Five Years Leading the Cabinet: What Denys Shmyhal’s Government Delivered

The formation of Denys Shmyhal’s government

On March 4, 2020, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Denys Shmyhal as Prime Minister of Ukraine. He succeeded Oleksii Honcharuk, whose tenure lasted only 188 days — one of the shortest terms in office in the country’s history. While Honcharuk had come to symbolize a young “team of change,” Denys Shmyhal entered politics with a different background.

At the time, he was not affiliated with any parliamentary political faction but had a reputation as an effective administrator. His career was closely tied to business and regional governance. Shmyhal held senior positions in major industrial companies, particularly in the energy sector. From 2017 to 2018, he served as Deputy General Director for Social Affairs at DTEK Zakhidenergo, the third-largest power generation company in Ukraine and the leading one in Western Ukraine. He later became the head of the Burshtyn Thermal Power Plant.

Denys Shmyhal’s premiership is the longest in the history of independent Ukraine—over five years, three of which coincided with the period of full-scale war. The average lifespan of Ukrainian governments—of which there have been 21 since independence — is approximately 1.5 years (570 days). The Shmyhal Cabinet served for 1,960 days (see Figure 1). Prior to this, the longest-serving governments exceeding 1,000 days were those of Volodymyr Groysman (2016–2019) and the first government of Mykola Azarov (2010–2012).

One of the reasons Denys Shmyhal remained in office for such an extended period is martial law. The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law explicitly prohibits dismissing the entire government before its conclusion. Furthermore, under the Constitution, replacing the Prime Minister automatically results in the resignation of the entire Cabinet. Therefore, under current legislation, it is impossible to formally change the head of government during wartime. In this context, the dismissal of Shmyhal and the subsequent reshuffling of the Cabinet nevertheless contradict the letter of the law, even if there was public demand for a government overhaul.

The initial composition of Shmyhal’s Cabinet (as of March 4, 2020) can be characterized as predominantly technocratic. Although the government was formally established under the aegis of the presidential party Servant of the People, only a small number of its ministers were openly affiliated with this party. The only direct representatives of Servant of the People were Mykhailo Fedorov (Ministry of Digital Transformation) and Denys Maliuska (Ministry of Justice).

The majority of Cabinet members were technocrats or independent experts, united by their functionality and experience in their respective fields. For example, Maryna Lazebna (Ministry of Social Policy: 2020–2022), Vadym Huttsait (Ministry of Youth and Sports: 2020–2023), and Serhii Bessarab (Ministry for Veterans Affairs: March–December 2020) all entered high-level politics for the first time.

The 2020 Shmyhal government appeared as an “anti-crisis team”: it was composed largely of experienced administrators, sectoral experts, and representatives of regional management. The political newcomers who had characterized the Honcharuk Cabinet became less prominent. At the same time, the government included figures who carried over from previous political cycles — most notably Arsen Avakov, who continued to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs since the Yatsenyuk administration and remained one of the most controversial figures, as well as Mykhailo Fedorov (Ministry of Digital Transformation), Denys Maliuska (Ministry of Justice), Vladyslav Krykliy (Ministry of Infrastructure), and Oleksii Orzhel (Ministry of Energy and Environmental Protection) (see Figure 2).

Over the course of five years under Denys Shmyhal’s leadership, the composition of the Cabinet changed continuously in response to crises, calls for greater efficiency, and corruption scandals. Personnel changes were often explained as necessary to “adjust priorities, teams, and visions” amid wartime conditions. For instance, 2024 saw a sweeping reshuffle, with more than half of the Cabinet replaced (see Figure 2). Another factor driving ministerial turnover was corruption scandals in individual ministries — such as the defense procurement scandal during Oleksii Reznikov’s tenure or the allegations against Agrarian Policy Minister Mykola Solskyi involving the illegal use of state-owned land — which undermined public trust in the government as a whole.

