Migration Scare Stories: Is Ukraine Really at Risk of an Influx of Labor Migrants?

An estimated 28-34 million – this was Ukraine’s population at the start of 2023, according to the Institute of Demography. Over the past two years, the situation has certainly not improved: the zone of active hostilities has expanded, the enemy has unfortunately occupied additional Ukrainian territory, and the government has allowed men up to age 22 to leave the country. Employment has fallen from 56% in 2021 to 50% in 2024, while the share of economically inactive people has risen from 37% to 44%, and the remainder are still seeking work. It is also hardly realistic to expect that children, pensioners, or service members can be brought into the labor market on a large scale.

Labor power is the foundation of the economy – people produce goods, provide services, and keep businesses moving forward. When workers are in short supply, firms reduce output, their costs rise, and they are forced either to raise prices or operate with lower profits, resulting in lower investment in development and lower tax payments.

As in advanced European countries, mortality in Ukraine exceeds births, and the population is steadily aging. The war has intensified these long-term trends. In 2024, for example, the mortality rate was three times higher than the number of births. This is partly because women of reproductive age are postponing childbirth amid uncertainty and danger, and partly because many potential mothers have left for safer countries abroad.

One way to address demographic crises when a country lacks sufficient domestic workers is to bring in labor migrants. They fill open positions, which in turn boosts production, increases tax revenues, and strengthens financial stability. As of 2022, globally, there were 167.7 million labor migrants, accounting for 4.7% of the total workforce. Nearly one-third of them are concentrated in high-income countries across three subregions: 23.3% in Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, 22.6% in North America and 13.5% in the Arab states.

Worldwide, in 2022, there were 167.7 million labor migrants, comprising 38.7% women and 61.3% men. The main employer of labor migrants in 2022 was the services sector, which accounted for 68.4% of all migrant workers. Another 24.3% were employed in industry and 7.4% in agriculture. The services sector is especially attractive to women, with nearly 81% of female migrants working in this sector, whereas men are more often employed in industry or agriculture.

According to estimates by the Ministry of Economy, over the next decade, Ukraine will need to bring at least 4.5 million workers into its labor market. Clearly, attracting migrants could be one way to address Ukraine’s labor shortages. And this is not a new idea – before the full-scale war, Ukraine was already receiving labor migrants who came to work, study, or reunite with family. Even now, some Ukrainian companies are trying to recruit workers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Central Asian countries; however, their share remains low (Figure 5).

As before the war, most foreigners came for personal reasons (Figure 4), for example, to reunite with their families (91% in 2020 and 98% in the first half of 2025). Others come for service or study, and the smallest share comes for work.

After the full-scale invasion, there was a noticeable redistribution of foreigners’ migration flows (Figure 5). Before 2022, most entries came from countries to the east of Ukraine, but the geography changed significantly once the war began. In 2020, the highest numbers of border crossings into Ukraine were recorded among citizens of Moldova, Belarus, and Russia. In 2025, Moldova remains the leader in terms of the number of entries, with Romania and Poland completing the top three.

Although hundreds of thousands of foreigners enter Ukraine every year, interest in permanent or long-term residence remains modest. According to the State Migration Service, in the first nine months of 2025, 2,384 immigration permit applications were reviewed, and in 2,129 cases, applicants received a positive decision. For comparison, in just two months of 2019, 2,027 cases were reviewed (almost the same volume as in nine months of 2025). In other words, despite public fears, there is no mass “influx” of foreign workers. Most applicants seek immigration permits on family or humanitarian grounds: marriage to a Ukrainian citizen (71% of all permits granted), joint children (8%), territorial origin (7%), Ukrainian descent (6%), or long-term residence in the country (3%).

Among the 306,000 people who hold permanent residence permits, the majority are originally from Russia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus (mostly former residents or people with family ties in Ukraine (Figure 6)). However, there is no noticeable influx of new applicants wishing to settle in Ukraine. In the first nine months of 2025, only 2,289 people obtained a permanent residence permit for the first time, indicating that demand for permanent residence in Ukraine among foreigners remains low. This refers not to migrants staying in the country temporarily, but specifically to those who have decided to remain long-term and formalize their status. Labor migration, by contrast, manifests primarily through temporary residence. 

As of fall 2025, more than 46,000 foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine hold temporary residence permits (Figure 6). The largest groups come from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Moldova, India, Uzbekistan, the United States, China, and Israel. Of these, more than 10,000 foreigners are officially in Ukraine for employment, another 7,000 for study, and roughly 5,000 for volunteer or civic activities. These are targeted and regulated flows rather than a mass influx. Among labor migrants, the majority are executives and managers: one in three holds a managerial position or is developing a business in Ukraine. At the same time, since 2022, the number of those coming to volunteer or work in civil society organizations has increased.

Attracting migrants is challenging primarily because of the risks they face themselves. The war continues, even the deep rear does not guarantee safety, and the economy is still unable to offer wages competitive with those in EU countries. Additional barriers include cultural differences, language barriers, and the lack of stable integration programs. For many foreigners, Ukraine becomes more of an intermediate stop – a launchpad for moving onward to the EU labor market. Ukraine is not yet a magnet for labor migrants: neither in terms of wages, nor safety, nor quality of life. So fears that Ukraine will be “overrun by waves of migrants” are exaggerated. It is more realistic to speak of the gradual development of a more open yet still regulated labor market.