeover” was used as an official term to describe Russia’s policy toward Crimea. While in reality, Russia’s conquest of the peninsula took place even earlier. In 1783, Empress Catherine II simply signed the Manifesto for the Acceptance of the Crimean Peninsula, whereby she acknowledged that Russian troops already occupied Crimea at the time of the “takeover”.

After 1783, the local deportations of Crimean Tatars began. The Russian administration sought to “liberate” Crimea from the Tatar population as soon as possible.

In 1954, Crimea was handed over to Ukraine unlawfully

Serhiy Hromenko explains that there are several propaganda theories as to why Crimea became part of Ukraine “unlawfully”. One of them is that there was no quorum in the Russian parliament during the handing over of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. This myth is debunked by simply looking at the documents. According to the minutes of the sitting of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the RSFSR, 15 of its 27 members took part in the sitting to vote for the handing over of the Crimean region. That was enough to make a decision.

Another myth is that Russia never agreed to change “its” territory. In reality, the Russian parliament as the supreme authority representing the RSFSR amended Article 14 of the republic’s Constitution in 1954, which determined the composition of the RSFSR. That is, parliament agreed to change the territory of the Russian Republic.

Crimeans and residents of Sevastopol made their “historic choice” in a pseudo-referendum

The decision to hold a so-called “referendum” was made at a session of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on February 27, 2014. The parliament building had already been seized by unidentified military forces. According to Krym.Realii, journalists were not allowed into the session hall, so it is not known whether there was a quorum for such a decision and how MPs voted under the muzzles of Tommy guns. 

In 2015, one of the operation leaders to take over Crimea, Igor Strelkov (Girkin), admitted that deputies had to be “herded” into the Parliament to vote on February 27. 

Two questions were put to the “referendum”: “Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?” and “Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea as of 1992 and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?”. None of them provided for the possibility of maintaining the status quo. 

Crimea’s Constitution as of 1992 provided for the peninsula’s broad autonomy. As if it were a separate state with its own government bodies “exercising on its territory all of the powers except those voluntarily delegated to Ukraine.” 

In addition, the Crimean “referendum” took place without international observers who could record violations. At the same time, Crimean journalists and voters repeatedly stated that ballots were handed out massively to the same people. They were also handed out to people with Russian passports. 

Neither Ukraine nor the European Union or the United States recognized Crimea’s “referendum” results. 

Donbas and Crimea were threatened with ethnic cleansing – like in Odesa, where “neo-Nazis burned people alive”

It is how Putin describes the Odesa tragedy of May 2, 2014, which killed 48 people. That day’s events constitute one of the main highlights of Russian propaganda. A need to “protect” the population of Crimea and Donbas from imaginary “neo-Nazis” has justified Russian aggression all these years.

On that day, clashes broke out in the downtown between those supporting the federalization of Ukraine and opposing the new government and the supporters of Euromaidan and unity. Both groups used firearms, killing six people. The police were rather passive.

The “supporters of federalization” fled and barricaded themselves in the House of Trade Unions. Matilda Bogner, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, wrote that stones and Molotov cocktails were then flying from both sides. Then a fire broke out in the House of Trade Unions, whose circumstances are still not known. Investigations into this incident are ongoing.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the total death toll from the conflict amounted to 13,100-13,300 as of January 31, 2021. At the same time, the total number of conflict victims is 42-44 thousand people, including the wounded. 

Yet Vladimir Putin broke the causal link. These casualties are a direct result of the aggression of Russia that began occupying Crimea on February 20, 2014, and then invaded eastern Ukraine with the help of “volunteers” such as Igor Girkin and the regular army. Pro-Russian militants who Russia fully controls do not adhere to the first clause of the Minsk agreements – a ceasefire. Over nearly a year since the last “ceasefire” (July 27, 2020 – July 12, 2021), the OSCE mission recorded 42.8 thousand violations of the regime of silence.

Russia does not recognize itself as a party to the conflict, continuing to destabilize the situation by providing support to the militants, issuing passports to Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories and creating provocations near the Russian-Ukrainian border.

