Russia’s Interference in European Politics

What do Europe’s political extremes stand for?

Across Europe, political parties whose agendas diverge from the EU’s prevailing course are gaining increasing influence. These parties advocate prioritizing national interests over EU-wide policies, restricting immigration, rejecting environmental regulations, and promoting traditional energy sources. While they often brand themselves as conservative, critics accuse them of radicalism—especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

One of the main points of criticism is these parties’ stance on military aid to Ukraine. They emphasize the need to bolster their own national security and defense, often arguing for a reduction in support to Kyiv. Some of their leaders maintain—or have maintained in the past—ties with Russian political circles. For instance, the 2023 electoral victory of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) was portrayed by Russian media as a win for the Kremlin, citing party leader Geert Wilders’ past expressions of support for Vladimir Putin. However, Wilders insists he is not an ally of Moscow and has acknowledged Russia as the aggressor, calling Putin a “horrible dictator.” While he no longer opposes financial aid to Ukraine, he remains against sending Dutch troops to the country.

Russia’s interference in European politics, however, is not a recent phenomenon. Between 2014 and 2022, the Kremlin spent over $300 million financing foreign political parties. As of 2023, more than 900 political parties and organizations—and some 1,300 influential individuals—across 19 European countries were promoting pro-Russian narratives. In addition, Russia conducts information campaigns in support of specific candidates—the most recent example being Romania—and works to stir up discord within European societies. Direct Russian involvement in European politics is not always easy to detect. Still, some political forces openly support Moscow. Unfortunately, even when these forces are in opposition, they can still influence European governments’ decisions on Ukraine. Below, we examine several examples.

GERMANY. The Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) party is well known for its pro-Russian rhetoric. An investigation by The Insider revealed that AfD members of parliament sabotaged arms deliveries to Ukraine, acting in the Kremlin’s interests. Vladimir Sergiyenko, an aide to a Bundestag MP, coordinated public statements with Russian handlers in exchange for payment. The AfD has also filed lawsuits seeking to block military assistance to Kyiv.

An investigation by Der Spiegel revealed links between AfD staffers and Russian security services. The Kremlin was found to have financed AfD Members of the European Parliament Maximilian Krah and Petr Bystron. The Czech government also confirmed the scale of a Russian influence operation in which AfD played a key role. Moscow used the media platform Voice of Europe to spread pro-Russian narratives across Europe in the lead-up to the 2024 European Parliament elections. Through the same platform, Moscow funneled millions of euros to politicians promoting Russian propaganda. In response, the Czech government and the EU imposed sanctions on Voice of Europe and several individuals involved.

Today, AfD commands around 20% of the vote. While a significant number of people continue to protest against the party, it is nevertheless likely to remain a major influence over both German and EU politics.

SLOVAKIA. The Slovak parliament currently includes three openly pro-Russian parties: Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, 23%), Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas – sociálna demokracia, 17.2%), and the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, 13.1%). The current prime minister—now serving his third term—Robert Fico, represents the first of these. Fico is planning to visit Russia on May 9 and, together with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been blocking EU assistance to Ukraine. He has repeatedly made pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian statements, calling sanctions against Moscow “pointless,” promising to veto Ukraine’s NATO membership bid, and dismissing the Ukrainian army’s fight to liberate occupied territories as “naive.” In 2024, he became one of the first European leaders to break Russia’s diplomatic isolation by traveling to Moscow—ostensibly to negotiate gas supplies.

The Voice party (Hlas) was founded in 2020 and is led by Peter Pellegrini—an ideological ally of Fico and the current president of Slovakia. In February 2020, ahead of Slovakia’s elections, Pellegrini received an invitation to visit Moscow, facilitated by Viktor Orbán. Investigative reports indicate that the Hungarian and Russian governments discussed possible ways to support Pellegrini.

The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana), the oldest of the three (active since 1989), is led by Andrej Danko. Danko has stated that supporting Ukraine “doesn’t solve the problem, it only heightens tensions” and that Russia “is not an aggressor, but merely defending its interests.” He also claimed that Russians “entered this territory with the intention of helping their nation,” effectively justifying Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Danko headed a delegation of pro-Russian Slovak MPs who visited Moscow in January 2025. He described the opportunity to speak in the State Duma as “a once-in-a-lifetime honor.”