Corruption scandals also tainted a minister who nonetheless remained in office through the end of Shmyhal’s tenure — Oleksii Chernyshov, who in June 2025 was formally served a notice of suspicion for corruption by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). He began in the first Shmyhal Cabinet as Minister for Communities and Territories Development and, in 2024, was appointed to lead the newly established Ministry of National Unity.

Alongside personnel changes, the Shmyhal government also carried out reorganizations of ministries — including mergers, splits, and name changes. According to the Prime Minister, these steps were part of a broader institutional reform aimed at reducing the number of agencies and civil servants. However, despite Shmyhal’s ambitious plans to downsize the government to 15–16 ministries, the actual number of ministries increased.

The Honcharuk government had reduced the number of ministries from 25 to 17 by merging various agencies. However, immediately upon taking office, Shmyhal reinstated the Ministry for Veterans Affairs and the Ministry for Reintegration, restored the Ministry of Youth and Sports as a separate body from the Ministry of Culture, later split the Ministry of Energy and Environmental Protection into two standalone ministries, reestablished the independent Ministry of Agrarian Policy, and created the new Ministry for Strategic Industries. In 2024, he also restructured the Ministry for Reintegration into the Ministry of National Unity. As of July 16, 19 ministries were operating in Ukraine, though another wave of reorganization is planned.

It is important to understand that government effectiveness is determined not by the number of ministries, but by the quality of governance. For example, the 2019 merger of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Agrarian Policy led to administrative disorientation in both sectors, which have distinct priorities and targeted policies. As such, mergers may sometimes result not in optimization but in decreased effectiveness within each domain. Therefore, the key lies not in mechanically reducing or dividing institutions, but in ensuring a balanced government structure capable of delivering professional policy and accountability in every field.

The highest number of personnel rotations between 2020 and 2025 occurred in the Ministry for Strategic Industries and the ministry responsible for the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories. The latter was renamed the Ministry of National Unity in 2024. Both ministries saw four different heads during this period (see Figure 2). The Ministries of Defense, Education, Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, and Internal Affairs each experienced three changes in leadership.

At the same time, there were also stable figures. The longest-serving members of Shmyhal’s Cabinet were Mykhailo Fedorov, who has headed the Ministry of Digital Transformation since 2019 — beginning under the Honcharuk government — and Serhii Marchenko, who served continuously as Minister of Finance in the Shmyhal government since March 2020. Other long-standing figures include Yuliia Svyrydenko, who initially served in the Shmyhal Cabinet as First Deputy Minister for the Development of Economy, Trade, and Agriculture, then moved to the Office of the President as Deputy Chief of Staff, and was ultimately appointed Minister of Economy in November 2021. Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko also held his post for a considerable period, beginning in September 2021, despite being associated with high-profile corruption scandals.

A Government without an approved program

At the start of its term, every newly appointed Cabinet is required to present a program of action to Parliament within one month. If the Verkhovna Rada approves the program, the government receives a one-year “immunity” from dismissal. However, in the context of Ukrainian political realities, even this safeguard does not guarantee stability. Parliament voted to dismiss the Honcharuk government just six months after it took office, despite approving its program in September 2019. The dismissal followed a resignation statement from Honcharuk himself, amid the government’s deteriorating public image due to economic underperformance and the leak of an audio recording from a closed-door meeting, in which he spoke of the President’s “primitive understanding of economic processes.”

Shmyhal’s Cabinet began its term under extraordinary circumstances: immediately after its appointment, a nationwide quarantine was declared in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The new government found itself facing a triple crisis — healthcare, economic, and security-related — as the country continued to live under the conditions of a war with Russia that had been ongoing since 2014.

The first version of Shmyhal’s government program drew criticism from members of Parliament for being overly vague and lacking clear benchmarks. In response, the Cabinet submitted a revised program, expanded from 10 to 85 pages, which included a detailed list of objectives for each ministry. Even this revised document was not approved by Parliament. As a result, Shmyhal’s government operated for five years without a program officially endorsed by Parliament.

