White Book of Reforms 2025. Chapter 3. Judicial reform and law enforcement

The creation of democratic institutions in Ukraine after 1991 has been very slow and is still unfinished in some cases due to Russian interference and pushback from elites. A captured judicial system is an effective instrument for fighting political opponents or business competitors and reaping corruption rents. Thus, although some significant steps were taken, leading to an increase in the Rule of Law Index (Figure 3.2), no government has been eager to undertake comprehensive reforms of the legal system.

Weak law enforcement deterred foreign investment in Ukraine and was a major obstacle to business before the full-scale invasion. Additionally, Ukrainians perceive the legal system to be extremely unfair. For example, a survey by the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP) shows that 85-90% of Ukrainians believe that unfairness within the judicial system is a serious problem, and according to a VoxUkraine survey, Ukrainians perceive courts as one of the most corrupt institutions (although much fewer people report interacting with the courts or facing corruption during these interactions). This perception is not groundless. For example, during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, dozens of protestors were imprisoned on false accusations. In 2019, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau uncovered a number of corrupt judges. Since the full-scale invasion, Andriy Portnov — the former deputy head of the Yanukovych administration, who is under US sanctions for corruption — has won several defamation cases against Ukrainian NGOs and media outlets that labeled him as pro-Russian and corrupt.

The Constitutional Court, a separate authority responsible for interpreting the Constitution and ensuring that legislation aligns with it, faces challenges of its own (mainly because its judges are political appointees). For example, in 2020, it effectively ended the requirement for e-declaration of assets, and in 2019, it removed criminal liability for illegal enrichment. These decisions severely undermined anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine (Parliament has since restored these clauses).

Judicial and law enforcement reforms have been driven mostly by Ukraine’s civic activists and international partners. For example, conditions for opening EU membership negotiations included integrity checks by the Ethics Commission of candidates for the Higher Council of Judges (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), as well as new rules for the election of Constitutional Court members.

Since this Chapter is based on the Reform Index, that is, legislative changes to the “rules of the game”, we pay the most attention to reforms of the judiciary, police, and prosecutors. We briefly touch upon reforms of the Security Service of Ukraine and the issue of enforcement of court decisions. Legal education and Bar reform, although important, are beyond the scope of this Chapter. Anti-corruption infrastructure is mostly discussed in Chapter 1, other than the High Anti-Corruption Court, which is covered in this Chapter.

Reforms in 2014-2019

One of the first moves of the new government that came into power after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was the dismissal of heads of courts. However, since heads of courts were elected by judges of these courts, 85% of the former heads were reelected. Thus, it was clear that much deeper and comprehensive reforms of the court system were needed. At the same time, courts are only one part of the legal system, while other components, such as the police, prosecution, and State Security Service, are no less important. We cover them in turn. 

Police

Police reform began in 2015 with the new law “On National Police“. The new patrol police replaced the traffic police and took on additional functions, ensuring order not only on the roads but in all public places. Unfortunately, the reform did not proceed past this initial phase due to a lack of political willpower (see the White Book of Reforms-2018 for details). Successful reformers from Georgia had been invited to implement similar police reforms in Ukraine, but they were soon fired by the Minister of Internal Affairs, who did not want any real reform. The newly hired patrol police officers were soon discouraged by rather low salaries and lack of prospects: career advancement was not possible for those who did not want to become part of the unreformed, corrupt system. Thus, public trust in police remained low, although trust in patrol police was higher than the National Police (Figures 3.3A and 3.3B). 

During 2016, the former militia cadres were evaluated by a special commission that reviewed their integrity and professionalism. However, only 7.7% of them were fired, and about half of those later were restored to their jobs by court decisions. Often courts based their decisions on the Labour Code, which makes it practically impossible to fire those officially employed. However, there was strong resistance to reform from the entire system, including the Minister of Internal Affairs. Moreover, attestation commissions lacked both clear procedures and the capacity to perform evaluations properly. 