These statements—along with ongoing Russian propaganda—appear to have shaped public opinion in Slovakia. More than half of Slovaks blame either the West or Ukraine for the war, while only 40% see Russia as responsible—the lowest figure among countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

AUSTRIA. The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), founded in 1985, has consistently opposed EU integration and support for Ukraine. Its leader, Herbert Kickl, has openly stated his intention to block Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, arguing that it poses a threat to European agriculture. FPÖ’s position closely mirrors the political stance of the Hungarian and Slovak governments. A vivid display of the party’s pro-Russian leanings came in March 2023, when Kickl’s MPs walked out of the Austrian parliament during President Volodymyr Zelensky’s video address in protest against Austria’s support for Ukraine.

FPÖ’s September 2024 election campaign was marked by strongly anti-European and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. One of the party’s key posters read “Stop the EU Madness” and depicted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky alongside European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, set against a backdrop of tanks and helicopters with the caption “Fueling the War.” Through this messaging, the party sought to foster voters’ negative attitudes toward the EU’s policy on Ukraine. Like Germany’s AfD, FPÖ also has financial ties to Russia. In 2019, FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache was caught discussing potential funding from a Russian oligarch in exchange for political favors once in power. Today, FPÖ leads in public opinion polls with 34% support.

BELGIUM. The New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA) came in first in Belgium’s 2024 national elections, receiving 18% of the vote. The party’s platform includes the separation of Flanders from Wallonia—possibly explaining its receptiveness to Russian narratives about the “independence” of the so-called “DPR” and “LPR.” Party representatives served as observers at the so-called referendum in Crimea, as well as during the “elections” held in the self-proclaimed “DPR” and “LPR.” The Russian propaganda outlet Voice of Europe has published interviews with members of Vlaams Belang. In 2018, Filip Dewinter, a member of Vlaams Belang, took part in drafting a resolution to lift sanctions against Russia, which was to be submitted to the Belgian parliament. Such initiatives were not unique to Belgium. In the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), there were also discussions concerning a report by a Belgian MP on the potential lifting of sanctions against Russia. For example, in June 2019, PACE considered a resolution that could have weakened the Assembly’s sanctions mechanism and enabled the return of the Russian delegation. After 2022, representatives of Vlaams Belang were compelled to condemn the aggression—however, they still oppose sanctions against Russia.

In 2024, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) launched an investigation into Vlaams Belang over the possible embezzlement of EU funds. Nevertheless, by mid-2024, the party had the highest level of public support—23%. Slightly behind was the N-VA, with 22%. Both parties advocate for dividing Belgium into two states and oppose immigration, but N-VA supports providing both military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, setting it apart from Vlaams Belang.

FRANCE. The National Rally (Rassemblement National), founded in 1972, is currently led by Marine Le Pen, who succeeded her father as party leader. The party has close ties with Russia—for example, its 2014 election campaign was financed by a Russian bank (though, according to media reports, the loan was repaid in 2023). Le Pen’s connections to Russia are detailed in a report by the French parliament. The report states that Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev served as one of the intermediaries between the Kremlin and the French far-right and that the National Rally has regularly supported Putin’s policies: party members have visited Russia, Crimea, and Donbas, taken part in elections organized by Russia, and voted in the European Parliament against resolutions that were unfavorable to the Kremlin. In 2024, Marine Le Pen was forced to explain herself after receiving public support from Russia’s Foreign Ministry. In that year’s parliamentary elections, the National Rally received the largest share of the vote—37%—but a governing coalition between the left-wing Popular Front and Macron’s party prevented the far right from forming a government.

ITALY. The League (Lega), led by Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, has long-standing ties with the Russian authorities. Salvini has repeatedly expressed support for the Russian president, whom he called “the best statesman on Earth” in 2019. On March 6, 2017, the League signed a five-year agreement with United Russia—which was automatically renewed in March 2022.

