Why Cutting MPs’ Funding Won’t Fix Military Pay

Why Cutting MPs’ Funding Won’t Fix Military Pay

5 February 2026
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The 2026 state budget, adopted last December, has once again sparked debate — as it does every year. The most sensitive issue is military pay, which remains unchanged. At the same time, the budget earmarks a 40% increase in funding for lawmakers, to nearly UAH 300,000 per MP. That disparity has triggered a public backlash. The argument typically runs like this: while some service members receive a bare minimum of UAH 20,000 a month, “corrupt MPs” are pocketing ten times as much. Let’s set emotions aside and assess how fair these claims really are.

Higher payouts to MPs

So what actually changed in MPs’ compensation under the new budget? The increase in base salaries is tied to a UAH 300 rise in the subsistence minimum. Since MPs’ base pay equals ten subsistence minimums, their salary rose by just UAH 3,000 — from UAH 30,280 to UAH 33,280. Including bonuses and allowances, the average MP salary in 2026 will be about UAH 53,000, up from UAH 50,000 last year. On top of that come allocations for officially registered assistants. These amount to 44 subsistence minimums — UAH 133,232 last year and UAH 146,432 in the 2026 budget. The largest increase is in funding for parliamentary duties, which rose from one base salary to three. In other words, where the structure previously looked like “Salary ~50k + Duties fund ~30k + Assistants ~133k = ~213k,” it now looks like “Salary ~53k + Duties fund ~100k + Assistants ~146k = ~299k.”

Source: Slovo i Dilo 

It is precisely this increase in the parliamentary duties fund that generated headlines about “triple salary hikes,” fueling public outrage. But most of this money does not go directly into MPs’ pockets. Funds for assistants must be used to pay assistants’ wages. And funds for parliamentary duties are effectively reimbursements for housing, transportation, business travel, constituency offices, and related expenses. Although oversight of these expenditures is weak, legally, they do not constitute MPs’ personal income.

So how much does the state actually spend on MPs? By our estimates, maintaining one MP (including all funds and reimbursements) will cost the budget about UAH 3.5 million in 2026. At present, 393 MPs are active in Parliament. That puts total spending on lawmakers at roughly UAH 1.3 billion, up from UAH 1.1 billion last year. That represents an 18.2% increase, or UAH 200 million (nearly twice the projected inflation rate). In the context of Ukraine’s overall budget, this is not a large sum, and, as shown below, it cannot deliver higher military pay.

Budget spending on the Armed Forces

Overall, UAH 2.81 trillion is allocated to defense in 2026. Almost half of that — UAH 1.3 trillion— will go to salaries. The Defense Forces number about one million people. Pay is highly uneven, ranging from UAH 20,000 in rear areas to UAH 120,000 or more in combat zones (including combat bonuses). Even so, these amounts are often insufficient, as service members spend a significant share of their income on gear, vehicle repairs, and even weapons.

The additional UAH 200 million allocated to parliamentarians amounts to just 0.015% of total military wage spending. In time terms, that UAH 200 million covers army expenses for 1 hour and 27 minutes. Moreover, even a complete confiscation of all MPs’ payouts (UAH 1.3 billion) would raise military salaries by only 0.1%.

Where to find money for the military

The army’s funding problems stem from an overall shortage of resources. Currently, Ukraine covers only about 54% of its expenditures through tax revenues (projected at UAH 2,611 billion in 2026). That year, 58% of all budget spending—UAH 2.81 trillion—is slated for national defense. The budget deficit, including the defense shortfall, will be covered primarily through external assistance in the form of grants and loans.

The largest of these will be an EU reparations-backed loan, approved only after significant effort. With U.S. financial assistance having ended, Ukraine should not expect substantially higher external funding next year.

In other words, nearly all domestic revenues are already being spent on security and defense. Additional funding for the Defense Forces can come either from higher taxes and improved tax administration (that is, reduced tax evasion), or from cuts to certain government programs—the largest non-military spending item at present is social protection.

Therefore, higher allocations for MPs’ duties are unlikely to have any meaningful impact on the country’s defense capacity or on service members’ well-being. Still, the decision has become a major media and reputational failure—set against both widespread misunderstanding of the importance of parliamentary work and ongoing corruption scandals. Such poorly considered and communicated actions by Parliament only fuel populism and deepen distrust in politicians and the state as a whole.

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