As for the Minsk agreements, Ukraine and Russia have different interpretations of how to implement them. Ukraine insists that the restoration of border control and the withdrawal of foreign troops should take place before local elections. Russia believes that these steps should be implemented after the elections and that Ukraine should negotiate with the “DPR” and “LPR”, which are fully controlled by Moscow. If one follows the Russian scenario, a “peaceful settlement” will lead to election fraud and the victory of pro-Russian forces that will continue destabilizing Ukraine’s domestic policy.

Of course, the Minsk agreements are not perfect, but they were adopted during the bloody battles of the Ukrainian army with Russian troops near Debaltseve. Implementing the Minsk in Russia’s interpretation will, in effect, become Russia’s political occupation of all of Ukraine. 

History 

Putin on “historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”

Putin routinely ascribes to Russia the history of Kievan Rus and continues the hackneyed topic that today’s southern Ukraine lands, i.e., Sloboda Ukraine and Donbas, are “historically Russian”.  However, this is not in line with historical reality. Here we explain why. For a considerable period, the region comprising these lands was called the Wild Fields. It was a vast, almost uninhabited area. There was virtually no political power here. Poland (and before it, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) and the Tsardom of Muscovy considered the southwestern and northeastern parts of the Wild Fields respectively to be their own only nominally.

However, in practice, one should always distinguish between possessing something “on paper” (in this case, it would be more accurate to say “in one’s head”) and reality.  Since the end of the Middle Ages, these lands’ settlement and economic development were carried out by representatives of different ethnic groups and peoples, including Ukrainians.  By the way, interestingly, on a 1720 map, Putin’s “historically Russian lands” belong to either Ukraine or the Crimean Khanate. Later, Sloboda Ukraine emerged in the part of the Wild Fields inhabited by Ukrainians.

One can also refer to more up-to-date data. Take the 1897 census of the Russian Empire. Its results show that the so-called “Little Russian” (i.e. Ukrainian) language prevails not only in modern Ukraine (particularly in the “historically Russian lands” mentioned by Putin) but also extends beyond modern Ukraine. 

Putin thinks that the accession to Ukraine of its modern western territories was a merit of Russia. It is not true either. It is enough to look at the aforementioned map of Ukrainian lands of the beginning of the 18th century to see that Podillya, Volyn, Galicia (Halychyna), and even Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) are part of Ukraine. In the early 20th century, among the population of Eastern Galicia, which is now part of our country, 63.4% were Ukrainians. The Russian Empire’s invasion of these lands does not mean that it annexed them to Ukraine. The ancestors of Ukrainians had already lived there. The case is even more straightforward for Western Ukraine than for the Wild Fields because the lands of the historic Right Bank of Ukraine were under the rule of Cossack hetmans. Therefore, it would be correct to say that Russia did not give these lands to Ukrainians but simply occupied them.

Manipulating with the word “Russian” 

The full name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus, Samogitia, etc. Putin should also know that in the historiography of the time, the terms “Rus” and “Rus land” were used to refer to modern Ukraine territories. The modern Russian Federation was referred to by a different name back then – Muscovy. Interestingly the chronicles of north Slavic cities, specifically Rostov, Suzdal, Ryazan, contain accounts of trips “to Rus”, i.e., the lands of modern Ukraine.

After a tour of Ukrainian cities by a Moscow delegation accompanied by some higher Cossack officers, more than 100,000 people swore allegiance. However, we only know about it from data of the Muscovites themselves. However, it is known that the March Articles (the agreement formed after the Pereyaslav Council) were not ratified by the Cossacks’ representative body – the Cossack Rada. Neither was it supported by the Bratslav, Poltava, and Uman regiments, the Zaporizhian Sich, the clergy led by Bishop Sylvester Kosiv, and many Cossack officers, including Ivan Bohun, Petro Doroshenko, and Ivan Sirko.

Besides, during the National Liberation War, Bohdan Khmelnytsky negotiated not only with Moscow. The hetman sent diplomatic missions to the Ottoman Empire and Transylvania. According to unconfirmed reports, he also corresponded with the then ruler of England, Oliver Cromwell.