Despite this, Shmyhal’s team articulated an ambitious vision for the country’s development in its program. In addition to crisis response measures addressing the pandemic and wartime challenges, the document outlined long-term strategic priorities: European integration, digital transformation, and reintegration of temporarily occupied territories. In the economic domain, the focus included the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, the stimulation of innovation, the expansion of international trade, tax optimization, and industrial revitalization. The program also emphasized energy security, social protection, pension reform, and the advancement of education, infrastructure, and transportation.

Reform activity of the government under D. Shmyhal

The government led by Denys Shmyhal enacted 330 reforms, which collectively received a score of 365.41 points from experts of the Reform Index. On average, this amounts to around 50 reforms per year—a relatively steady pace, with a peak in 2024, when the government initiated a record 79 reforms. That year marked the high point of reform activity under Shmyhal’s leadership (see Figure 3).

In terms of reform activity, the Shmyhal government demonstrated results comparable to those of Volodymyr Groysman’s Cabinet. The Groysman government produced an average of 60 reforms per year—roughly the same pace as Shmyhal’s team (see Figure 4). This reflects a stable, though not breakthrough, pace of change, focused primarily on technical and administrative improvements. By contrast, the true reform surge came under the government of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. In the first year following the Revolution of Dignity, experts from the Reform Index recorded 193 government initiatives with high reform potential. This dynamic was driven by strong public demand for transformation and significant political will to enact change.

Thus, surges in reform activity in Ukrainian politics are often linked to crises or pivotal historical moments. Accordingly, the Shmyhal government, operating under wartime conditions, showed moderate but relatively consistent performance.

The Shmyhal government was also responsible for five counter-reforms (see Figure 3). Among them were legislative initiatives related to industrial parks that introduced tax and customs exemptions for importing equipment up to three years old, as well as a ten-year exemption from corporate income tax. According to experts, such measures create risks of unfair competition and inefficient use of public resources.

Reform Index experts also classified several initiatives in the healthcare sector as anti-reform measures. These included the introduction of state price regulation for medicines — a policy that, while well-intentioned, could reduce pharmacy profitability and lead to closures, particularly in rural areas where access to pharmacies is already limited.

Another negatively assessed measure was the cap on salaries for heads of healthcare institutions, limiting their compensation to no more than 60% above the average salary of medical staff. The problem lies in the fact that the resolution does not specify whose salary should serve as the baseline — that of doctors, nurses, or junior personnel — creating confusion and risks for effective management.

The pilot project for monetizing the “baby box” was also classified as an anti-reform effort. Replacing the in-kind package with a cash allowance proved inconvenient, as instead of receiving essential items directly in maternity wards, parents were required to purchase them in designated stores. This created particular hardships for low-income families in rural areas, who had to spend additional resources on transportation and sourcing the items.

Another eight acts received a “neutral” rating — 0 points — indicating their ambiguous or limited value for systemic reform.

The majority of reforms — 249 out of 324 — were implemented through Cabinet resolutions. This reflects the government’s active use of its own regulatory instruments to advance change without waiting for the more complex parliamentary process of passing legislation. While smaller in number, the share of adopted laws was strategically significant — 43 reform-oriented bills submitted by the government were approved by Parliament (see Figure 5).

A distinct segment of the government’s reform activity was made up of ministerial acts. The most active ministries in advancing reforms were the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Finance — their directives were recorded most frequently in the Reform Index.

At the same time, the government’s reform priorities largely aligned with its declared programmatic goals. The most substantial reform efforts took place in Business Environment and Human Capital. These included reforms to administrative services and regulatory policy, as well as initiatives in healthcare and social protection. By contrast, progress in Monetary Policy and Energy Independence was more limited.

Which reforms defined the Shmyhal Cabinet?

The Shmyhal government can claim credit for 45 “top reforms” (see Figure 6)—regulatory acts that received high expert ratings (+2 points or higher). These were primarily resolutions and laws aimed at improving the business environment, healthcare, social protection for military members, and digital transformation.

