YouTube is one of the main social networks where Ukrainians get their news. Therefore, Russian and pro-Russian propagandists persist in trying to fill this platform with “ideologically correct” content.
For instance, the YouTube channel Vyshka has been blocked in Ukraine since April 2024, but the story does not end there. Moreover, familiar figures continue spreading pro-Russian narratives. Lana Shevchuk, a former host of Medvedchuk’s propaganda channels and later a host of Vyshka, has been running her own YouTube channel, LANA TUT! (Lana is here), for three months now. On her broadcasts, Shevchuk appears to have learned from the mistakes of previous projects, carefully disseminating manipulative and sometimes blatantly false messages. To legitimize these narratives, members of parliament occasionally assist her — sometimes without even realizing it. What’s wrong with the channel and the MPs’ statements on it? Let’s analyze the facts.
Lana Shevchuk
Lana Shevchuk is a Ukrainian TV host who worked for sanctioned pro-Russian channels like NewsOne, Pershyi Nezalezhnyi (First Independent), and NASH. In 2021, during a NewsOne broadcast about the return of Ukrainian prisoners, Shevchuk cited only the perspective of “LPR/DPR” militants, even though they were not parties to the negotiations.
After these channels were shut down, Shevchuk became a host on Novyny.Live and often appeared on the programs of propagandist Vasyl Apasov. Since January 2024, she has been a host on Vyshka, the rebranded YouTube channel of NASH. Earlier, we examined in detail the statements made by Vyshka’s guests and the messages promoted there. In April 2024, the channel was blocked in Ukraine, although it continued to operate in other countries, releasing videos until August with Shevchuk as the consistent host. In August, Shevchuk launched her own YouTube project, LANA TUT!
Notably, the speakers invited to Shevchuk’s channel often overlap with those from Vyshka. This is a second “red flag” following her work on pro-Russian channels. Guests on LANA TUT! include pseudo-experts like Ruslan Bortnyk, Vadym Karasiov, Dmytro Spivak, and Fikret Shabanov, who previously appeared on Vyshka. In earlier materials, we debunked their manipulative and false statements.
On her broadcasts, Shevchuk claims to address “complex, delicate topics with significant political undertones”. One frequently discussed issue is the law banning religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The blogger asserts she has no bias against any religious organization. For example, in one video, she expressed surprise that only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) would be checked for ties to Moscow.
Lana Shevchuk, 22/08/2024
Manipulation
“The UOC must publish letters confirming that its representatives have withdrawn from the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and all governing bodies of the ROC. There is already a response from UOC representatives. They raise, in my opinion, a reasonable question: there are UOC representatives who joined the OCU before this law. So, UOC representatives are asking: why are you addressing only the Ukrainian Orthodox Church? Why not those clergy who joined the OCU or other religious organizations operating in Ukraine? We are all equal before the law, and we should not make one religious organization, like the OCU, seem more noticeable or prioritized.”
The UOC-MP is “prioritized” in the context of banning pro-Russian churches because it remains subordinate to the ROC, and its representatives have repeatedly propagated pro-Russian narratives. In January 2023, a religious studies examination by the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience confirmed that the UOC-MP remains structurally part of the ROC and has not severed ecclesiastical-canonical ties.
Meanwhile, the law applies not only to the UOC-MP. If any religious organization is suspected of collaborating with the ROC or spreading the “Russian world” ideology, State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience will conduct an expert examination. If violations identified in State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience directives are not corrected, the organization can be banned only through a court decision. Under the law, Ukrainian religious organizations suspected of ties with the ROC must sever these connections by December 23, 2024.
Previously, in the article “Who Preaches Lies: Fact-Checking MPs Opposing the Ban on the UOC-MP”, we examined in detail what the law banning religious organizations connected to the ROC entails and the manipulations being spread about it.
Members of parliament also appear on LANA TUT!. Some actively spread false information, while Shevchuk tries to provoke others into discussing sensitive topics, thereby legitimizing pro-Russian narratives through their statements — or lack thereof.
The guests invited to the broadcasts are predominantly those who criticize the government. However, it should be noted that the host makes an effort to maintain “impartiality” by inviting representatives of various political forces. One such guest is MP Nina Yuzhanina from European Solidarity. The choice of Yuzhanina was no accident: she is popular on media, one of the main spokespersons of the party, and an active participant in parliament, frequently submitting amendments to legislation. An ideal candidate to attract more views and, in doing so, push the host’s own ideas into the information space. The scheme works like this: invite MPs, ask a question that clearly reveals Lana’s position on the issue, and secure either affirmation or at least silent agreement from the MP (as they are unlikely to challenge the host during the broadcast).
