White Book of Reforms 2025. Chapter 15. Reforms in Culture and Media

However, public funding for culture remains low. Now there are obvious constraints on this funding, but in the past, the cultural sector was financed according to the “leftover principle” because of the generally careless attitude to culture and identity. Indeed, in the absence of state support, it was more profitable to produce TV series, record songs, import books etc. in Russian rather than Ukrainian because the Russian language market is much larger than Ukrainian.

The most significant changes in the cultural sphere have been the laws on decommunization, the gradual restriction of the use of the Russian language and Russian-language products in the media and public sphere, and the switch to a new model of cultural funding (including the creation of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation). 

The mass media market in Ukraine has been and remains distorted because owners and managers of the majority of media don’t treat them as businesses. Many large media outlets distribute their product for free and maintain low advertising prices because their primary source of revenue comes from oligarchs. This makes it difficult for independent media outlets to secure sufficient funding from advertisers or readers. The new Law “On Media” discussed below was supposed to change the situation, but currently, the largest media asset — television — is monopolized by the state. Meanwhile, audiences are increasingly migrating to social networks, making the future of the media market uncertain. If market players and the state manage to instill in consumers a culture of respect for intellectual property rights and an understanding of the need to pay for content, there is hope for improvement. 

2014-2019

One of the first steps in cultural policy reform was the adoption of several laws aimed at decommunization and decolonization in 2015. These are laws on condemning totalitarian regimes, commemorating the victory over Nazism, honoring the memory of those who fought for Ukraine’s independence, and providing the public access to archives. 

These laws provided the legal basis for renaming streets which had been named after imperial figures, dismantling monuments to them, and banning totalitarian symbols (e.g., flags and emblems of the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, other communist countries, and Nazi Germany). However, in many cities and villages, active decommunization only began in the spring of 2022, as local authorities had previously sabotaged the implementation of these laws with the support of some national-level politicians. 

No less important, though less publicized, was the opening of Ukraine Security Service (SBU) archives from the period of Soviet occupation in line with these laws. Although some archives had been destroyed or taken to Moscow by Soviet authorities in 1991, these archives remain an invaluable source of information for historians from Ukraine and other countries.

Another important process was the state support for the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. After an unsuccessful attempt in 2014 to repeal the “Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law,” which de-facto pushed Ukrainian language out of the public space, the government gradually implemented measures to promote Ukrainian language. In 2016, “language quotas” were introduced, which mandated that at least 35% of radio content and 50% of television broadcasting be in Ukrainian, with a gradual increase to 60%. In 2017, the quotas were raised to 75% for national and 60% for local television channels. In 2019, Parliament passed a law supporting the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language, which gradually introduced the mandatory use of the language in different domains. In 2020, the government appointed a language ombudsman and established its secretariat. 

Many politicians and opinion leaders opposed both the language quotas and certain provisions of the new language law, particularly the introduction of Ukrainian as the “default” language in the services sphere. Their arguments often focused on “market-based” logic, i.e., that demand for Ukrainian-language content would naturally generate supply (and thus there is no need to support Ukrainian content). However, given the much larger size of the Russian market and Russia’s aggressive promotion of its cultural products, “free competition” could lead to the gradual displacement of the Ukrainian language. Unfortunately, as we discuss below, many necessary steps to protect Ukrainian cultural space were made only starting in 2022.

In 2014, the Ukrainian State Film Agency (Derzhkino) began banning Russian films that contain propaganda or that were created by people who support Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting followed suit by prohibiting Russian TV programs, series, and other content. Unfortunately, many TV series and programs produced in Ukraine effectively promoted Russian narratives, immersing Ukrainians in a common cultural space with Russia.

In 2018, the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation (UCF) was established, launching grant funding for cultural projects with a focus on results rather than the process. This implied supporting the creation of specific cultural products such as books, films, exhibitions, music albums, etc. The Foundation’s website provides details on all supported projects, including the amount of funding and the results achieved. This represents a significant shift from the “traditional” model of cultural funding, which allocated funds to cultural institutions regardless of the quality or relevance of their output. However, as we discuss below, the Foundation’s work faced many challenges. 

