If We Want to Discourage Nuclear Weapons, We Need to Get Tougher on Russia

If We Want to Discourage Nuclear Weapons, We Need to Get Tougher on Russia

28 July 2025
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The world’s most dangerous lesson has been reinforced over the past few months: if you want to wage war without consequence, make sure you have nuclear weapons. While Iran has faced direct military strikes from the US and Israel for inching toward nuclear capability, nuclear-armed Russia has launched a full-scale war in Europe and been largely insulated from decisive responses by the world’s democracies. The contrast sends a clear signal: nuclear weapons are the surest path to impunity.

From the very beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, rich democracies made it clear that direct intervention in Ukraine was off the table. Worse still, every time Putin mentioned nuclear weapons, government officials pulled back on their pro-Ukraine rhetoric and military aid. This is despite Russia posing a clear threat to democracies worldwide, while having a much lower GDP and military budget than Europe, not to mention the United States and other wealthy democracies. There was much talk of avoiding a scenario where Putin felt backed into a corner. As a result, Ukraine was given just enough aid to not lose, but not quite enough to beat back Russia decisively. Nuclear saber-rattling clearly worked.

Contrast this with Iran, whose rhetoric both before and after the US strikes was duly reprinted in the news media but largely ignored by decisionmakers. Iran had been weakened by Israel’s effective dismantling of Hamas and Hezbollah. Without a nuclear weapon, the most damage it could realistically do was attack nearby American bases or oil-producing capacity.

The danger of the contrast between Iran and Russia is that Iran—and other observers—may conclude that the value of a nuclear weapon and nuclear threats is greater than previously thought. Even if there is a regime change in Iran, it’s likely that any new regime would not reach the same conclusion. And while the strikes have undoubtedly destroyed some nuclear-weapons capacity, destroying the nuclear expertise Iran has built up is harder. Yes, many prominent scientists have been killed, but Iran can surely find others among its 90 million inhabitants. Russia and China would also happily contribute their nuclear expertise, as they have before. And Iran can find new locations to continue its nuclear program that will take time to uncover.

What can be done to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon in the longer run? Without boots on the ground—that is, an effective occupation—which no one seems to want or be planning for, it’s nearly impossible to force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Yes, known nuclear sites can be bombed, and scientists can be assassinated. But Iran knows that this is a threat and will likely become much smarter about protecting its nuclear assets. Worst still, Iran is not the only country that has observed the contrast between the treatment of a nuclear-armed aggressor and one that does not have nukes. The new developments could spark a new rush to develop nuclear weapons by countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Turkey.

What’s the alternative? It’s simple: get tougher on Russia. This means more sanctions with bite—not half-hearted ones that are easy to evade—including secondary sanctions. It means giving Ukraine more weapons that can strike military targets deep inside Russia. This solution doesn’t require foreign troops on the ground, and while the weapons may not be cheap, it’s a small price to pay to help neutralize a large, belligerent country.

Some might claim that Russia is stronger than Iran, but it’s not. Russia’s economy is faltering under the weight of sanctions and the demands of a wartime footing. On paper, it still has a large military-industrial complex. It reportedly produces more artillery shells than all NATO countries combined and has dramatically increased tank production. But this productivity is deceptive; much of it is simply replacing rapid wartime losses. With sustained pressure on both Russia and its key enablers, Russia’s current trajectory could quickly become unsustainable.

There’s strong evidence that Russia’s nuclear threats were mere bluster. And if Putin clearly sees that nuclear threats don’t work, he will back down. The world’s democracies must make it clear—not through cheap talk but through tangible and decisive aid and sanctions—that they are not afraid to support Ukraine in its defense against Russia. The best way to reduce nuclear risk is to show would-be aggressors that nuclear weapons are not a viable strategy for achieving their goals.

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