Marathon at the equator. Fact-checking the statements Zelensky made at his regular press conference

The statements the President made at the press marathon can be split into several categories. The first category encompasses a large number of statements that cannot be verified using our fact-checking methodology (unfortunately for fact-checkers and journalists and fortunately for the President). They include comments on the Wagnerian case, intelligence officer Vasyl Burba’s lack of professionalism, allegations against Rinat Akhmetov for engaging in “anti-state activities,” and discussing Ukrayinska Pravda’s investigation about Andriy Yermak’s birthday celebration.

The second category includes fact-based and largely correct statements on foreign policy. Both the journalists and the President avoided manipulating issues of war and peace and the Western partners’ support for Ukraine.

Lastly, the most manipulative comments were made regarding the presidential team’s accomplishments, HR policy, and allegations directed toward the previous authorities, including statements about Petro Poroshenko’s activities.

Manipulation and true accomplishments

Speaking about changes in domestic politics, Volodymyr Zelensky managed to address many issues on the agenda: vaccination against COVID-19, infrastructure development, energy, judicial reform, military security, and peace agreements in Donbas. However, the President could not give correct indicators for all the questions and openly used manipulation in some cases.

The Ukrainian army has indeed been receiving new or refurbished equipment both from Ukrainian manufacturers and international partners. For instance, the Ukrainian cruise anti-ship missile “Neptune” was brought into service in 2020. The army also received modernized Ukrainian BTR-4E and new multi-launch rocket systems “Verba.” The Island-class patrol boats received from the United States represent an example of international assistance. The Bayraktar UAVs, purchased earlier from Turkey, went on patrol for the first time this year.

Salaries for the military were last raised in January 2019. According to Andriy Taran, former Minister of Defense (2020-2021), the UAH 131 billion allocated in the Ministry of Defense’s draft budget for 2022 will not be enough to increase salaries in the near future. 

Upon his appointment, the new Minister of Defense, Oleksiy Reznikov, said that financial support for the army and equalizing servicemen’s salaries are priority issues. However, he did not provide any details on how they could be resolved. A little later, at the same press conference, Zelensky said that the Defense Minister would soon announce innovations regarding salaries for the military. It is, therefore, not yet possible to comment on whether servicemen’s wages will indeed increase.

Former President Petro Poroshenko also said that changes to the judiciary were among priority reforms of his presidency. To “reload” the judiciary, Parliament passed a law on the judiciary, the status of judges, and constitutional changes to the judiciary in 2016. In 2017, the Supreme Court was selected through a competitive selection process, and the re-certification of judges began. But the public had questions about the Supreme Court’s composition and the re-certification procedure. Yet, it is wrong to claim that no one had ever tried to reform the judiciary before President V. Zelensky and the mono-majority in Parliament.  

The EU and the US support anti-corruption and judicial reform in Ukraine but have repeatedly expressed frustration with the slow pace of reform. In particular, in October 2021, they expressed disappointment with another delay in appointing the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) head. As of November 26, the selection committee’s meeting to elect the SAPO head did not occur due to several committee members’ absence. 

SAPO has been without a director for more than a year. Representatives of anti-corruption NGOs (e.g. Transparency International, the Anti-Corruption Action Center) believe that the President’s Office may impede the competition by influencing the committee members delegated by the Verkhovna Rada. In the absence of a permanent SAPO head, all decisions under the SAPO’s jurisdiction are made by the Prosecutor General, i.e. an official appointed by the President with the consent of Parliament.

The Servant of the People faction and deputies from other groups were not alone in voting for the HCJC bill. The European Solidarity and Holos factions also did. MPs from Holos also supported the HCJ bill.

Voting for judicial reform bills

Like at his previous press conference in May 2021, the President avoided direct answers regarding the activities of Oleh Tatarov, Deputy Head of the President’s Office. However, his activities also fall under the President’s responsibility since this official was appointed by presidential decree. The head of the President’s Office can only submit proposals for the appointment or dismissal of their deputies.

Oleh Tatarov was deputy head of the Investigation Department of the Interior Ministry during the events of the Revolution of Dignity. He oversaw detentions of the protesters and placed ultimatums on them. Zelenskyi had earlier expressed his view of him in a BBC interview, saying at the time that “this particular person did not disperse anyone” and that information of the families of those killed on the Maidan being dissatisfied with him had allegedly been spread by the media associated with Petro Poroshenko.

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were 12.7 thousand in-patient beds for COVID-19 patients in Ukraine. On September 29, 2021, the Prime Minister said that 45,000 beds were available for in-patients, and a total of 90,000 beds were to be provided. Since then, the Minister has not updated the information about the number of available in-patient beds and the maximum number of beds.