The conversation with Yuzhanina is a textbook example of such manipulation. Shevchuk repeatedly tried to radicalize the guest’s rhetoric and force her to admit that Ukrainization, derussification, and the necessary tax increases are dividing society.
Nina Yuzhanina, 11/10/2024
“As for renaming, this really should be decided by historians, people who can clearly propose options for renaming because I’m convinced we need to abandon Russian names and those associated with the Russian Federation, and this process must be completed. There are many interesting historical insights about cities’ origins and the roots of settlements. Our faction has Volodymyr Vyatrovych. I often disagree with his more assertive policies, I believe we should act more softly, more persuasively, and ensure that these measures are non-violent. That’s why I often ask: What opinion did the community express? How would they like their city, town, or village to be named?”
Lana Shevchuk, 11/10/2024
Manipulation
“But they say no one even asks them.”
Shevchuk interrupted Yuzhanina with the assertion that the opinions of Odesa residents were disregarded during the renaming process. This raises the question of who “they” are. Generalizations like “people say” or “activists claim” do not represent the sentiments of a region’s population. There is no evidence online of any violation of democratic procedures during the renaming in Odesa. Renaming is conducted through public discussions, often hosted on the “Socially Active Citizen” portal of the Odesa City Council.
Odesa residents, however, show limited participation. For example, in one such poll, the highest number of votes for renaming was 214 “for” and 169 “against” concerning renaming Leo Tolstoy Square to honor Mendele Moykher Sforim. In total, fewer than 400 residents expressed opinions on one of the most controversial renamings. Whether this low turnout is due to a lack of awareness about influencing local government decisions or general indifference to renaming remains unclear. Yet it cannot be said that residents’ opinions were not solicited.
Lana Shevchuk, 11/10/2024
Manipulation
“That’s true. I completely agree with you that there is now a systematic, blatant division of society, a segmentation of our community. And people are slowly protesting. I haven’t seen people rally against tax increases or their economic status. But in Odesa, for example, I saw people protesting against the renaming of cities or streets. In my opinion, this too is divisive.”
Shevchuk’s statement creates the impression that a large crowd of discontented residents gathered on the streets. In reality, the “protest” in question was a solitary picket.
On September 30, Odesa activist and journalist Leonid Shtekel, editor of Odessa Daily (spelled with a double “s”), staged a lone protest outside the regional administration. Shtekel is known for his pro-Russian stance on derussification, having opposed the adoption of the language law, compared Ukrainization to Nazi Germany’s occupation policies, and described the Ukrainian language as inferior to Russian.
Despite his calls, Odesa residents did not support Shtekel. By his own account, “very few” people joined the protest. Judging by photo reports, fewer than 30 individuals attended — and that number may include passersby curious about Shtekel’s sign.
Lana Shevchuk, 11/10/2024
Manipulation
“Or certain initiatives of the Ivano-Frankivsk mayor, who insists that language ombudsmen should patrol the city and point fingers at displaced persons from the East, forced to flee due to the war, criticizing their Russian-speaking habits. What do you think — do such initiatives also divide us?”
Next, Shevchuk mentioned the initiative about language inspectors who allegedly would walk around the city and “show Russian-speaking displaced people that they are speaking some kind of wrong language”. In reality, Ivano-Frankivsk’s “language volunteers” primarily engage in educational activities: distributing flyers, informing about the schedule of Ukrainian language courses, and so on. They can also make remarks to service establishments if they do not comply with the language law. However, “language volunteers” do not have the authority to fine or otherwise restrict businesses or passersby.
At the same time, the Language Ombudsman, Taras Kremin, considers the term “language inspectors,” used by Mayor Ruslan Martsykin, to be unfortunate. Russian propagandists employ this phrase to spread the narrative about the “oppression of Russian speakers”. However, the term “inspector” was given a different meaning. There are no plans for forced Ukrainianization in Ivano-Frankivsk or other cities.