In 2017, the Parliament extended tax exemptions for film distribution until January 1, 2021, including an exemption for Ukrainian films and foreign films dubbed in Ukrainian from the value-added tax (VAT). Later, these exemptions were extended until 2025 and probably will be extended further.

The first significant changes in the media sphere were implemented in 2015 when the Parliament passed two laws aimed at facilitating journalists’ work: one granting access to Parliamentary committees and another increasing liability for counteracting journalists’ work. Despite these measures, the National Union of Journalists continued to record dozens of attacks on journalists annually, while government officials used many excuses, among them the pandemic and the war, to restrict access to information. 

2019-2024

In 2019, the new Parliament granted local councils the authority to support film production in their regions, and the government introduced several additional changes to support filmmakers. It channeled state support for film production through Derzhkino rather than the UCF and allowed it to reimburse a quarter of the expenses of foreign filmmakers shooting in Ukraine. Previously, both foreign and Ukrainian producers were eligible for reimbursement, so this change disadvantaged domestic producers. However, state funding for film production has gradually decreased over the past five years (Figure 15.2), which could soon lead to a considerable reduction in Ukrainian film production.

At the end of 2019, Ukraine joined EURIMAGES, the European fund for the co-production and distribution of films, making it easier for Ukrainian filmmakers to find international partners. 

In 2021, the government introduced the concepts of “cultural service” and “basic set of cultural services” and at the same time transferred cultural institutions from districts to communities within the decentralization framework. The government hopes that “arm’s length” cultural institutions will be funded by the communities. However, not all of them are able to do this, and rural communities are especially unlikely to cope with this challenge. In accordance with this law, in 2024, the Ministry of Culture, with the support of international organizations, launched a pilot project in the Vinnytsia and Kyiv regions to create a Register of the Basic Network of Cultural Institutions. The register will allow to see which regions or communities have enough cultural institutions and which require state support for provision of basic cultural services.

The COVID-19 pandemic was a severe blow to culture, as many cultural institutions and events imply large gatherings of people. In response to it, in the summer of 2020, the government decided to support the creative industries by allowing the UCF to provide not only project-based but also institutional support to organizations in these sectors. This law also expanded state support for book publishing, including translations, writing, and book distribution. In December of the same year, the government approved a list of paid services that cultural institutions could provide, and Parliament granted tax benefits to creative industries to improve the financial situation of cultural institutions. 

Unfortunately, despite these positive initiatives, the government began to undermine institutions that had proven their effectiveness and ability to function in novel ways. A striking example is the situation with the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation and the Dovzhenko Center. In 2021, the first head of the UCF was accused of misusing funds. However, these accusations lacked proof, and representatives of the sector filed a complaint with the State Bureau of Investigation about the case. 

In 2021, a new supervisory board was elected for the UCF. Almost immediately, concerns arose about their interference with the grant distribution process, as the board would sometimes support projects that lost grant competitions while denying funding to the winners. As a result, several cultural institutions called on the government to dissolve the board. Despite this, the board worked until the end of its legally mandated three-year term. During the election of the new UCF supervisory board in 2024, the public closely monitored the process and was generally satisfied with the outcome. At the end of 2024, the board elected a new UCF head via the competition.

Since 2015, the Dovzhenko Center (an institution tasked with the preservation, research, and promotion of national film heritage, which also manages a unique film archive) has been significantly transformed. It not only became a prominent educational hub and venue for important cultural events but also began generating more revenue. However, in August 2022, the Dovzhenko Center was transferred to Derzhkino, which issued an order for its “reorganization.” This plan involved transferring the center’s archive to another institution and evicting it from its premises. Despite protests from the cultural community, civil society, and international attention, Derzhkino did not appoint Olena Honcharuk as the center’s director, even though she won the competition for the position twice (she currently serves as the acting director). In the summer of 2023, Derzhkino canceled its “reorganization” order, halting the process for now, but there are no guarantees that attempts to reorganize the center will not be revived.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, Parliament banned the public performance of Russian music (at the same time allowing the UCF to support national music production) and prohibited the import of books from Russia and Belarus. As a result, Ukrainian publishing activity has intensified despite the war, and the number of bookstores is growing. Research by the Ukrainian Book Institute shows that Ukrainians are reading more, with a significant increase in the number of people reading Ukrainian-language books. 