According to the National Health Service of Ukraine website, there are 65,000 beds for infectious patients available in the country, with the total number of beds being 126.7 thousand.

The number of those opposing vaccination has not decreased significantly, and the initial number of such opponents was lower. Thus, according to a KIIS survey conducted in August 2020, 47% of Ukrainians were ready to be vaccinated against COVID-19 for free, and 42% said they would not do so. According to Rating’s poll data published in December 2020, 55% of respondents supported, and 40% opposed free vaccinations. A survey conducted by the same organization in January 2021 showed that this ratio had changed in the opponents’ favor: 43% and 52%, respectively.

According to the latest 2021 surveys, the number of those opposing vaccinations remains at 40-50% of the country’s population. The August survey conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Center for Political Sociology found that 56% of Ukrainians did not plan on being vaccinated in the near future. According to an October survey by Rating, those unwilling to be vaccinated amounted to 43%.

According to the January-October 2021 results, Ukrzaliznytsia made UAH 113.5 million in profit. Comparatively, the company ended 2020 with a loss of UAH 11.94 billion. However, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the company also received a profit of UAH 2.9 billion in 2019, UAH 203.9 million in 2018, UAH 114.5 million in 2017, and UAH 303 million in 2016.

Boryspil International Airport made UAH 189 million in January-September 2021. In 2020, it incurred losses amounting to UAH 1.48 billion. However, the airport was also steadily profitable before the pandemic.

Ukraine’s seaports have always been profitable before and during the pandemic. 2021 data is only available for the first six months, with profits amounting to UAH 944 million. 

Therefore, linking the profits of state-owned enterprises exclusively with the policy of the presidential team, and in particular, with de-oligarchization, is manipulation.

In October-November 2021, vaccination rates indeed accelerated (see the Chart) approaching the above figures.

According to the National Academy of Sciences, Ukraine passed the COVID-19 incidence and mortality peaks in November.

Indeed, on November 24, the OSCE Mission reported that 66 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since a ceasefire was introduced on July 27, 2020.

Despite formal ceasefire agreements, the OSCE regularly records violations of the Donbas armistice: since the beginning of the ceasefire, observers have recorded more than 85,000 violations.

In 2020, the population and industry consumed 31 billion cubic meters of gas. At the same time, the state-owned and private companies produced 20.2 billion cubic meters. That is, Ukraine produces about 65% of its total needs.

It is not entirely clear what criteria can be used to define the most successful reform over the last 50 years. Without a doubt, the presidential team has contributed to this area’s development. Following the introduction of the “Large Construction” program, greater attention started being paid to infrastructure in Ukraine, with more funding allocated for its development. However, it is hard to compare infrastructure reform with the other important reform areas such as healthcare, judicial, anti-corruption, and land reform without any clear criteria.

At war with the “predecessors”

The traditional theme of Ukrainian politicians’ speeches is admonishing the previous government. Several statements by Volodymyr Zelensky specifically related to the activities of the previous head of state, Petro Poroshenko. 

Suppose Volodymyr Zelensky tried to accuse the previous President of gaining popularity by speculating on the topic of victims during the Revolution of Dignity. In that case, it is manipulation: Petro Poroshenko took part in the Euromaidan much earlier. The “bulldozer” moment (i.e. Poroshenko’s speech before the protesters) took place on December 1, 2013 i.e. long before the killing of the Heavenly Hundred.

Although the President does not formally accuse his opponents, he effectively blames them for Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian territory. However, it is too simplistic a perception. In September 2020, the State Bureau of Investigations published an investigation about how Ukraine lost Crimea. Yanukovych-era politicians began impairing the Ukrainian army’s combat effectiveness in 2012, failing to take measures in late 2013 and early 2014 to prevent annexation, despite available intelligence information about Russia mounting an operation.

As for Donbas, Petro Poroshenko did indeed promise to end the war as soon as possible. Just like Volodymyr Zelensky did before the presidential election. Although those were different promises: by ending the war, Petro Poroshenko meant getting the occupied territories back by military means (a quick and effective anti-terrorist operation), and Volodymyr Zelensky planned on concluding peace agreements with Russia.

However, not everything is decided by presidential will because the future of the conflict largely depends on Russia. In the case of Petro Poroshenko, Russia thwarted plans to end the war by quickly launching a massive offensive in Donbas. In the case of Zelensky, it expected a surrender from the new President unwilling to make concessions as part of a peaceful settlement.

Over the first five years of the war in Donbas (April 2014 – April 2019), it was possible to free 3,233 prisoners. Petro Poroshenko himself gave a slightly higher number, namely 3,270. Over the two and a half years of the Zelensky presidency, it was possible to return 136 people to Ukraine. However, during the “35-for-35” exchange in September 2019, Ukraine handed Vladimir Tsemakh over to Russia, a key figure in the case of the downed Boeing 777 that could have provided valuable evidence to the international investigation authorities.