Moreover, this initiative by the Ivano-Frankivsk mayor is not new. Similar monitoring mechanisms have existed for several years. After the adoption of the language law, many cities established working groups to check compliance with the law in signage and announcements in educational institutions, service sectors, and healthcare facilities. These checks apply only to public spheres of life regulated by the law.
Lana Shevchuk used a similar tactic during a conversation with another MP, Viktoriia Hryb. The host repeated a claim often promoted by Russian propaganda, alleging that the government intends to fight “to the last Ukrainian”, to which Hryb did not respond.
Viktoriia Hryb, 14/10/2024
“If Ukrainian citizens and those, about whom you are speaking, who will shout ‘betrayal’ and everything else, if they provide us with a plan to win this war without Western assistance, then I would like to see that plan.”
Lana Shevchuk, 14/10/2024
False
“To the last Ukrainian.’ I believe that plan has already been announced.”
Since this claim was not refuted during the broadcast, viewers might be left thinking it is true and that such a “plan” indeed exists. In this way, Shevchuk legitimized an overtly Russian narrative. In Russian propaganda, the phrase “to the last Ukrainian” is used to suggest that Ukrainian or Western politicians are “forcing” Ukrainians to fight against Russia.
However, the channel’s issues are not limited to the host’s statements. Invited MPs also make factual errors. Next, we analyze their false or manipulative claims.
Heorhii Mazurashu
Heorhii Mazurashu appears on Lana Shevchuk’s broadcasts. Although he left the “Servant of the People” party, he remains part of its parliamentary faction. Mazurashu claimed that the war is allegedly beneficial to Ukraine’s political and military leadership.
Heorhii Mazurashu, 03/09/2024
False
“This damn war, so many problems, so many tragedies it has brought to our country — it turns out to be obviously beneficial for the military leadership. Let’s recall the state of the army in Ukraine before the war, before 2014. It was about reductions, underfunding. I represent sports, and we competed with them on a residual principle: ‘Whatever is left, let’s throw it at the army and sports to patch some gaps.’ What do we have now? The war started in 2014 — it became a priority; we needed to develop the army. After 2022, enormous sums started coming in, hundreds of billions. So, it turns out to be beneficial for them, as they gained access to these funds. […] It turns out that it’s politically advantageous for the leadership as well because it’s an opportunity to stay in power indefinitely.”
This narrative is often spread by Russian propagandists to shift responsibility for the war onto Ukraine. In reality, the Ukrainian state has repeatedly and publicly expressed its desire to end hostilities.
In addition to presenting the Peace Formula, Ukraine initiated the Peace Summit, aiming to leverage international support, military and economic pressure on Russia, to establish a just peace.
Given the complex situation on the frontlines and insufficient levels of international support, forcing Russia into peace is unlikely to be realistic in the near term. However, it cannot be claimed that Ukraine has not declared its aspiration for peace or that its leadership is “profiting” from the war. Russia initiated the invasion, and Ukraine’s demands — deoccupation of all territories, punishment of war criminals, reparations, etc. — are justified.
The Kremlin continually rejects any attempts to end the war, insisting on “considering the situation on the ground”. This implies Ukraine’s recognition and acceptance of occupied territories in exchange for a ceasefire (without security guarantees or reparations), as well as commitments not to join military alliances and to adopt neutral status. However, there are no guarantees that even after accepting these conditions, Putin would not continue his aggression. Agreeing to the Kremlin’s terms and ending the war under current conditions would amount to capitulation.
Thus, Ukraine’s military and political leadership has attempted to end hostilities on its terms but could not agree to Russia’s ultimatums. For now, neither Ukraine nor Russia is ready to compromise on their fundamental positions.
Viktoriia Hryb
Also, Lana Shevchuk’s broadcasts frequently feature independent MP Viktoriia Hryb, who was elected from the now-banned “Opposition Bloc”. She is a member of the Committee on Energy and Housing and Communal Services. However, with Shevchuk, she more often discussed the ban on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the detention of priests from this organization. In particular, she expressed indignation over the detention of Metropolitan Arsenii (Ihor Yakovenko), the abbot of the Holy Dormition Sviatohirsk Lavra in Donetsk Oblast.
Viktoriia Hryb, 22/09/2024
False
“The case of Metropolitan Arsenii is now being heard in the Sloviansk court. First of all, looking at what is happening, for me, as a person, it is simply incomprehensible how under such circumstances it was even possible to imprison the metropolitan because his sermon is supposedly the main evidence of his guilt. It is available in the public domain; anyone can watch it. […] And all that was said was: ‘Let us pray for our brothers and sisters who are now at a checkpoint in one settlement or another.’ Listen, no coordinates, nothing. But now they are accusing him of ‘revealing’ the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).”