Prosecution

Until 2014, the prosecution was essentially the “fourth power” of the government system: it could check legal compliance of any enterprise or government agency. This unconstrained power created ample opportunities for corruption that were often used by prosecutors. Another major issue was the lack of political independence of the prosecution: the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed by the president and Parliament, and individual prosecutors are dependent on support from senior colleagues (in 2017, only 11% of prosecutors felt they had independence from their superiors). Thus, prosecutorial reform included three major elements: legislative limitations on the powers of prosecutors, the introduction of self-governance (by creating an all-Ukrainian conference and council of prosecutors and a qualification-disciplinary commission of prosecutors, which started operating in 2017), and the replacement of corrupt prosecutors through open competitions. 

To implement the first element, the Law on Prosecution was amended in 2014 and 2015. These amendments separated the functions of prosecutors and the administrative staff of the prosecution, increased the independence of prosecutors (by making it more difficult for higher-level prosecutors to fire their subordinates), and introduced a competition-based selection of prosecutors. They also prescribed a reduction in the number of prosecutors from 22,000 in 2014 to 10,000 by 2018 (by 2018, the number of local prosecutorial offices was reduced from 650 to 175, and about 3,000 prosecutors were dismissed), and relaxed the eligibility requirements for those willing to become prosecutors. The purpose of the last two changes was to attract new people to the prosecution and pay them decent salaries. 

The most important changes concerning prosecutors were the amendments to the Constitution adopted in 2016, along with the changes regarding the judicial system. These legislative changes made the prosecution a part of the overall judicial system rather than a stand-alone authority, deprived it of general supervision and investigative functions, and introduced the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution (see Chapter 1). 

To remove corrupt employees from the prosecution, in early 2015, President Poroshenko appointed David Sakvarelidze, who had previously implemented effective prosecutorial reforms in Georgia, as Deputy Prosecutor General. However, the prosecutorial reform stalled right away because the Prosecutor General (Viktor Shokin) was part of the “old guard.” Additionally, there were design flaws in the reforms: the procedure for the appointment of the Prosecutor General was unchanged, and reforms started with “ordinary” prosecutors rather than the Prosecutor General’s Office (thus, not many people wanted to take lower-level positions while the top level remained unreformed). In mid-2015, Sakvarelidze and his team arrested two corrupt high-level prosecutors who allegedly were linked to Shokin (so-called “diamond prosecutors“). In response, Shokin fired Sakvarelidze and a few investigators. In March 2016, upon the insistence of the US, who financed both prosecutorial and police reforms, Victor Shokin was fired. According to the media, as of summer 2023, these “diamond prosecutors” were still on trial.

Thus, despite the introduction of significant legislative changes, the prosecution remained largely unreformed. 

Judiciary

In February 2015, the Law on the Right to a Fair Trial was adopted. This law increased the openness of court hearings and clarified procedures for court hearings and appeals. But more major changes to the judicial system were introduced in 2016-2017: amendments to the Constitution, the new Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges, the Law on the High Council of Justice, and the Law on Reforming the Judicial Process. These laws:

• increased the independence of judges from the political system. Previously, judges were appointed by the president for an initial 5-year term and then reappointed by Parliament until retirement; now, judges are selected by competition run by the High Council of Justice, the highest self-governing body of judges, and formally appointed by the president until retirement at age 65. They can be dismissed only by the High Council of Justice;
• raised the salaries of judges from 10-13 to 30-75 times the subsistence level (today, judges earn from UAH 70,000 to UAH 430,000 per month, while the average salary in Ukraine is UAH 21,000 per month). Pensions for retired judges were significantly increased and are now, on average, 17 times higher than average pension, although some judges do not deserve such benefits;
• made the prosecution a part of the judicial system rather than a standalone power, while also depriving it of universal oversight powers. A separate Chapter on the prosecution was removed from the Constitution, and an article on the prosecution was added to the “Justice” Chapter;
• eliminated one level of courts (including the High Court on Civil and Criminal Affairs, the High Commercial Court, and the High Administrative Court) that stood between the appellate courts and the Supreme Court, thus making the court system three-level again. These changes also foresaw the establishment of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), which has been operating since 2019, and the High Intellectual Property Court, which is not yet operating;
• clarified the powers of the Supreme Court, and the rights and duties of trial participants;
• stated that only attorneys at law can represent a person in court (with a few exceptions for cases regarding social protection, elections, or those involving children). This resulted in a monopoly of the National Lawyers Association over the legal sector. In 2019, Parliament allowed legal entities to self-represent in courts. The opportunity for citizens to act as their own lawyers should also be restored.