The manipulation is that the opinion of Khmelnytsky and part of the Cossacks are passed off as the opinion of the whole state. Also, in this quote, the terms “Rus” and “Russian” are mixed up again while not being identical at all. 

Not the same language, no. During the Middle Ages and partly in modern times, Old Ukrainian or Old Belarusian, also known as Ruthenian, was spoken on the territory of Ukraine. It was not just a spoken, “folk” vernacular but one of the official languages ​​of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in which the legal documents of this state were written. 

We have already seen that Putin knows very little about the history of Ukraine. However, it looks like he should also learn the history of his own country. If “everyone spoke the same language”, then why did Russian tsar Peter I issued a decree in 1720 ordering that books in Chernihiv and Kyiv be published exclusively in Russian? If they “spoke the same language,” why did Pyotr Valuev, the minister of interior of the Russian Empire, issue a circular in 1863 banning almost all printed material in Ukrainian except for “fine literature”, which will be discussed in more detail below? So, more than one language was spoken. 

In the context of the church, Putin should know that Ukrainians tried to create their own church, as evidenced by the Metropolis of Halych established in 1302 and abolished in 1347 under pressure from Moscow’s Prince Simeon the Proud. The history of this metropolis clearly shows that the “unity” of Ukrainians and Russians in the church took place in the same way as the territorial “unity”, i.e., through force and usurpation by Russia.

Ukraine = “outskirts”

The source for citing the Kievan Chronicle, where the word Ukraine was first mentioned, was the Hypatian Codex, compiled only in the first quarter of the 15th, not the 12th century. Besides, of the three uses of the word “Ukraine” in the Hypatian Codex, two unambiguously mean “land”, not border.

More importantly, in the ancient Slavic languages, the prefixes “o” (hence the word “okrayina”, i.e., outskirts) and “ou” (hence the term “Oukrayina”) were antonyms, not interchangeable words. The terms have the opposite meaning. Even in modern East Slavic languages, ​​there is not a single word in which the prefixes “o” and “u” are interchangeable. Therefore, the modern word “Ukraine” cannot even theoretically stem from the word “outskirts”. They are antonyms.

Ukrainians did not support Mazepa when he sided with Sweden  

There are many events in the history of Ukraine confirming that the Ukrainian peasantry did not care whose rule they had to recognize. For example, in 1700, a retainer of the Kyiv colonel claimed that their colonel was the same ruler in power as the Moscow tsar. There were many cases when Ukrainians did not understand why they had to be subjects of the Moscow throne or openly despised it. It, therefore, makes no sense to talk about the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie and especially the peasantry of the 17-18 centuries as having a clear political position.

It should be mentioned that Mazepa was not supported not by the inhabitants of Little Russia but by the inhabitants of the Hetmanate, a Cossack state also known as the Zaporozhian Sich. Mazepa’s uprising was motivated by a desire to get rid of Moscow’s tyrannical power over Ukrainian lands. We mentioned above the March Articles accepted by Khmelnytsky. There was no talk of Ukraine’s dependence on Muscovy, let alone accession. However, taking advantage of Ukraine’s difficult situation, Muscovy had already almost wholly absorbed it by the beginning of the 18th century.

By the way, “brotherly Russia” responded to the news of Mazepa’s uprising in a very peculiar way. At the end of 1708, a 10,000 strong Moscow army under the command of Aleksandr Menshikov surrounded the hetman’s capital, Baturyn, and began storming it. In the early hours of November 2, the city was captured and destroyed, and its defenders and all civilians were killed.

“Language similarities”

Have you seen government documents written in vernacular? And a regional dialect enshrined as the official language of the state? We have already written about the status of the Ruthenian language in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, aAnd it was not a regional dialect. It was the literary language of Ukrainians, a separate language developed from the language once spoken in Kievan Rus.

The works of Skovoroda, Shevchenko and Kotliarevsky are part of the Ukrainian culture, not Russian. Kotliarevsky’s works are especially important because they helped start the formation of the modern Ukrainian language, while the Old Ukrainian language was in decline due to Russia’s efforts. 

What were the real consequences of the Ems Ukaz and the Valuev Circular for the Ukrainian language?

