On July 22, Ukraine’s Parliament passed Draft Law No. 12414 in turbo mode. The original version of the bill included provisions on investigating wartime disappearances. However, by its second reading, amendments were added that significantly reduce the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), effectively making these bodies subordinate to the Office of the Prosecutor General.
Despite calls from civil society to veto the law, the President signed it on the same day it was adopted. Both the changes themselves and the government’s disregard for public opinion sparked widespread public outrage and protests in the capital and other cities.
Although this law falls within the current two-week monitoring period for the Reform Index project (Reform Index 269 covers the period from July 14 to July 27), we decided to have our experts evaluate it immediately using our standard methodology — which assigns a score from -5 to +5. The experts rated the law at -4.5. This marks the first major counter-reform in a long time and poses a serious threat to the progress made in building an independent anti-corruption infrastructure. It is also among the three most harmful anti-reform measures in the Index’s history.
The other two counter-reforms also involved anti-corruption. In 2017, a law scoring -5 required public figures engaged in anti-corruption work, NGO contractors, and members of state enterprise supervisory boards to file electronic asset declarations. That provision was later repealed. In 2020, a Constitutional Court ruling regarding the unconstitutionality of anti-corruption legislation provisions related to declaring income and assets scored -4.5. However, nearly a month later, Parliament passed a new law restoring the powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) to oversee asset declarations.
Law on centralizing the Prosecutor General’s power and limiting the authority of NABU and SAPO, -4.5 points
Law No. 4555-ІХ introduces amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. These changes essentially dismantle the independence of Ukraine’s key anti-corruption institutions — NABU and SAPO. The most significant shift is that the Prosecutor General now receives not just a coordinating or supervisory function but an actual managerial role over all investigative bodies, including those previously outside of their chain of command — namely NABU, SAPO, and the Economic Security Bureau (ESB).
First, the Prosecutor General is granted the formal right to demand full access to criminal case materials from NABU, SAPO, ESB, or any pre-trial investigation body. This goes beyond simply reviewing materials — the Prosecutor General can obtain them for whatever period and in whatever form they choose. Once in possession of the case, the Prosecutor General may assign another prosecutor to verify whether investigators followed legal procedures.
Second, the Prosecutor General gains the right to reassign investigative jurisdiction. If an investigative body is deemed “ineffective” or unable to work due to objective circumstances (like damage from shelling, occupation, or technical inability to conduct investigative actions), the Prosecutor General may transfer the case to another agency. This means a case being handled by NABU or ESB could be reassigned to, for example, the National Police or the Security Service of Ukraine — without the consent of the agency that initiated and led the investigation.
Additionally, the Prosecutor General alone now determines who will serve as the prosecutor in a given case — including SAPO cases. This replaces the previous system in which SAPO independently assigned prosecutors to cases. Moreover, administrative orders related to SAPO’s operation (e.g., reorganizations or staffing changes) are now issued with the agreement of SAPO’s head — but the initiative and control rest with the Prosecutor General.
During martial law, the Prosecutor General may also appoint new prosecutors without a competitive process, including individuals who have never previously worked in the prosecution system.
In short, under these new rules, a single official — the Prosecutor General — gains the authority to interfere in any investigation, reassign investigative agencies, appoint prosecutors, and demand full access to case files. These changes create serious risks of power concentration, political influence over anti-corruption bodies, selective prosecution of corrupt officials, or suppression of investigations on orders from above.
Previously, anti-corruption bodies functioned within a separate vertical structure. In particular, they were not subordinate to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President. To ensure that leadership appointments in the anti-corruption infrastructure would not depend on a single person or political body, a mechanism was established whereby the Cabinet of Ministers appoints the head of NABU based on the recommendation of a selection commission composed of Ukrainian and international experts, while the Prosecutor General appoints the head of SAPO based on a similar process. This helped ensure their independence. By contrast, the candidate for Prosecutor General is nominated by the President and approved by Parliament — without a competitive process or integrity screening.
Expert commentary
Mykola Khavroniuk, Director of Research and Head of Anti-Corruption Program, Centre for Policy and Legal Reform
“In 2006, Ukraine ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. This international treaty — ratified by the vast majority of countries — requires that states ensure the independence of bodies tasked with preventing and combating corruption. The Convention’s provisions make clear that these bodies should be specialized, effective, and autonomous in their activities. To meet these standards, Ukraine established an anti-corruption infrastructure and guaranteed its independence.
Ukraine has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to fighting corruption — especially within the framework of the EU Association Agreement and its candidate status for EU accession. All EU countries are required to combat corruption. Given Ukraine’s high perceived level of corruption compared to other European countries (according to Transparency International), the effectiveness of its anti-corruption policy is of fundamental importance to the European community.
In this context, the adoption of Law No. 4555-IX on July 22 raises serious concerns, as it significantly weakens the independence of specialized anti-corruption agencies — reducing their procedural autonomy to that of regular investigative bodies.
Above all, the law demotes specialized anti-corruption bodies — staffed by trained professionals selected through independent competitions — to the level of ordinary agencies. From the perspective of Parliament and the President, these institutions are now unnecessary, and all corruption cases are to be placed under the Prosecutor General — an official appointed through a political decision, without competition, integrity checks, or independent professional evaluation. Since the Prosecutor General cannot realistically oversee such a volume of cases alone, they must delegate responsibilities to close associates. This creates issues of unclear accountability, lack of transparency, and the potential erosion of public trust in the anti-corruption system. It also limits the ability of civil society and international partners to monitor proper adherence to the principles of investigative confidentiality and legal compliance.
Therefore, Law No. 4555-IX may endanger the systemic efforts that have built Ukraine’s anti-corruption framework over the past decade.”
Pavlo Demchuk, Senior Legal Advisor, Transparency International Ukraine
“TI Ukraine views the adoption of this bill negatively, as it poses a serious threat to the foundation of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Most critically, it undermines their independence — which previously enabled them to investigate corruption regardless of how powerful the official involved was. Without any safeguards, NABU and SAPO investigations now become vulnerable to interference by the politically appointed Prosecutor General, who can influence proceedings at their own discretion, without clear rules and with the risk of arbitrary decisions.”
On July 24, a draft law was registered in the Verkhovna Rada to restore the independence of NABU and SAPO. It was signed by 48 lawmakers—mainly from the Holos and European Solidarity factions, along with several MPs from Batkivshchyna and Servant of the People. The President has also promised to submit a new bill that would preserve all provisions needed to maintain the independence of anti-corruption institutions. At the time of this publication, the President’s draft had not yet been made public, though it has been formally registered in Parliament.
Information about the Reforms Index project, the list of Index experts and the database of the regulations assessed are available here.
Attention
The author doesn`t work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have no relevant affiliations