In addition, these laws outlined the procedure for the qualification assessment of sitting judges by the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). This commission is responsible for the selection of judges and performs some functions to ensure their integrity. It is assisted by the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which evaluates the integrity of judges who undergo the qualification assessment. 

During 2016-2019, the Supreme Court was re-elected using the new transparent procedure with the participation of the Public Integrity Council. However, since negative assessments by the PIC could be overruled by a qualified majority of the HQCJ, 44 of the 193 newly elected Supreme Court judges had integrity issues. 

In the fall of 2017, the HQCJ started the evaluation process for sitting judges. It planned to review the competence and integrity of about 7,000 judges in less than two years. It came as no surprise that the process lacked proper scrutiny (although at one point it was even broadcast online), and civil society organizations that monitor it had a number of serious concerns about the methodology of the evaluation and its practical implementation. In short, as with the police and prosecution, the overwhelming majority of judges passed the evaluation very easily. Civic activists noted that the HQCJ did not verify the information that judges provided about their revenues and assets, even though this information sometimes appeared dubious. According to the HQCJ, as of the end of 2024, only 5% of the 2960 judges who went through the evaluation process did not pass it (Figure 3.4). 

More details about judicial reforms until mid-2019 can be found in the previous White Books of Reform (2018, 2019) and VoxUkraine publications.

Another aspect of the law enforcement system requiring attention was the enforcement of court decisions: in 2015, only about 20% were implemented. Thus, in 2016, Parliament allowed private bailiffs in addition to public ones, and the Cabinet of Ministers introduced remuneration for both private and public bailiffs that depends on the results of their work (public bailiffs receive 2% of the worth of recovered assets and private bailiffs — 10%). Since 2017, the number of private bailiffs has increased (Figure 3.5A), but they still play a limited role in enforcing court orders (Figures 3.5B and 3.5C). This is because private bailiffs still don’t have the same rights as public bailiffs (e.g., they cannot access information on the vehicles of debtors from the police system). If the government aims to develop private bailiffs, it should grant them the same rights and responsibilities as public bailiffs have. 

In 2021, the National Bank of Ukraine obliged banks to provide information on a debtor’s accounts to public bailiffs. Still, in 2021, public bailiffs recovered only 2.4% of the amount claimed (for private bailiffs, this share was 3.2%). In 2023, the respective shares were 7.3% and 4.6%.

Reforms in 2019-2024

High Anti-Corruption Court

In mid-2018, Parliament adopted the Law on the High Anti-Corruption Court. Although this court was technically established in 2016, the government and Parliament delayed the law’s adoption (eventually, it even had to be included as one of the conditions of the IMF program) because, as we discuss in Chapter 1, the newly created anti-corruption system would function only if all three elements (NABU, SAPO and HACC) were operational. 

Another law established that appeals to HACC cases would be considered by the HACC appellate chamber rather than by general appellate courts, which could be corrupt. In April 2019, HACC judges were selected and appointed. The HACC began operating in September 2019, and the legislative changes adopted by the new Parliament allowed it to avoid an excessive caseload by considering only new corruption cases being investigated by the NABU and SAPO rather than both new and “legacy” cases.

In 2024, Parliament raised the number of judges and staff members of the HACC so that it could handle an increased workload. As of mid-September 2024, there were 42 open positions for judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court and 21 in its appellate chamber. 27 and 11 positions have since been filled, respectively, and the competition for the 15 and 10 remaining vacancies should have been completed by March 2025. Since only 7 out of 140 candidates made it to the interview stage, the process will likely last longer. However, the quality of HACC judges cannot be compromised for the sake of speed. 