On April 24, 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine informed Metropolitan Arsenii of suspicion regarding the dissemination of information about the movement, transfer, or location of AFU. On April 25, he was taken into custody. Investigators reported that in September 2023, he informed parishioners about the locations of checkpoints, as well as units of the AFU, the Security Service of Ukraine, National Police, and Defense Forces of Ukraine within the Sviatohirsk municipal community.
A recording of the sermon is available online. The priest did not pray for believers, as Hryb claimed, but rather described military activities at checkpoints, specifying their locations. “On the Nativity of the Theotokos, Security Service of Ukraine officers came for an interview: ‘What will you have on the holiday?’ I explained what would happen and how our services would be conducted. And everything seemed fine and peaceful. But today, there are three checkpoints (location name — ed.): one on the hill near (location name — ed.), another below here, and one at the end of (location name — ed.) near the monastery entrance. They stand there, checking passports, recording, photographing people, noting passport numbers, recording data, email addresses, and mobile phone numbers of everyone,” said Metropolitan Arsenii.
On October 8, the Sloviansk City District Court extended Metropolitan Arsenii’s detention until December 6. On November 6, the metropolitan’s lawyers filed an appeal, but the Dnipro Court of Appeal upheld the detention. Viktoriia Hryb also attended the hearing.
Notably, the abbot of Sviatohirsk Lavra has been making anti-Ukrainian statements since 2018. Specifically, he claimed that in 2014, Sloviansk was shelled by Ukrainian troops “on Turchynov’s orders”, and there were no Russians present. He also said that Crimea’s population should decide its own affiliation.
Viktoriia Hryb, 31/10/2024
Manipulation
“Regarding the renaming of streets and dismantling of monuments. Well, I think we’re playing into the enemy’s hands here. Why? Because we see that in society, these steps are not accepted by many people, many people are against it. And when we see a few deputies, like today in parliament, taking the podium and saying that if, God forbid, we don’t rename these last five cities that failed in parliament, they will block the podium and the work of our Verkhovna Rada.”
Hryb also commented on derussification. However, the deputy does not cite clear data but uses general phrases like “many people”. In this way, Hryb creates the illusion that the majority opposes renaming.
This is not true. In a poll conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center (December 13-21, 2022), 59% of respondents said they positively viewed the renaming of toponyms associated with Russia, the USSR, and the Russian Empire.
On October 25, 2024, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory published a survey regarding renaming. Regarding renaming populated areas and streets named after Soviet or communist figures, in 2024, 77% responded positively (71.6% in 2023). A similar trend applies to names linked to Russian imperial political or military figures. In 2024, 74.7% supported renaming (71.5% in 2023). As for renaming cities and streets named after Russian cultural figures, 65.6% supported it in 2024 (59% in 2023).
Oleksii Kucherenko
MP from “Batkivshchyna”, Oleksii Kucherenko, is a frequent guest on Shevchuk’s channel. He typically comments on a wide range of topics, from Zelenskyi’s Victory Plan to anti-corruption initiatives. Kucherenko is also a member of the Committee on Energy and Housing and Communal Services, so he occasionally makes statements related to tariffs. For instance, he claimed that “Energoatom” does not explain why the cost price of electricity is 1.7 UAH/kWh, although a few years ago, it was nearly three times lower.
Oleksii Kucherenko, 28/08/2024
Manipulation
“I agree with you that society is indeed constantly being kept on edge, in a full state of alarm, an Armageddon, ‘everything is lost’. I’m not even mentioning that amidst this noise, the price of electricity was raised to 4.32 UAH/kWh, and no one is even planning to show us MPs, me personally, and Tymoshenko, as we personally sent inquiries, the real cost price. I still say that the cost price of ‘Energoatom’, primarily, is concealed; it is unclear to me. Why was it 0.57 UAH a couple of years ago, and now the cost price is 1.7 kWh? What did they invest in?”
In reality, Kucherenko referred to the cost price of electricity from four years ago, which was 0.5987 UAH. During this time, several factors could have influenced the increase in cost price: the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, resulting in the loss of part of its capacity and qualified personnel, an increase in repairs due to Russian shelling, “Energoatom’s” debts, inflation, and more. Comparing the current cost price of electricity production during wartime in Ukraine with that of four years ago is a clear manipulation.