Putin justifies the official policy of the Russian Empire, which suppressed the languages ​​of all the peoples inhabiting it, except the Russians. He considers it normal to bring a language to a primitive state when all that can be published in it is, in modern terms, entertaining content. Virtually, it  is the support of the “sharovarshchyna” into which Ukrainian culture and other national cultures in the USSR were transformed.

“Dramatic events in Poland” is how the Russian President refers to the national liberation struggle of Poles for their country’s independence. No matter what Putin said, the Valuev Circular was not directed against Poles. It was directed against the patriotic movement of Ukrainians, i.e. the Ukrainophiles working to revive the culture of their people.

And while the Valuev Circular did give some freedom to the artistic sphere, the Ems Ukaz limited it. Until 1881, it was forbidden to stage theatrical performances in Ukrainian. A publication ban was imposed on books in Ukrainian. Contrary to what Putin says, the works of art were not published freely but only with consent from the imperial administration. Even public performances in Ukrainian and concerts featuring Ukrainian songs were banned. 

Belonging to the Slavs

In Ukraine, no one officially denies that Ukrainians or Russians belong to the Slavic peoples. However, it is not entirely clear why Putin views belonging to one group of peoples as a basis for the existence of one state, or even more so – of one people. Are Poles and Czechs one people? In Putin’s logic, probably yes. In reality, no. However, none of the reputable scholars denies the fact of their kinship and belonging to the Slavs.

About fake Ukrainization

Putin again keeps his eyes on all things good, ignoring all things bad. Ukrainization was not launched to revive Ukrainian culture. The Soviet government needed to maintain control over the recently “annexed” territories to establish communist ideas in them. To this end, it was decided to provide specific benefits for the languages ​​of some peoples of the USSR.

Secondly, have you ever wondered why Ukrainization lasted less than ten years? Was this time enough to Ukrainianize everyone? No. The leadership had changed in Moscow. Lenin, who favored the idea of ​​Soviet autonomy and wrote about the Great Russian chauvinism, was replaced by Stalin, who had plans for centralization. He saw a threat in national movements. This problem was resolved in a traditional way: some Ukrainian patriots were shot dead, while the rest were sent to Siberia “to build a common state”. Along with Ukrainization, Stalin curtailed other indigenization policies.

Transcarpathia wanted separation

Putin fails to mention that the idea of ​​including Transcarpathia in the RSFSR does not belong to the region’s Orthodox residents but to party workers of the 4th Ukrainian Front, involved in campaigns in Mukachevo aimed at the region’s future ascension to the USSR after the liberation of Transcarpathia. That is, Putin repeats the myth that since the Russian people live in Transcarpathia and not the Ukrainian people, it was necessary to include the Transcarpathian region in the RSFSR as an autonomy. Putin also forgot that atheism prevailed in the USSR, so the party members were not Orthodox.

Crimes: dekulakization, Holodomor, deportations

The modern Russian Federation is the official successor to the USSR, which in turn was the successor to the Russian Empire. It is, therefore, at least morally responsible for its crimes against Ukraine. Besides, Russia already has a number of its own “merits”. For example, violations of international law and the attack on Ukraine with the subsequent occupation of its territories and murdering thousands of Ukrainians. Moscow can also “boast” of crimes against human rights, e.g. repressions against Crimean Tatars and mass arrests.

It is traditional Russian rhetoric that the Holodomor was not a campaign against Ukrainians but a consequence of collectivization, from which everyone suffered – Ukrainians and other peoples of the USSR alike. It is not true, however, because Ukraine suffered from famine the most in absolute terms. Kazakhstan suffered the most considerable relative losses and uses their own term for the terror famine – “asharshilyk”. Having other victims does not justify the perpetrator. The Holodomor was recognized as genocide in 2010 by the Kyiv Court of Appeal after reviewing the documents and testimonies of witnesses and 16 countries, besides Ukraine.

Authors: Myroslava Markova, Svitlana Slipchenko, Kyrylo Perevoshchykov, Eduard Dudka

We thank Yevhenii Monastyrskyi, a historian and leading researcher at the War Childhood Museum, for the scientific editing of the History block.