Prosecution

The new Parliament elected in summer 2019 re-launched the evaluation of prosecutors: special commissions at the Prosecutor General’s Office and oblast (regional) prosecutor offices were tasked with assessing the professional competence and integrity of prosecutors. The same law eliminated the special military prosecution, which was created in 2014 to investigate war crimes in the occupied territories of Ukraine. However, Yuriy Lutsenko, the Prosecutor General in 2016-2019, misused it to investigate other crimes as well. Now, war crimes are investigated by the State Security Service, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the National Police, and are presented in court by the prosecution system. The government is considering restoring the special military prosecution and special military courts to handle cases related to war crimes.

As a result of evaluation of prosecutors in 2019-2021, about 35% of prosecutors were fired (including about 50% from the Prosecutor General’s Office and ⅓ from oblast-level and local prosecutor offices). However, many of them were reinstated by the courts because of flaws in the legislation that launched the evaluation process. For example, the law stated that before the evaluation, prosecutors should be considered “warned” about potential dismissal, but Parliament lacked the authority to issue such warnings. Today, the evaluation procedure continues.

As of mid-September 2024, the number of prosecutor vacancies exceeded 1,200 or about 12% of the maximum number (the prosecution system can employ at most 15,000 personnel: 10,000 prosecutors and 5,000 administrative staff). In 2022, the requirement to have two years of legal experience to become a prosecutor was canceled in order to widen the pool of candidates. Additionally, an internship at prosecutors’ offices was introduced. 

In August 2023, the government, with support from the EU, launched a pilot project called “Community Prosecutor” aimed at improving citizens’ trust in law enforcement agencies. In the four pilot communities, prosecutors actively communicate with citizens and local authorities about their needs. They also speak to students about the responsibilities of prosecutors. Overall, the EU has been deeply involved in law enforcement reform in Ukraine: it provides training to police officers and prosecutors, and now helps to investigate war crimes.

A detailed overview of prosecution reform during 2014-2023 suggests that prosecutors still lack independence and a proper system of assessment of their work. For society, perhaps the most painful matter is that no judges or prosecutors who unlawfully imprisoned participants of the Revolution of Dignity were punished. Since 2014, the government and law enforcement agencies have sabotaged investigations and court hearings, allowing some suspects to go free because the deadline for investigation passed. Only four people from the special police forces who participated in atrocities were sentenced. 

Reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)

SBU reform has been on the agenda for a long time, having started during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (2005-2010). In 2008-2009, Ukraine’s National Security Council adopted the Concept for SBU Reform and the Comprehensive Program on SBU Reform. The relevant draft law was developed as well, but was later scrapped. In 2015, the reform was relaunched, supported by Ukrainian civil society and international partners. The main idea of the reform is the liquidation of SBU departments responsible for investigating economic crimes. In this way, the SBU would be deprived of opportunities to pressure businesses and would only be responsible for anti-terrorist activities and uncovering hostile foreign agents. The SBU was not particularly effective at investigating economic crimes anyway. For example, in 2020, it investigated 505 economic cases, of which only 90 proceeded to court. Additionally, the reform would stop the SBU from conducting pre-trial investigations, reduce the number of employees from 27,000 to 15,000 people, and demilitarize its structures. 

In early 2021, the relevant draft law was adopted in the first reading (it proposes a reduction of SBU staff to 20,000 employees). G7 ambassadors, as well as representatives of the EU and NATO, welcomed this development. However, civil society organizations state that this draft law requires considerable adjustments. For example, according to the draft, the SBU would receive the power to suspend the licences of media outlets involved in activities deemed a threat to national security. Civil activists are concerned that this could be used to limit freedom of speech.

Judiciary

Apart from the launch of the High Anti-Corruption Court, one of the first steps of the new Parliament was to give a “fresh start” to judicial reform in November 2019. The fundamental reason for “reloading” the highest judicial bodies was that the prior judicial reform of 2016 had increased judicial independence before cleaning up the system, and thus judges elected to the HCJ and HQCJ were not interested in genuinely implementing the reform (however, cleaning up the system before increasing judicial independence would also have been a risky option, since it could’ve resulted in the de facto political dependence of judges).

A law on judicial self-governance, adopted in 2019, established that an Ethics Commission composed of three international experts would evaluate the integrity of the members and candidates for the High Council of Justice. It also stipulated that the High Qualification Commission of Judges would be re-elected by a commission consisting of three delegates from the Conference of Judges and three international experts. 