Among the most notable initiatives were those in the digital sphere. As early as 2020, the Cabinet opened access to over 100 datasets, ranging from the land cadastre to vehicle and insurance registries. It subsequently introduced automated government services on the Diia portal, enabling citizens to exchange documents with minimal bureaucratic involvement.

During the war, the government opened access to environmental information via the EcoSystem web portal and introduced the Social Services Portal of the Ministry of Social Policy, designed to consolidate all social services on a single platform. In the context of digitalization, other key developments included the rollout of Diia.Signature functionality for legal entities and the launch of the e-Permit system, which allows entrepreneurs to obtain permits and licenses electronically (the project is still in pilot mode, so its effectiveness should be evaluated once it becomes fully operational). It is also worth noting that under Prime Minister Shmyhal, the government actively continued the digital reform agenda initiated by the Honcharuk Cabinet. As a result, Ukraine today can share its experience and significant progress in digitalization and the automation of public services.

Reforms benefiting service members were especially significant. In 2024, the process of obtaining combatant status was automated — eliminating bureaucracy and granting the status immediately upon entry of data into the official registry. This initiative received a +2.5 rating. In response to the unprecedented challenges of full-scale war, the Cabinet accelerated the digitalization of registries and the rollout of online services aimed at reducing the administrative burden on frontline soldiers and veterans. In particular, the government expanded the range of digital services related to social protection and the reintegration of military personnel. These changes reflect the Shmyhal government’s systemic approach to adapting state functions to wartime conditions, though the effectiveness of some individual initiatives remains a matter of debate.

In the healthcare sector, the Cabinet reformed the corruption-prone Medical and Social Expert Commission (MSEC) system. It was replaced with expert teams of practicing physicians, formed specifically ahead of each individual assessment based on the person’s medical condition. The updated system has been operational since January 1, 2025.

In the area of business regulation, the government eliminated over 200 outdated licenses and permits in sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and others. It also launched the comprehensive e-Entrepreneur online service on the Diia portal, enabling business registration, account opening, and registration as a unified tax payer.

However, the most impactful reforms were those related to national security and sovereignty. The key measure was the law banning religious organizations affiliated with Russia, which received a +3.5 rating. It grants the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience the authority to inspect religious institutions and terminate their activities if ties to Moscow are identified. This is a strategic step in disentangling Ukraine from Russian influence in both spiritual and cultural domains.

Other equally important government decisions included the ban on pro-Russian political parties—although this measure proved only partially effective, as pro-Russian forces in Parliament rebranded themselves under a new political name — and the synchronization of Ukraine’s power grid with the European network, which definitively severed the country’s energy ties with Russia.

What were the criticisms of the Shmyhal government?

According to estimates by the Reform Index, Denys Shmyhal’s government was far from the worst among the post–Revolution of Dignity Cabinets. Despite external challenges — including the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion — the Cabinet managed to maintain a relatively stable pace in adopting reform-oriented decisions. However, it is important to consider the methodological limitations of the Index: it primarily tracks the adoption of regulatory acts with positive long-term impact, rather than the quality of their implementation. Yet it is the execution of reforms — not merely their drafting — that constitutes the core responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers as the executive branch.

The government was repeatedly accused of inefficiency due to its slow response to key challenges, delays in personnel decisions, and drawn-out reform implementation.

Some of the most serious blows to public trust in the executive branch came from corruption scandals in individual ministries. One of the earliest was the arrest of Vasyl Lozynskyi, First Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development, on suspicion of bribery related to the procurement of mobile boiler units (the case is ongoing; one of the individuals involved has received a sentence after reaching a plea agreement with investigators).