Since 2022, Russia has destroyed more than 2,000 Ukrainian cultural institutions and nearly 1,000 cultural monuments and has looted Ukrainian archives and museums. The cultural sphere has suffered from reduced funding, as well as from the fact that many artists have joined the military or left the country. Even far from the front lines, cultural institutions often cannot function properly. For example, museums may have hidden or evacuated parts of their collections, theater performances are disrupted by frequent air raid alarms, etc. 

At the same time, there has been a surge of interest in Ukrainian culture both within the country and abroad. Also, the government began working on a long-overdue initiative: creating an electronic catalog of artifacts and cultural treasures of Ukrainian museums and filling in electronic registers of cultural heritage (e.g., ¾ of intangible cultural heritage items were added to the list after the full-scale invasion). Furthermore, due to the war, the Ministry of Culture compiled a “red list” of cultural assets at risk, and the UCF developed grant programs and scholarships to revive cultural and artistic activities, as well as to support projects aimed at helping people affected by the war.

In the media sphere, the most significant change during this period was the adoption of the new Law “On Media,” which aligns Ukraine’s media regulations more closely with European standards. The law expands the powers of the state media regulator, the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, allowing it to impose sanctions on those who violate media legislation. At the same time, the law increases the influence of industry NGOs in decision-making processes. According to the law, representatives from NGOs and local unions of journalists are to be included in the supervisory boards of regional media outlets. Their number must exceed that of representatives from local authorities. Additionally, every media organization, civic organization, and a professional union can nominate one person for a position on the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

The law increased transparency of media ownership and brought online media into the legal domain. Another step towards implementing European standards in the media market was amending the laws on advertising. These changes strengthened the prohibition of discrimination in advertising and introduced fines for inciting discrimination and hatred based on ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and other characteristics. The fines amount to 10% of the licence fee for licenced entities and from 5 to 40 times minimum wage for media organizations per day that the law is violated. 

Additionally, the law imposed new restrictions on alcohol advertising. Unlike tobacco brands, alcohol brands are still allowed sponsorships, including media sponsorships. However, the law sets strict rules for alcohol advertising, such as not showing alcohol consumption or implying that alcohol can solve personal problems or contribute to success, etc. The changes also simplified rules for interrupting films with advertisements and introduced mandatory labeling of ads on social media. The law empowered the Ministry of Economy to address violations of intellectual property rights in advertising. Later, Parliament allowed advertising in minority languages (excluding Russian) in areas with larger minority populations.

A very important change was the ban of religious organizations related to Russia. The implementation of this law in practice is quite challenging, as Ukraine must remain within the legal framework, despite the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church openly supports Russian aggression and spreads Russian propaganda.

What next?

For many years, both the Ukrainian government and society paid little attention to the cultural sphere, seeing it more as a supplement rather than a cornerstone of national identity. Meanwhile, Russia invested significant resources to keep Ukrainians within a common cultural space, reinforcing the myth of “one people.”

On the international stage, the situation is even worse: Russian culture has long received recognition and the label of “great”, while Ukrainian culture remained largely unknown until 2022. This created pro-Russian biases in Western societies, perhaps contributing to the nearly unanimous “expert” predictions that Ukraine would be conquered within days and therefore should not be provided with weapons. Although the situation is gradually changing, Ukraine still has much work to do to promote its culture abroad. 

It is clear that the state lacks sufficient financial resources for this. For example, in 2025, funding for culture and film production will decrease from UAH 1.38 billion (USD 34.5 million) in 2024 to UAH 593.6 million (USD 15 million). Funding for Derzhkino will be reduced threefold (from UAH 618.4 million to UAH 204.1 million), for the Ukrainian Book Institute by 2.6 times (from UAH 466 million to UAH 178.5 million), and for the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation by half (from UAH 215.7 million to UAH 145.7 million). Moreover, funding for the Ukrainian Institute, which handles cultural diplomacy, will decrease from UAH 80 million to UAH 65 million.