However, this law allowed the “old” High Council of Justice to block the formation of the Ethics Commission to preserve the status quo and to protect the interests of the “judicial mafia.” There is evidence suggesting that HCJ was influenced by judges from one of the most corrupt courts in Ukraine — the Kyiv City District Administrative Court (the so-called “Vovk recordings” case, which is currently being considered by the High Anti-Corruption Court). This case became the catalyst for the “reloading” of the HCJ.

At the end of 2022, the Kyiv City District Administrative Court was dismissed. Now Ukraine must create a new administrative court that would consider cases involving central government agencies (this is one of the conditions of the current IMF program). Until it is created, cases of the Kyiv City District Administrative Court will be considered by regional administrative courts.

In 2021, Parliament established procedures for integrity checks of HCJ members and the selection of HQCJ members. These procedures increased the influence of Ukraine’s international partners and civil society over these processes, enhancing transparency and predictability and provided stronger guarantees of the impartiality of elected HCJ members. The law also enabled the formation of the Ethics Commission which had been blocked in 2019. When the Ethics Commission started the evaluation of HCJ members in early 2022, 12 out of 15 members resigned rendering the HCJ inoperational. During 2022-2023, 17 of the 21 HCJ members were elected with the participation of the Ethics Commission. 

At the end of 2024, the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors at HCJ started working. This service will handle disciplinary cases (complaints) against judges. In 2021, Parliament introduced fines (though modest — ranging from UAH 850 to UAH 2550) for non-compliance with the demands of disciplinary inspectors.

The process of filling vacancies at the HQCJ began in September 2021 and was completed in June 2023. The commission, consisting of three international and three Ukrainian experts, selected 32 candidates from a pool of 301 applicants. The Higher Council of Justice then appointed 16 of these candidates as members of the HQCJ. A few months later, the HQCJ started evaluating judges to address the ongoing shortage of judges in Ukraine’s judicial system, which is staffed at slightly more than 50%. As of December 31, 2023, Ukraine had 4,150 judges, while 6,329 were needed (as shown in figure 3.6, the deficit of judges remains a persistent issue).

By April 2024, the HQCJ had completed the evaluation of over 400 judges who began the process back in 2017. With the HCJ and HQCJ now operational, Ukraine will gradually fill the judicial vacancies. While this process may take time, the focus is on ensuring that newly appointed judges are qualified and possess a strong reputation. The Public Integrity Council (PIC), which consists of 20 representatives from civil society, academia, the legal community, journalists, and other sectors, assists the HQCJ in evaluating the integrity of candidates.

The law “On Improving Procedures for a Judicial Career,” adopted at the end of 2023, simplifies the evaluation procedures for judges and stipulates that the HCJ, in consultation with the PIC, HQCJ, and the Council of Judges, will establish a clear list of criteria for assessing the integrity and professional ethics of judges. These changes should make the evaluation process more impartial.

In 2024, the HCJ submitted 474 candidates to the president for judicial appointments and dismissed 237 judges, including the former head of the Supreme Court, who was arrested by the NABU for bribery in May 2023.

At the end of 2024, Parliament modified the qualification examination procedure for judicial candidates. These changes allow the HCJ to set the threshold for the IQ test while also requiring that candidates score no less than 75% on exams covering history, general law, and specialized law.

Despite constant reduction in the number of judges, the number of cases remains large. Thus, in 2023 the courts received about 4.5 million cases and related materials to review, which is more than in 2021. As figure 3.7 shows, Ukrainian courts are understaffed, and in about a quarter of them judges are overloaded with cases.

The law “On Mediation” adopted in January 2022, should help reduce court clog. While mediation had been practiced informally for some time, this law provides an official framework for it. Hopefully, many cases will be resolved by mediation, without the need to resort to a lengthy and costly trial. 

Supreme Court

Although the Supreme Court was completely “reloaded” in 2017-2018, it turned out that the newly elected judges were not immune to corruption. In May 2023, the head of the Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was caught red-handed by NABU agents while accepting a bribe of $2.7 million from a Ukrainian oligarch. Currently, this case is being considered by the High Anti-Corruption Court. Another Supreme Court judge was dismissed for holding dual Russian citizenship (which is illegal in Ukraine). 