The claim that “Energoatom” conceals and “is not planning to show the real cost price” is untrue. In December 2023, the Ministry of Energy responded to an inquiry from Batkivshchyna MPs, stating that at the time, the production cost of 1 kWh at NPPs was 1.08 UAH. Kucherenko published this response on Facebook. According to the latest available data from June 2024, the production cost of 1 kWh at NPPs is 1.7 UAH.
At the same time, production expenses are not the full cost price of electricity. The total price includes the costs of regional energy distribution, transmission through “Ukrenergo” networks, supply to consumers, and VAT (20%). Therefore, the market price for electricity is significantly higher than the cost paid by household consumers, and this difference is compensated by “Energoatom” and “Ukrhydroenergo”. More details on tariff formation and other electricity-related manipulations can be found at the link provided.
Additionally, Kucherenko criticized supervisory boards, claiming they are mechanisms of interference in internal affairs.
Oleksii Kucherenko, 28/09/2024
False
“This is a mechanism of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs through these supposedly civilized institutions — supervisory boards. When I hear ‘supervisory boards’, I just want to immediately punch someone in the face. I think everyone understands what a ‘supervisory board’ is.”
Supervisory boards are designed to oversee the activities and financial stability of large private companies, non-profit organizations, and state enterprises where a high level of control and transparency is needed. Specifically, supervisory boards aim to reduce corruption. According to the corporate governance reform, supervisory boards are mandatory for strategically important enterprises that are not planned for privatization. Similar practices exist in many countries. Supervisory boards are not mechanisms of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. A supervisory board does not control the operational activities of an enterprise — that is the responsibility of the company’s management.
The presence of foreigners on a supervisory board does not imply an attempt to control Ukraine’s internal processes. Foreign citizens are often selected for supervisory boards because they possess high qualifications and experience necessary for the role. Moreover, they do not have conflicts of interest with the government, which reduces political pressure on company activities and increases accountability to society.
Mykola Skoryk
Some MPs have adopted Lana Shevchuk’s narrative about the alleged unnecessity or harm of decolonization and Ukrainization. Among them is Mykola Skoryk, an MP who was elected from the now-defunct Opposition Platform — For Life party. He remains in the Verkhovna Rada as part of the parliamentary group “Platform for Life and Peace” and is in the Committee on Finance, Tax, and Customs Policy. On Shevchuk’s channel, he found yet another platform to claim that language doesn’t matter and that Ukrainization divides society — one of the host’s favorite themes.
Mykola Skoryk, 09/10/2024
Manipulation
“I wouldn’t have been able to pass exams to university during Soviet times because I knew all the terminology exclusively in Ukrainian, and I made no distinction. I knew that Pushkin, Shevchenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka were great figures, and it’s not for me to judge who is better, who is greater, or lesser. Because I am incapable of writing even a single line of poetry. And these are people who are part of our history, our culture. Why should we consider that, well, for example, Pushkin’s poetry has anything to do with what is happening now?”
In the article “Not the Right Time: Fact-checking Politicians’ Statements on Derussification”, we analyzed politicians’ manipulations on the topic of decolonization. We highlighted the real threat that Pushkin poses to Ukrainian statehood and, using concrete examples, and proved that his works are part of the colonial legacy imposed on Ukrainians. Pushkin’s work presents Russian culture as superior to others, endorses the imperialist policies of the Russian Empire, and justifies genocides.
Mykola Skoryk, 09/10/2024
Manipulation
“The fact that people are dying is a huge problem. But again, I don’t understand what relevance the monument to Pushkin, erected in 1919 at the expense of Odesa residents, has to this.”
Predictably, the conversation turned to the defense of the Pushkin monument in Odesa, allegedly funded by the people of Odesa. This myth was also debunked in the fact-check on politicians’ statements about derussification. The fundraising for the monument was organized by the “Slavic Charitable Society”, which promoted Russian imperialism and culture. A significant portion of the funds was provided by the society itself, with support from the local governor-general. Ordinary Odesa residents showed little enthusiasm for the unveiling of the monument.
Lana Shevchuk eagerly agreed with all the MP’s statements, concluding that the removal of Soviet colonial heritage is “a huge tragedy for our new generation.