In 2018, representatives of this Italian party visited Moscow to negotiate a scheme for receiving $65 million from the Russian government. The negotiations involved Andrei Kharchenko—an officer of Russia’s FSB foreign intelligence service and a representative of the Fifth Service. This division played a key role in attempts to politically destabilize Ukraine, particularly during the Euromaidan. An investigation by The Insider revealed that Kharchenko also met with Iranian officials.

 Since the start of the full-scale war, the leader of the League has continued to spread Russian propaganda regarding the war against Ukraine.

ROMANIA. Călin Georgescu, leader of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor, AUR) and a candidate in the most recent presidential election, was detained for his involvement with an organization exhibiting fascist traits and for promoting individuals responsible for genocide or war crimes. He is also facing charges of falsifying statements about the sources of his campaign funding, along with other electoral offenses. Georgescu had previously claimed that his campaign was entirely free of charge and not financed by any external sources. However, there are suspicions that Russia may have funded it through intermediaries.

In addition, Georgescu met with Russian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, which raised further questions about his political connections. As part of the investigation, law enforcement carried out 47 searches involving individuals close to Georgescu, including his partner, who, according to police, maintains contacts with high-ranking Russian officials.

Romania is a clear example of how a country’s institutions can respond to an external threat and defend the constitutional order—without hiding behind appeals to “the will of the people.” Let’s now take a look at how other countries are protecting themselves from foreign influence over their domestic politics.

Regulating foreign funding of political parties

Out of 181 countries worldwide, only 52—including Germany, Belgium, and Austria—allow foreign donations to political parties. However, such bans or permissions may vary in extent. For example, 16 OECD countries prohibit all foreign donations. In contrast, others may permit certain types—such as contributions from individuals or non-governmental organizations—while banning donations from legal entities or foreign states. EU countries often allow parties to receive funding from foreign individuals or parties registered within the EU. This aligns with the recommendations of the Venice Commission from 2006, which generally advised banning foreign funding of political parties.

In recent years, many countries have introduced bans on foreign funding of political parties or made existing bans more stringent. Violations of funding rules—particularly the receipt of money from foreign donors—are typically punishable by fines, imprisonment, suspension of party activities, loss of public funding, or even deregistration.

A 2021 report by the European Parliament acknowledges the problem and recommends that EU member state governments take additional measures to counter hostile political influence. However, it also notes that proving foreign influence over a political party is quite difficult, as funding can be concealed—through proxies, cryptocurrencies, or even cash. Therefore, despite investigations by journalists or data from NGOs, proving the receipt of foreign funds and applying relevant legislation to violators remains a significant challenge.

At the same time, the fact that even openly pro-Russian positions do not reduce some politicians’ approval ratings—as in the cases of Orbán or Fico—suggests that the reasons behind the democratic world’s rightward shift are more fundamental. We recommend reading our series of analyses on the causes and consequences of populism’s rise: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Conclusions

Two key conclusions can be drawn from the above. To start with, right-wing sentiment is on the rise in Europe. The third-largest faction in the European Parliament—Patriots for Europe, with 84 out of 720 members—includes representatives of many of the parties mentioned above, with the exception of those from Slovakia. The growth of such sentiment is partly driven by real challenges, such as the significant influx of migrants into the EU. In some cases, migrants do not integrate into the societies where they reside, leading to the formation of ghettos and a rise in crime.

However, the ties between far-right parties and Russia show that Moscow is deliberately supporting these forces and amplifying related narratives in order to destabilize European societies. Among other things, such chaos and internal disruption reduce political and military support for Ukraine. And if pro-Russian forces come to power, that support could disappear altogether.

At the same time, the rise to power of far-right or populist forces would have negative consequences for European countries themselves since the simplistic solutions these parties offer to complex challenges do not work in practice. In the current context—where Russia is waging war against Europe—European intelligence services must devote far more attention to political actors who promote Kremlin-aligned narratives or benefit from Russian support. Relevant legislation should also be made stricter. At the same time, it is essential to conduct an honest dialogue with voters about the problems facing modern Europe and realistic ways to address them.