Today, the Supreme Court has 156 of the 196 judges needed. During 2023, the Supreme Court resolved about 500 cases, which is more than in 2022 but about twice as few as in 2021. In 2020, Parliament adopted a law that should reduce the workload of the Supreme Court. This law narrows the range of cases that can be considered by the Supreme Court (those that have already passed local and appellate courts). These cases should either set precedents or correct the decisions of lower-level courts if they did not take into account existing precedents. By narrowing the scope of cases it considers, the Supreme Court will be able to focus on its main function: setting precedents for courts in Ukraine. 

Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court is very important because it not only interprets and explains the Constitution but also has the power of judicial review (that is, it can decide that laws are not aligned with the Constitution). Thus, it could theoretically cancel any reform implemented so far by deciding that its underlying laws don’t align with the Constitution. In this way, it reversed criminal liability for illicit enrichment in early 2019 (this automatically closed 65 corruption cases and undermined other work of NABU and SAPO). Similarly, in 2020, it undermined the system of electronic declarations by public officials and thus the entire anti-corruption system. Both decisions were later reversed by adopting new laws, but questions about the integrity of the Constitutional Court remain. For example, the former head of the Constitutional Court, Oleksandr Tupytskyi, was sanctioned by the US for corruption. Now, he is wanted by Ukrainian law enforcement. 

In the future, the Constitutional Court will consider Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO, post-war elections, reintegration of occupied territories, etc. That’s why the integrity and professionalism of the judges of this court (who serve for 9 years and are very hard to dismiss) are extremely important. However, the appointment of these judges is political: 6 are appointed by the President, 6 by Parliament, and 6 by the Conference of Judges. Thus, one of the seven conditions for the EU opening accession negotiations with Ukraine was changing the appointment procedure for judges of the Constitutional Court. They will still be appointed by political entities, but from a pool of candidates whose professionalism and integrity have been properly evaluated and confirmed.

In December 2022, Parliament changed the procedure for selecting Constitutional Court judges by introducing an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) that would screen the candidates. The Venice Commission issued a negative opinion on this reform, which the European Commission upheld. Specifically, the Venice Commission recommends that Ukraine include procedures that would make it impossible to sabotage the AGE’s work (e.g., introduce substitute AGE members, simplify selection of AGE members by Parliament, increase the number of AGE members from 6 to 7 to avoid tie votes). Additionally, it recommends making the selection process for Constitutional Court judges public so that it can be scrutinized by civil society and ensure that candidates not approved by the AGE do not make it onto the Constitutional Court. 

In 2023 Parliament adjusted the competition procedure so that members of the Advisory Group of Experts appointed by the Venice Commission or international organizations have a decisive voice in the selection of candidates. In March 2024, the competition for 5 vacancies in the Constitutional Court began. Since then, two judges have been appointed, and one judge retired because his term ended, so four vacancies remain. 

Digitalization

The judicial system, as well as other branches of the Ukrainian government, is currently being digitized. Thus, all stakeholders involved in trials (lawyers, notaries, bailiffs, court experts, etc.) were recently obliged to register their personal accounts in the Unified Judicial Information-Telecommunication System. Other agents (e.g., enterprises) can register in this system voluntarily. Once the system is fully operational, functions such as document exchanges, data collection, personnel and asset management, etc. will also be digitized. The system should have been deployed in early 2019. However, it ended up requiring much more human and material resources than initially planned. Thus, in 2021, Parliament allowed the deployment of the system in stages. The Ukraine Facility plan foresees the full digitalization of the Ukrainian court system by the end of 2027. The deputy head of the State Court Administration responsible for digitization plans to intensify development of the system by reviewing its functions, employing more IT specialists at the state-owned enterprise that develops the system, and integrating it with the Diia app.

International cooperation

In May 2022, Parliament adopted a law on Ukraine’s cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). The law defines the procedures for transferring cases to the ICC, Ukraine’s support of ICC activities, ICC operations in Ukraine, etc. In August 2024, Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute, which it signed in 2000. However, the ratification law stipulates the condition that the ICC cannot investigate cases against Ukrainian soldiers during the next seven years. This was done to minimize the risk that Russia would weaponize the ICC against the Ukrainian Army. At the same time, ratification is beneficial for Ukraine because it will allow for the investigation and prosecution of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Besides, ratification of the Rome Statute is one of the conditions for Ukraine’s integration into the EU. 