Lana Shevchuk, 09/10/2024
Manipulation
“I saw children burning textbooks in Russian, books by Pushkin and other writers. I thought this was also a great, great tragedy for our consciousness, for our new generation.”
According to Shevchuk, just like Russian books, Ukrainians should also retain Soviet city names. Once again, the host referred to fabricated testimonies of locals who were allegedly not asked. However, a survey of the residents of Pivdennoukrainsk was actually conducted.
The MP shares her opinion and believes that renaming the city is too expensive, and a state at war cannot afford such a luxury.
Lana Shevchuk, 09/10/2024
Manipulation
“Yuzhnoukrainsk, Pivdennoukrainsk. People living there even write to me personally: why didn’t anyone ask us? Why is this being done now?”
Mykola Skoryk, 09/10/2024
Manipulation
“I don’t think it would have been a big problem if Yuzhne remained Yuzhne. Especially since Yuzhne is not just a city, it’s a port. This means all maritime registers would need to be updated — do you understand how much money and effort this would cost the state? Why was this done now? I don’t understand.”
However, renaming a city, street, or any other toponym is not as expensive as Skoryk suggests. The main cost involves creating new signs, while making changes to electronic registers requires minimal resources.
Take the example of Dnipro, which was renamed from Dnipropetrovsk at a cost of up to 800,000 UAH. At first glance, this amount may seem significant, but in the year of renaming, it accounted for just 0.009% of the city budget. Pivdennoukrainsk is much smaller in area and is not a regional center, meaning the expenses would be lower. Moreover, there is no need to rename everything. This year’s decommunization efforts affected just over a dozen cities nationwide.
Anna Skorokhod
The next invited guest, who considers the removal of colonial heritage unnecessary, is Anna Skorokhod, a member of the parliamentary group For the Future. She reiterated the narrative that “Ukrainian divides society” and went even further, claiming that Ukrainization is coercive, “bordering on absurdity,” and spoke in Russian throughout the broadcast.
Anna Skorokhod , 03/10/2024
Manipulation
“Some things about basic decommunization, maybe some monuments to Lenin — that all — I support, yes. But bordering on absurdity, why? First of all, you are setting society against itself. Even a war over language — it’s about pitting society against itself.”
Even more striking than the MP giving the interview in Russian was her pronunciation, emphasizing the “a” in the word “ukráinsky” (Ukrainian) instead of stressing “i”.
Anna Skorokhod , 03/10/2024
Manipulation
“If you want people to learn Ukrainian, I fully support it, of course. But not by force! Schools and kindergartens teaching Ukrainian — I fully support that. But why are you prohibiting people from speaking their own language?”
Under the language law, Ukrainian is the primary language for public communication and services. All service providers are required to serve clients in Ukrainian but may switch to Russian or another non-state language upon the client’s request. This means that in the service sector, any language acceptable to both the client and the service provider may be used, but the service provider must initially address the client in Ukrainian and cannot refuse service in Ukrainian. The law obligates public sector and business employees, not ordinary visitors, to speak Ukrainian. Visitors retain the freedom to choose their language of communication.
In private life, people can speak any language they choose. Personal communication is not regulated by the law. Meanwhile, a November 2024 survey by the Rating sociological group showed that 58% of Ukrainians speak only Ukrainian at home, 31% use both languages, and only 9% speak exclusively Russian. This indicates that more people are consciously and voluntarily using Ukrainian in daily life. Furthermore, a February poll by KIIS revealed that 81% of citizens support the removal of Russian from official communication across the country or oppose its use in their region.
Thus, claims about societal fragmentation based on language and supposed hostility between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations are significantly exaggerated.
Yurii Kamelchuk
Lana’s YouTube channel visits MP Yurii Kamelchuk, who ran for parliament in 2019 as a member of the Servant of the People party. In September, he left the party and the Lviv Regional Party Organization Council. However, Kamelchuk remains a member of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kamelchuk repeatedly spread unscientific statements, conspiracy theories, and fakes about the WHO, coronavirus, and vaccines, which we have debunked. This time, there were no conspiracy theories, but populism was still present: the MP proposed a radical increase in military salaries. While the idea of greater support for the military is commendable, Kamelchuk’s proposal is unrealistic.