This incident became a marker for subsequent cases. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Defense was embroiled in a scandal involving food procurement for the military at prices inflated by two to three times. This resulted in the resignation of Deputy Minister Viacheslav Shapovalov. Continued scandals over inflated procurement costs in the defense sector ultimately forced Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov to step down as well. In response to mounting public pressure, the government was forced to revise its approach to defense procurement—leading to the establishment, in December 2023, of the State Rear Operator. This procurement agency is currently undergoing a merger with the Defense Procurement Agency (created in June 2022).

A similar situation arose around the construction of fortifications: media reports raised concerns about the condition of these structures and the possible embezzlement of funds during construction. In response to public outcry, Parliament established a Temporary Special Commission to assess the effectiveness of fund utilization and the quality of work performed. (This commission was later dissolved, and in March 2025, a new investigative — not special — commission with broader powers was formed.) The Temporary Special Commission concluded that there was an urgent need to audit existing fortifications and ensure the effective reuse of materials, which required an expansion of the commission’s mandate.

Another media explosion came with the investigation into Minister of National Unity Oleksii Chernyshov, whom NABU and SAPO accuse of abuse of office and accepting a particularly large bribe in exchange for the unlawful granting of a land use permit in Kyiv for the construction of a residential complex by one of the capital’s developers. 

The Ministry of Energy was not spared from suspicion and became one of the most problematic institutions within the Shmyhal Cabinet. Deputy Minister of Energy Oleh Kheilo was arrested for allegedly accepting a bribe of USD 500,000. Former Deputy Minister Maksym Nemchynov received a notice of suspicion from NABU for allegedly causing multimillion-dollar losses to Centrenergo. Kostyantyn Lohvynenko, former head of Kharkivoblenergo—a company subordinate to the Ministry of Energy — was also detained on suspicion of embezzlement. Scandals also reached Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko himself, who has been accused of systematically promoting individuals personally loyal to him into senior positions at key energy companies, raising concerns about the creation of controlled management chains for political or commercial influence.

The energy sector remains under intense scrutiny. Large-scale Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure exposed serious shortcomings in the government’s strategic planning. One of the most illustrative examples is the failure to implement the three-tier protection project for energy facilities. The government had committed to delivering this strategically critical initiative to safeguard 22 key energy sites. Despite a high level of project readiness and backing from international partners, work was halted due to chronic underfunding. The business community directly blamed Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, whose order reportedly blocked all disbursements and initiated audits that paralyzed implementation.

Equally controversial were developments related to the completion of two units at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant and the import of energy equipment for the project. In May 2025, Parliament adopted a law allowing the purchase of used Russian-origin equipment from Bulgaria for use in the construction of new units at the Khmelnytskyi plant. However, reports later surfaced online that Bulgaria was refusing to sell the reactors to Ukraine due to its own plans to expand domestic nuclear energy capacity.

Implementation of reforms has also fallen behind. Despite the adoption of laws in 2024 to overhaul the Economic Security Bureau (ESB) and the Customs Service, their actual implementation has stalled. Although the selection commission chose a new head of the ESB, the Shmyhal government did not approve the candidacy, effectively blocking the agency’s renewal. The situation is similar with the Customs Service — still considered one of the most corrupt institutions in the country, with the need for reform widely recognized. As such, delays in its restructuring are not only unjustified but also harmful to the state. The government has since postponed the reform timeline, citing a lack of funding.

Conclusions

Denys Shmyhal’s premiership lasted more than five years — the longest in the history of independent Ukraine—and fell during a challenging period marked by the COVID-19 pandemic and full-scale war. The government demonstrated an ability to adapt quickly and implement necessary reforms, particularly in the areas of digitalization, business deregulation, and social support. At the same time, the Cabinet operated without a program approved by Parliament, indicating limited political backing from the legislative branch. Frequent personnel reshuffles, a series of controversial decisions — especially in energy and anti-corruption policy — and the delays in implementing several key reforms left a mixed impression of the government’s overall effectiveness. Thus, the Shmyhal government combined visible achievements with persistent shortcomings — many of which remain to be addressed by future administrations.