Naturally, it would be manipulative to compare the periods of different lengths (2014-2019 and 2019-2021) with hostilities’ different intensity levels and, consequently, with different potential prisoner numbers. However, it cannot be said that the previous presidential administration did not make efforts to liberate Ukrainians.

In 2015, a Russian court seized the property of the Lipetsk confectionery factory in Russia owned by Roshen, making it impossible to sell. In June 2017, the factory ceased operations altogether.

In 2018, Roshen stated that it had never sold its products in the occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea. The company suggested that some third parties could have supplied its products to the occupied territories.

At war with the oligarchs

A real surprise at the press conference was the President’s words about Rinat Akhmetov and his being possibly involved with preparing a coup in Ukraine on December 1-2 this year. The oligarch denied this information after Zelensky’s speech. However, both the President’s and the businessman’s statements cannot be verified using our fact-checking methodology. To understand the context and the following sections, we will describe the background against which such statements were made.

The President accused the businessman not only of anti-government activities but also of contributing to the energy crisis. At the same time, he used manipulation when he said that the state resolves this crisis alone, without help from the private sector.

The DTEK Group does provide about 80% of the country’s heat generation. As of November 26, only two Ukrainian TPSs had coal reserves above the minimum required, namely those in Luhansk and Kryvyi Rih. DTEK owns both.

The Ministry of Energy has graphs showing the country’s coal reserves. For instance, at the end of October 2021, the actual reserves at TPSs and CHPSs were 4.2 times lower than planned. The government’s task is to prevent such crises, including introducing clear rules for the energy market and supporting competition.

The energy crisis affects both state-owned and private enterprises. According to Vitaliy Dovhal, Tsentrenergo’s acting CEO, the state-owned mines have failed to fulfill the delivery plans by 30-40%, forcing Ukraine to buy expensive imported coal.

However, DTEK also participated in purchasing imported coal to meet Ukraine’s needs. For instance, in August this year, DTEK and Tsentrenergo made a deal with an American company to supply 75,000 tons of coal, which was then equally distributed between state-owned and private enterprises. In addition, in November, the company chartered seven vessels to ship coal from the United States and Colombia. Zelensky meant these very agreements. On November 15, he spoke about 7 (not 11) vessels with coal, which would fully meet Ukraine’s needs by the end of this year. On November 20, the first ship arrived in Ukraine and brought coal for Tsentrenergo.

The President also had a chance to talk about his plans for de-oligarchization. However, his statement about the 20% of GDP being allegedly owned by the oligarchs is difficult to fact-check. Firstly, the law on oligarchs has not yet entered into force, so there is no official list of all the oligarchs. Secondly, there is an issue of assessing oligarchs’ hidden wealth. According to the World Bank, the net assets of the three richest Ukrainians exceeded 6% of the country’s GDP in 2017. However, it should be kept in mind that comparing wealth, which is an asset, with GDP for a certain period (e.g., a year) may not be entirely correct.

Wagnerians and the personality of Vasyl Burba

As expected, the conference’s main topics were the operation aimed at detaining the fighters from the Wagner private military contractor, and Vasyl Burba, former head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry. The latter spoke on Freedom of Speech on November 20, criticizing the actions of the President’s Office that led to aborting the operation.

Volodymyr Zelensky criticized the very idea of ​​the operation and negatively assessed the intelligence officer’s personal and professional qualities. Most of these comments cannot be fact-checked due to a lack of information available in open sources. 

Vasyl Burba’s involvement with suppressing the protests was mentioned in the documents provided by Hennadiy Moskal in 2014 that contained the SBU’s operative plans for dispersing Maidan. These plans are part of the material of the investigation into the Maidan killings. However, Vasyl Burba is not currently a suspect in the case.

Conclusions. How did the marathon go?

The article’s most common verdict is “Manipulation.” Occupying an honorable second place is “Without a verdict.” Openly false quotes that would be completely untrue were few. However, this does not necessarily mean that the President provides reliable information.

Firstly, the topics under discussion helped Volodymyr Zelensky avoid getting more “Untruth” verdicts since the accuracy of his statements about the personality of Vasyl Burba, the Wagnerian case, and “Akhmetov’s war against the state” cannot be verified according to our methodology.

Secondly, the press conference’s format proved helpful. The journalists and the President regularly exceeded the time limit, due to which the amount of “empty talk” increased significantly. Besides, some journalists‘ questions such as “List the biggest mistakes made during your presidency” or “Why have opinion leaders and journalists changed their rhetoric about you?” enabled Volodymyr Zelensky to avoid facts and drift off into long “lyrical digressions.”