In October 2022, Ukraine joined the European Public Law Organization, which should help align EU and Ukrainian legislation. At the same time, Ukraine ratified the Choice of Court Convention and made relevant changes to national legislation. This will simplify the jurisdiction of foreign courts over Ukrainian businesses and the international recognition of Ukrainian court decisions.

What next?

The next steps for legal reform are included in the Ukraine Facility, G7 priorities, OECD ACN recommendations, GRECO recommendations, and the Ukrainian Strategy for Reforming Law Enforcement Agencies (the latter already has an action plan for its implementation). These documents overlap on many aspects. Generally, they discuss the need to ensure the integrity and independence of judges and prosecutors, while increasing the transparency, accountability, and digitalization of the system. 

Thus, the European Commission recommends that in 2025 Ukraine should “introduce transparent and merit-based recruitment and selection procedures for managerial positions in central and regional offices of the National Police and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), with meaningful involvement of independent experts, along with strong disciplinary and anti-corruption rules tailored to the local context and addressing actual corruption risks.”

Based on an overview of the reform, the following changes are recommended for the prosecution. First, the independence of the Prosecutor General should be increased by specifying a limited set of grounds for dismissal. At the same time, there should be a competitive procedure for the selection of the Prosecutor General. Second, the promotion of prosecutors should be strictly merit-based, i.e., based on an independent evaluation. This will also increase the independence of prosecutors. Third, to reduce corruption risks, cases should be randomly allocated among prosecutors while also taking into account their qualifications (this was suggested by the prosecutorial development strategy for 2021-2022 but never implemented). Fourth, the procedure for disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors should be improved, taking into account the recommendations of the Council of Europe paper on the subject. The Ukraine Facility envisions the adoption of a law increasing the capacity and power of the Disciplinary Commission for prosecutors.

The Ukraine Facility plan and the EU-Ukraine Report pay close attention to the judicial and law enforcement systems. The EU-Ukraine report takes a broader view, discussing human rights, legal education, Bar reform, and other issues. The Ukraine Facility focuses on a few specific measures: 

• establishing periodic performance evaluations of judges and prosecutors; amending the law on financial declarations of judges to improve transparency about their assets and revenues;
• reviewing 2300 outstanding disciplinary cases against judges by the end of 2025;
• adopting a law on the enforcement of court decisions; implementing a strategy and action plan for improving the implementation of court decisions; launching a data collection system on the enforcement of court decisions and an upgraded IT system facilitating law enforcement processes;
• establishing the High Administrative Court;
• completing the evaluation of at least 1000 judges and filling at least 440 judge vacancies (in 2025, the HQCJ plans to continue holding competitions for 1800 vacancies in local courts, 550 vacancies in appellate courts, and 25 vacancies in the HACC);
• adopting a law formally introducing remote court hearings and regulating their procedural aspects;
• introducing the new e-Case Management System for the criminal justice system (replacing the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations);
• implementing an audit of court IT systems, adopting a roadmap, and starting the modernization of this system, including a new case management system;
• adopting a law on Bar reform introducing more transparency, self-governance, and integrity to the work of lawyers.

These developments require not only the adoption of new legislation but also substantial resources. It is not easy to evaluate thousands of candidates for judge positions, and there is a considerable backlog of disciplinary cases because the HCJ did not function for about two years. 

A large number of vacancies in the judicial system implies a high workload both for judges and court staff. However, speeding up the evaluation of judges at the expense of quality is not recommended. Ideally, the end goal of judicial and law enforcement reform should be for the anti-corruption infrastructure to become redundant because corrupt actions would be punished by the “regular” police, prosecutors, and courts. This is certainly a very distant goal at the moment, but it is important to take steps in the right direction.

A more detailed discussion of the progress of legal reforms in Ukraine can be found in the “shadow report” produced by the EU-financed “Pravo-Justice” project.