Yurii Kamelchuk, 17/09/2024
Manipulation
“In 2022-2023, I said the following: a soldier’s salary should start at $5,000. Here’s why. First, in peacetime, the American and Israeli armies (just two examples) have salaries starting from $5,000–6,000 in peacetime. During an operation or similar events, their salaries immediately increase two- or threefold. So, I wasn’t even citing some extraordinary military salary but a basic standard foreign salary. We’ve never had such salaries. The second figure I referenced is from conversations with entrepreneurs, even those with families and wealth. I asked them: what salary would motivate you to go to war? $5,000? No. $7,000? No. $10,000? Yes. Some began to say that starting with $10,000, they would be willing to serve professionally. […] If we had spoken about a professional army from 2022 with salaries of $5,000–10,000 or more, I’m sure the situation would have been completely different.”
Income comparisons between countries should account for purchasing power parity (PPP). This metric reflects differences in purchasing power because, for $5,000 in the U.S. and Ukraine, one can buy vastly different amounts of goods and services. The minimum military salary in Ukraine’s Armed Forces is 20,100 UAH ($1,748 PPP). In the U.S., it’s $2,017 ($2,017 PPP). Thus, the basic provisions in the U.S. are only about 15% higher. Of course, one must also consider better living conditions, equipment, and lower risks in U.S. service. However, even at the level of basic payments, Kamelchuk’s comparison is flawed.
The populism doesn’t end there. One must also consider the state’s financial capacity. Ukraine’s defense budget is entirely funded by domestic revenues. Western partners provide weapons and even financing for military equipment but not salaries for military personnel. Ukraine’s 2024 state budget amounts to 3.7 trillion UAH, with 1.54 trillion UAH allocated to the Ministry of Defense. Of this, 1.02 trillion UAH is spent on military personnel salaries — 66% of the defense budget or 27% of all expenditures.
A soldier’s salary depends on rank, position, and combat participation. With all additional payments, an ordinary soldier can earn up to 200,000 UAH per month. Meanwhile, Kamelchuk proposes base salaries ranging from $5,000 to $10,000 (206,500–413,000 UAH), without specifying the funding source. This is particularly problematic as Ukraine’s armed forces are continuously expanding. For instance, in 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces numbered 700,000; by 2024, President Zelenskyi reported 880,000. Moreover, other defenders, such as the National Guard, State Border Guard Service, and police combat units, also require support. The budget already fails to cover all military needs, leading to discussions about tax increases.
Another issue is motivation. Kamelchuk believes higher salaries should be used to attract recruits. However, an Info Sapiens survey ordered by Texty.org.ua found that monetary incentives were not the primary reason for mobilization. When asked if high salaries and income stability motivated their acquaintances to join the military, only 8.9% fully agreed, and 24.1% somewhat agreed, ranking last among motivators. The top reason was the desire to defend Ukraine and protect loved ones (32.7% fully agreed, 38.2% somewhat agreed).
Among the top five reasons people fear mobilization are inadequate material support, lack of proper training before deployment, the risk of injury or death, uncertainty about service duration, and the chance of serving under a “bad” commander. Thus, financial incentives are not the primary motivation for joining the military during active combat.
“Vyshka” 2.0?
Following efforts by Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, the Vyshka YouTube channel was blocked for the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives. Although the channel is still accessible via VPN, this forced its creators to “freeze” the project and launch a new one — LANA TUT!.
What has changed since then? Primarily, the number of hosts — on Vyshka, besides Shevchuk, Vasyl Apasov also hosted. The guest list, however, remains largely unchanged, featuring pseudo-experts, pro-Russian speakers, and politicians. MPs mentioned in this article, including Kucherenko, Hryb, Kamelchuk, Skorokhod, Mazurashu, and Skoryk, also appeared on Vyshka.
It’s unclear whether LANA TUT! will meet the same fate as Vyshka. However, MPs have the power to reduce the reach of dubious YouTube channels — by simply avoiding them. Even when sharing truthful information, their comments legitimize pro-Russian channels and boost their media presence.
Another issue is the statements made by the MPs themselves. This time, the main topics for manipulation included Ukrainization, derussification, and the ban on the UOC-MP. Other sensitive issues such as electricity prices, military salaries, and peace negotiations were also raised. These topics will remain relevant at least until the war ends, making it crucial for politicians to rely on verified facts rather than emotions, manipulations, or populist “simple and quick solutions”.
Photo: depositphotos.com/ua
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