Spending on the public media will remain at the 2024 level, with some budget programs even increasing. For instance, support for the Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine (Suspilne) is expected to rise to UAH 2.1 billion, which is UAH 300 million more than in 2024. Over UAH 1.5 billion will be allocated for the “United News” marathon and the “Dom” TV channel, the same as in 2024. However, Parliamentary “Rada” TV channel and the “Holos Ukrainy” newspaper (an official outlet that publishes new legislation) will receive UAH 78 million in 2025, down from UAH 198 million in 2024. Funding for the state media regulator, the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, will be reduced by UAH 7 million (3%). 

In our opinion, this funding “bias” toward television does not align with the current reality, as broadcast television, and the “United News” marathon (a 24/7 news broadcast produced by 5 largest TV channels and financed by the state that was formed right after the full-scale invasion) in particular, is rapidly losing both viewers and trust. In contrast, the participation of Ukrainian films in international film festivals and the availability of translated Ukrainian books in foreign bookstores attract significant attention to Ukraine. Therefore, funding for the TV marathon could be reduced in favor of more “prestigious” projects.

At the same time, funding for cultural projects can be sourced from private and international organizations, as the UCF does, by securing grants from the European Union (through programs like Creative Europe Ukraine and Horizon Europe) and other donors. To this end, government agencies and cultural institutions need to establish processes for collaborating with donors, from identifying organizations that can fund specific projects to ensuring effective reporting. This requires employing project managers who understand how to organize and promote cultural initiatives. Implementing transparent selection procedures and granting these managers autonomy over their work will help to attract more talent. It is crucial to develop public-private partnership projects in the cultural sphere because Ukraine has many companies capable not only of creating high-quality cultural products but also of promoting them. 

Another essential domain of work in the cultural sector directly related to the war is the preservation of culture in government-controlled territory and the recovery of artifacts stolen by Russia. For example, occupiers looted over 23,000 artifacts from the Kherson Regional Museum alone. 

The protection of cultural assets in Ukraine is governed by the laws “On the Protection of Cultural Heritage” and “On the Protection of Archeological Heritage.” Unfortunately, these laws lack clearly defined mechanisms for safeguarding cultural assets during wartime. They outline general measures for the protection, preservation, registration, and proper use of cultural heritage objects, such as preventing the destruction or damage of cultural sites, as well as their conservation and restoration. In 2023, the first law was amended to allow for the creation of cultural heritage registers, but the second law has not been updated since 2012. 

Recently, the government submitted to Parliament several draft laws aimed at strengthening the role of local authorities in preserving cultural and archaeological heritage. These laws would allow local authorities to impose significant fines on negligent owners or to take ownership of such objects. They would enable local governments to protect objects that are not officially recognized as cultural heritage but are historically valuable, and they also propose to create a registry of traditional Ukrainian artisans. Hopefully, these draft laws will be adopted in the near future.

It is also necessary to update the Cabinet of Ministers 2013 resolution that regulates evacuation, specifically to include into it the algorithm for evacuating cultural artifacts and the resources that can be used during this process.

The concept of “crimes against culture” must be incorporated into criminal law. The current Criminal Code does not specify penalties for attacks on cultural objects during wartime, their use for military purposes, or their looting. While there are punishments for smuggling and illegal transfer of cultural assets, these offenses are not classified as war crimes. This creates a legal gap that must be addressed. 

Creating electronic registers of cultural institutions, museum assets, intangible heritage, and other cultural elements is of high priority. Not only will this facilitate the restoration or recovery of damaged, lost, or stolen cultural assets, but it will also enable, for example, virtual museum tours, thereby promoting Ukrainian culture. A good example of effective work with such a register is the map of Ukraine’s intangible cultural heritage.

Finally, as part of the broader strategy to “build back better,” it is essential to restore damaged cultural institutions in a way that ensures accessibility, so that all the citizens have access to our cultural heritage.